ALEXANDER DOWNER – AUSTRALIA’S LONGEST SERVING FOREIGN MINISTER – TONY PARKINSON

By the time Alexander Downer left office, he had eclipsed Bert Evatt and Richard Casey to become Australia’s longest-serving Foreign Affairs Minister. Over nearly 12 years on the world stage, he negotiated with presidents, prime ministers, and powerbrokers to advance and defend Australia’s interests. It was a modern odyssey through wars, upheavals, and shifting alliances, as Downer sought to balance the ambitions of the United States and China while forging stronger ties with Indonesia. On Wednesday 4 February 2026, Tony Parkinson, journalist and author of A Step To The Right: The Life And Times Of Alexander Downer, addressed The Sydney Institute along with The Hon Alexander Downer to reflect on the highlights of Australia’s longest serving foreign minister.

ALEXANDER DOWNER – AUSTRALIA’S LONGEST SERVING FOREIGN MINISTER

TONY PARKINSON

As I find myself advancing in age, and flashing my Seniors Card whenever I’m asked, 20 years doesn’t seem all that long ago to me. It’s not even the span of one generation. Yet I think the book we’re here to discuss tonight reminds us of just how much the world has changed over that time — and maybe how much we as a nation may have changed.

As you’ve heard, this is a book about Alexander Downer’s career as Australia’s longest-serving Foreign Affairs Minister. It is also a book about a very different era of government — a very different approach not only to how Australia was governed, but perhaps also in the values we adopted in our dealings with the rest of the world. You have already heard Alexander articulate eloquently and powerfully tonight some of those values.

It was a time when policy was built on a sturdy philosophical scaffold — where, despite all the challenges of a rapidly changing world, the government brought consistency of principle and purpose to the way Australia positioned itself internationally.

It was an approach grounded meticulously in hard facts and rational thinking. Alexander Downer, like John Howard, had little time for the so-called cultural “vibe” — for the often emotive pleadings and selective moral outrage of what some call the limousine Left.

As Foreign Affairs Minister, Downer wasn’t interested in their posturing. You had to be forensic. You had to be rigorous in your assessments, and firm in your convictions.

You needed a clear-eyed focus on doing the right thing, even if it was not always the popular thing to do.

Most importantly of all, he understood that protecting the political and economic freedoms Australians enjoyed at home required that we also make the case for those same values in our dealings with the wider world. That we must stand up for the rule of law. That we champion democratic freedoms. That we defend intellectual integrity and independence, and promote the principles of economic liberalism. That we stand up resolutely against the intrusions and encroachments — the bullying — of authoritarian governments. And, critically, Australia had to reject, repudiate and resist with all the force we could muster those who supported the use of terror and violent extremism to achieve their political aims.

The Howard Government had its critics, and plenty of them. Some of its foreign policy choices were highly controversial and contentious. But here’s the thing: after almost 12 years in power, I would argue the Howard Government left Australians with a strong sense of clarity, of certainty, about the nation’s direction — and a confidence about their future.

How many of us could say the same today?

This is a book that could, and maybe should, have been written 10 or 15 years ago. Alexander could and probably should have written it himself. He is a talented communicator, a sharp wit and a person of forceful opinions. And he has a treasure trove of highly illuminating anecdotes about his interactions over many years with people in power here and overseas. He had almost 12 years in the job of Foreign Affairs Minister. Unmatched in our nation’s history.

Yet, for all that wealth of knowledge and experience, Alexander Downer didn’t have much inclination when he left Parliament to sit down to write his memoirs. And he hasn’t since.

A little while ago, Josh Frydenberg and I had a chat about this. We agreed it would be a shame if this story was left untold. So, I took on the project — and here we are.

What I set out to record in this book was an upfront account of Alexander’s distinctive contribution to our national life, and to our standing internationally — as a nation, and as a people.

Clearly, it would be pretty much a hollow exercise to attempt this book without Alexander’s direct, unflinching input — about decisions or outcomes, good or bad. He’s provided answers to any questions I have raised, with his own reflections, observations and arguments. He has done so openly, forthrightly.

Alexander was very generous with his time, given he was in Europe or the US during much of this process. He’s kept himself busy since leaving Parliament, including:

• His diplomacy for the UN in Cyprus
• His stint as Australia’s High Commissioner to the UK
• And, most recently, as a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, alongside former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice

He has very much stayed in the play, his finger on the pulse. All of which has added to an enormous bank of knowledge. So, the challenge for me was to explore and explain in some depth Alexander’s often quite unique perspectives on why events in the world unfolded as they did and why things are happening the way they are now.

Alexander’s recollections provide vivid detail on the landmark moments, and some of the critical emerging trends, defining the early twenty-first century:

• the September 11 terror attacks and their aftermath;
• a resurgent, more muscular China;
• This fragmentation of politics we’re seeing in many Western democracies, including our own;
• The return of Russian expansionism in Europe
• and the forlorn attempts, across all those years, to broker a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Let me now drill down into the signature achievements of the Downer era of foreign policy.

I would suggest the reset of Australia’s relations with modern, democratic Indonesia has to count among his great success stories.

Downer had to work through the tremors and trauma of the East Timor crisis — supporting and securing the independence of a tiny island nation while not rupturing relations with Indonesia.

Then came the shock of the Bali bombings. Here, for all the heartbreak in Australia, he was able to create a new era of close co-operation in counter-terrorism with Indonesia and other neighbours. To hunt down the threat of jihadist terror in our region. And, in 2004, there was that massive reconstruction package to help Indonesia through the devastating impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami on its northernmost province of Aceh — a contribution successive Indonesian presidents have described as an act of friendship and generosity they would never forget. Downer worked painstakingly across a decade — and succeeded — in greater far trust and affinity with Australia’s largest and nearest south-east Asian neighbour than at any time in our history.

The big step up in the operating rhythms of the US alliance — post September 11 — was another legacy. There were a lot of critics, and a lot of controversy, about his position on this. But the strengthening of that alliance, forged 75 years ago in this coming September, remains critical today to upholding the strategic balance of power essential to ongoing peace and prosperity in our own region.

Less obvious, but also highly significant, was the development of much closer security ties with Japan. This, too, is crucial to the alliance networks and that regional balance of power, underwritten by the US. Then there were the interventions to stop violence, bloodshed and the breakdown of law and order in East Timor and later the Solomon Islands. And another one that many people forget — his successful brokering of an end to the civil war in Bougainville. We need to remind ourselves: that conflict had cost more lives in a decade, than 30 years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland.

Finally, balancing the relationships with the US and China. The high water mark was probably 2003, when Presidents George W. Bush and Hu Jintao addressed joint sittings of the Australian Parliament on consecutive days. It’s a juggling act that remains the biggest strategic challenge for Australians today — and Alexander has strong views on how this complex equation has to be managed. That’s explored in detail in several chapters of the book.

I would not want anyone to think this book is a vanilla monologue. You will find the book catalogues criticisms of some of Alexander Downer’s most contentious foreign policy decisions, the scrutiny of some of his more controversial judgment calls, and those moments when his slightly outrageous sense of humour got him into terrible trouble.

Alexander would be the first to admit that Western governments badly misread Vladimir Putin. We discuss in the book how, in the euphoria of the immediate Cold War period, the Western alliance let down its guard. In the early 1990s, they signed the treaties of Bucharest and Budapest with the Russians and then assumed the future of Eastern Europe as free and democratic was a done deal. The lessons of previous generations were seemingly put into cold storage. As T.S. Eliot once wrote, albeit it in another context: “We had the experience but missed the meaning.” That proved a very dangerous miscalculation.

Alexander got on okay with Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s longtime (and still the) foreign minister. But the dialogue did become surlier as time went on.

Then he had the experience of sitting pretty much next to Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 — the day the Russian leader launched into an infamous and incendiary tirade against the West and NATO.

Alexander met Putin — formally, in person — at the APEC Summit here in Sydney later that same year. It left him in no doubt that Putin spelt trouble. He found him cold and calculating — as cold as a winter’s day in Moscow, as he put it. A year later, Putin sent tanks into Georgia. Then, he re-inserted Russia into the Middle East by providing military back-up for the murderous Syrian tyrant, Bashar Al-Assad. Then, in 2014, came the annexation of Crimea. And, eight years later, the bloodbath in Ukraine. All along, the NATO powers seemed unable to make the correct threat assessment or to summon the willpower to confront Putin.

This book goes to that broader story of when, where and how the Western alliance seemed to lose its mojo — the capacity and willpower to stand up to those whose actions jeopardise global security.

Iraq is another example. If there had been a united front against Saddam Hussein’s contempt for the rules of international behaviour — if France under Jacques Chirac had not threatened a veto of a final UN Security Council ultimatum in early 2003 — our conversations today might have been very different. But the West splintered over the issue. Europe by and large — with the exception of Britain and Poland — peeled off.

The US-led military action to remove Saddam from power turned out to be brilliant in its execution. The role of our own SAS was a critical — and under-reported — element

in that phase. I hope the book provides some insights which you may find revealing. That said, Alexander has no inhibitions about discussing how the aftermath of the invasion was poorly handled.

There were grievous mistakes by the Coalition Provisional Authority: standing down Iraq’s regular army without pay: a de-Ba’athification process that went too far; and a giant miscalculation in not involving Iraqi Opposition leaders more directly in core decision-making.

These serial blunders planted the seeds of insurgency. This is not hindsight speaking. Alexander sensed some of these dangers at the time, and raised them directly with Colin Powell. Before the invasion. So did the Brits. But the guy appointed to run the show, Jerry Bremer, wouldn’t listen. There also remains, of course, the big question mark over what happened to Iraq’s WMD. That is explored extensively in the book.

People may agree or disagree with some elements of the narrative in this book. They can and will question some of the judgment calls. But, again, I think one advantage of this book being published now is that it allows for a longer-range view. And Alexander can discuss judgments now that he might not have been comfortable discussing quite as openly at the time. He can be very candid. That’s in his nature.

John Howard talks about that in the book. He liked Alexander a lot, for several reasons — loyalty and a strong sense of shared values and convictions were obviously important to him. But another of Alexander’s qualities, as John Howard puts it, was that Downer was always game to say what others were not.

True to form, this book contains some very blunt appraisals.

With that teaser, I thank all of you for being with us tonight.