Speaker
Stephen Conroy
Speech Date
December 20, 2015
Issue
Issue 32
Senator the Hon Stephen Conroy is Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate and Shadow Minister for Defence. In the Rudd Labor Government, Stephen Conroy was the Minister for Communications. Over decades, Labor and non-Labor in Australia have pursued a bi-partisan approach to Australia’s Defence needs and alliances. Senator Conroy’s hopes for Australia’s future defence requirements continued that approach. To spell out how Labor sees the Australia’s priorities in defence, Senator Stephen Conroy addressed The Sydney Institute on Wednesday, 9 December 2015.
DEFENDING AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A CHANGING WORLD
STEPHEN CONROY
I want to thank Gerard Henderson for the kind invitation to address this distinguished gathering tonight. I also want to acknowledge the contribution of The Sydney Institute to Australian public discourse. Gerard and his team should be proud of their efforts to foster informed, independent and non-partisan debate and discussion in this country.
I have now been the Shadow Defence Minister for a little over two years. As I have come to appreciate, there are few portfolios that encompass so much and of such importance. It has been a busy two years for me, but it has also been a period of significant change for Defence.
Defence is undergoing significant reform through the First Principles Review – but implementation is only beginning.
Australia has re-committed personnel to Iraq in significant numbers, and is now conducting air operations over Syria. The next Defence White Paper has been further delayed and major capability decisions remain unresolved. Defence is undergoing significant reform through the First Principles Review – but implementation is only beginning. And, of course, Defence now has its third Minister in just over two years.
In my view, Defence is a uniquely important portfolio for the simple reason that it involves sending our fellow men and women into harm’s way to protect our country from people who would do it harm. Defence is also about preparing ourselves to do just that – to make the best possible decisions, to give our men and women the best kit and training to do the best possible job defending Australia and our citizens from those who would do us harm.
Defence thus sits at a unique intersection of national security, foreign policy, and economic and industry policy.
Tonight, I will touch on just a few reasons why Defence is so important. I intend to focus on three issues. The first is to explain Labor’s approach to Defence – to outline those principles that inform my approach to this portfolio. The second is to describe what I consider to be the key security dynamics evident across the globe and in our region. And, finally, to outline some of the force structure, capability and organisational challenges that lie ahead for Defence.
Labor’s approach to Defence
A central tenet of Labor’s approach to Defence is the principle of national self-reliance.
A central tenet of Labor’s approach to Defence is the principle of national self-reliance. As an independent nation, Australia’s armed forces need to be able to defend our nation without relying on others. This is an important element of ensuring that Australia is able to pursue its national interests without the undue influence of others. But it should not be confused with notions of Australia “going it alone”.
Australia has benefited enormously from a system of institutions, laws, norms and ideals that emerged from the ashes of World War II. Institutions like the United Nations, and laws like the Law of the Sea, that provide the framework for our security today – the security that has underpinned our national prosperity.
As I have said in the past, Labor recognises that Australia cannot act in isolation –
that the security challenges of our time require coordinated, international responses – and that Australia cannot be safe if we are surrounded by insecurity. That is why Labor believes that Australia must continue to invest in, and protect, the international system from which we have so benefitted. Only through these efforts can we ultimately provide for and protect our nation and our people.
The other element of Labor’s approach to Defence, and national security more broadly, is bipartisanship.
The other element of Labor’s approach to Defence, and national security more broadly, is bipartisanship. Labor’s Shadow Foreign Minister, Tanya Plibersek, gave an eloquent account of our views on bipartisanship earlier this year, so I do not propose to revisit this issue at length.
But I do want to make a few general points. Labor strongly believes that the best outcomes for Australia’s national security are achieved through consensus and bipartisanship.
Our nation’s security must be devoid of political gamesmanship. This is a genuine commitment by Labor and, to its credit, the Government has usually reciprocated. I have seen some commentary of late that suggests that bipartisanship could become a byword for political expediency.
I firmly reject this. Labor does not – and will not – offer our bipartisan support lightly. And while we strive for bipartisanship, there are matters on which Labor disagrees with the Government – such as the Future Submarines. But, on the whole, we believe a consensus driven approach is the best way to protect our nation and national interests.
Global challenges
The security challenges across the globe are numerous and complex – and the post-Cold War peace dividend seems like an increasingly distant memory.
I see two main security trends at play. The first is ungoverned spaces and fragile states. Instead of the hoped for end to the 9/11 decade, extremist groups continue to take advantage of ungoverned spaces and weak states to establish safe-havens from which they export violence. This is most obvious in the Middle East, but it is occurring across the globe, including in Africa and Asia.
Radicalised non-state actors are a new normal – and, as a result, once again Australia has committed significant numbers of military personnel to the Middle East.
Radicalised non-state actors are a new normal – and, as a result, once again Australia has committed significant numbers of military personnel to the Middle East. We have put our personnel in harm’s way to help those in need and to prevent a despicable terrorist group from doing us harm at home. These non-state actors pose a different challenge to traditional actors – and our responses, therefore, must be different.
In any confrontation on a traditional battlefield, our military forces far outmatch these groups. But they do not wage war in a traditional sense and, as a result, military force is but one – albeit important – tool that must be brought to bear. Nevertheless, these groups are likely to remain a central reason for the deployment of our forces to far-flung places for the foreseeable future.
As this audience would be aware, Labor has provided bipartisan support for Australia’s assistance to Iraq and, more recently, air operations across Iraq’s border with Syria. We believe it is in the national interest to contribute to the campaign against Daesh, although we have been upfront about our concerns with the coherence of the strategy guiding the international effort.
Some of this criticism, frankly, appears to be motived more by a desire to achieve political change in Washington than in Damascus.
Labor is not alone in its concerns – and there has been much criticism in recent months of the international strategy in Iraq and Syria. Some of this criticism, frankly, appears to be motived more by a desire to achieve political change in Washington than in Damascus.
Yet it is true that, to date, the international effort has not achieved all that we might hope. But we should not overlook some of the successes. The briefings I have received indicate that Daesh’s aggressive advance in Iraq has been largely halted, and in some instances, reversed. Our training efforts – which will ultimately help Iraq protect itself – are making progress. But our role is a supporting role.
The key to success will be a demonstrable commitment by Iraq’s leaders to overcoming sectarian divides and to unite for a common goal. I believe success is Iraq is achievable – but only Iraq’s people and their leaders can provide the fundamental ingredient for success. Meanwhile, the situation in Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe and a threat to global security.
Former US commander and CIA chief, David Petraeus, has described the crisis in Syria as a geopolitical Chernobyl. Of a population of 22 million, over 4 million Syrians are now refugees and over 7 million are internally displaced. This, in a country smaller than my home state of Victoria.
As we have seen, tragically, in the streets of Paris, the situation in Syria is a serious security threat that stretches beyond its borders. Much of the recent debate in Australia has focussed on “tactical” questions of whether we should contribute more personnel – or different personnel – to this theatre.
We should instead focus our national debate on what we hope to achieve – on our strategic objectives – and then set about the task of determining what forces to commit. We must also acknowledge that a durable solution will demand more than just military intervention – it will require diplomatic effort and a political solution.
As Peter Leahy has argued – Middle Eastern countries must be at the forefront of solving the Middle East’s problems.
There will not be a lasting solution absent an agreed way forward between the major players involved in the conflict. And it cannot simply be a solution decided upon in Washington, Moscow or Canberra. As Peter Leahy has argued – Middle Eastern countries must be at the forefront of solving the Middle East’s problems.
If an agreed solution ultimately calls for additional international contributions, then that is something Australia should consider – and Labor will be a constructive partner in those discussions. But, as a starting point, the international community should be encouraging the Arab states with the means to do so to secure a post‑conflict Syria.
Shifting power relations
Ungoverned spaces and weak states are one of two key security trends – the other is shifting power relations. It is in our region, to our north, where the greatest shifts are occurring – a generational transformation is underway as decades of stability lead to enormous economic growth.
In a post-GFC world in which developed economies have struggled to grow, Asia has become the world’s economic engine. But as economic weight has shifted to our region, so too has strategic competition increased.
Among the members of ASEAN, military spending between 2010 and 2014 is estimated to have risen by an average of 37.6 per cent.
Asia’s economic rise has led to a period of intense military build-up and modernisation. Among the members of ASEAN, military spending between 2010 and 2014 is estimated to have risen by an average of 37.6 per cent. The Japanese Ministry of Defence’s budget request for 2016 is the largest in Japan’s history.
South Korea is planning to raise defence spending by 3.6 per cent next year. And while China’s military spending is hard to gauge with accuracy, the trend is undeniable. The past five years have seen double digit increases, with a declared defence budget of around US$145 billion dollars – the second highest in the world. Of themselves, these trends are neither surprising nor a cause for alarm.
It is understandable that countries with healthy economies will want to modernise their militaries – and having more capable militaries in the region that can contribute to common security goals is desirable. But, coupled with a lack of transparency and historical grievances, these trends could have unforeseen consequences.
In a period of flux, it would be comforting to assume that the multilateral system that has served us well to date will be a stabilising force. But as DFAT Secretary Peter Varghese has noted, multilateralism is under intense pressure and is not delivering on our expectations. In Mr Varghese’s words:“… emerging powers are no longer willing to accept rules they did not write or outcomes which they perceive do not take their interests into account.”
For a middle power like Australia, for whom the international system provides a means to project our interests beyond our relative strategic weight, this is a concerning prospect.
As a result, the future of global leadership could be described as contested. For a middle power like Australia, for whom the international system provides a means to project our interests beyond our relative strategic weight, this is a concerning prospect.
A strong alliance
Notwithstanding the shifts underway, for the foreseeable future, the United States will remain the preeminent global and regional power. Ever since Labor Prime Minister John Curtin ‘”ooked to America” during our darkest hours, Australia’s alliance with the United States has underpinned our national security settings.
Labor strongly believes that this special relationship remains firmly in our national interest – and that an engaged and active United States is a common good for our region. Our alliance is an art, not a science – it is a relationship that is not defined by a precise formula or quid pro quo – and it is more than the sum of its parts.
It is also, in my view, a relationship that requires constant investment, innovation and reinvention to meet new challenges. This is particularly true of our defence cooperation under the alliance – cooperation that is increasingly defined by common and shared platforms and systems – whether through platforms like the Joint Strike Fighter or Growler aircraft or systems like our AEGIS-equipped Air Warfare Destroyers.
it was under the Gillard Labor Government that Australia and the United States agreed to the Force Posture Initiatives in our north.
Labor has been at the forefront of evolving the alliance to respond to new challenges. This includes extending the ANZUS treaty to cover cyber threats, and increased bilateral cooperation on space. And it was under the Gillard Labor Government that Australia and the United States agreed to the Force Posture Initiatives in our north.
These initiatives will eventually see a Marine Air Ground Task Force rotating through the Northern Territory, and US fighter, bomber and tanker aircraft making regular visits to our northern air bases. And as we look to the future, the initiatives provide an umbrella for further enhancing practical cooperation – including, potentially, naval cooperation.
Over time, I would like to see the initiatives evolve – to be seen less as separate air, ground and, perhaps, naval initiatives, and more as a comprehensive platform for high-end, integrated, joint activities with the United States – as a platform for bilateral defence cooperation that strengthens our operational capabilities and deepens our ability to respond to regional contingencies in a period of uncertainty.
This proud Labor legacy holds the promise of a new era of cooperation under the alliance – as well as a platform for increased cooperation with other partners in our region. Yet, the initiatives seem to have stalled under the current government, with prospects for further enhancement distant.
I encourage the government not to let discussions about dollars and cents unduly delay initiatives that are of strategic benefit to our nation and the basis for our alliance cooperation for decades to come.
There are some understandable reasons for this – costly infrastructure upgrades will be needed to fully realise the initiatives. But I encourage the government not to let discussions about dollars and cents unduly delay initiatives that are of strategic benefit to our nation and the basis for our alliance cooperation for decades to come.
China
China’s rise is at the centre of changes occurring in our region – it is not the only factor, but it is the most prominent. And its relationship with the United States will be the defining feature of this century.
Labor strongly supports the peaceful rise of China. China’s transformation has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. As our relationship with China matures and deepens over time, so too should we expand the links between our defence forces and personnel.
We conduct an annual bilateral Defence Strategic Dialogue with China, and some limited military training and exercising, including naval live fire exercises. We can, and we must, continue to build on this cooperation. That is how we build the people-to-people and organisational linkages that are so important to mutual understanding and effective cooperation.
While others have argued that China’s rise will lead to an inevitable ‘choice’ for Australia between our alliance with the United States and our growing relationship with China – I disagree.
I believe that we can continue to invest in our alliance with the United States while we simultaneously seek to build cooperation with China.
I reject the notion that there must be a binary, zero sum “choice”. We are, in the words of Defence Secretary Dennis Richardson, “friends with both, allies with one”. I believe that we can continue to invest in our alliance with the United States while we simultaneously seek to build cooperation with China.
It is important to acknowledge that our relationships with both differ. Our relationship with the United States is long and deep. Our relationship with modern China is only just developing. It is a relationship centred on trade that, I hope, will develop over time into a rounded and mature relationship as trust and confidence builds. We can expect China to want a greater say in existing global and regional arrangements and institutions – and to promote new arrangements and institutions which reflect its interests.
But trust and confidence will also require China to demonstrate a commitment to supporting the international system of laws and norms from which both our countries have directly benefitted.
South China Sea
Nowhere is it more apparent that the international system is under pressure and in need of support than in our region – particularly in the South China Sea. As Bill Shorten has said, Australia is not a disinterested observer in this matter. As a maritime trading nation, we have a direct interest in freedom of navigation and are the beneficiaries of an international system of laws and norms.
Like all nations, we have a right of passage through the oceans and skies of the region, in accordance with international law. We do not take a position on the competing claims
Like all nations, we have a right of passage through the oceans and skies of the region, in accordance with international law. We do not take a position on the competing claims – whether they be the claims of China, the Philippines, Vietnam – or any other claimant. It is important to acknowledge that China is not the only country that has sought to change the facts on the ground in the South China Sea. But China’s reclamation efforts are an order of magnitude beyond those of any other claimant and have been a catalyst for increased concern.
China is estimated to have reclaimed more than 2900 acres in the area – around 17 times more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the past 40 years. It has frustrated efforts in ASEAN to finalise a Code of Conduct, whilst also refusing to participate in the case that the Philippines has brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. This does not excuse the actions of other claimants – all must cease their efforts to change the facts on the ground and work towards a solution that is consistent with international law.
I believe that other likeminded countries, including Australia, also have an obligation to act in support of international law and norms in the South China Sea.
Our interest – Australia’s interest – is in supporting the international system. For this reason, Labor welcomes the recent activities by the United States in the South China Sea as an important affirmation of international law and norms. I believe that other likeminded countries, including Australia, also have an obligation to act in support of international law and norms in the South China Sea.
These actions must not be directed at any single claimant. And I would encourage all nations to become parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including the United States, as a confidence building measure and further step towards a normative rules based approach to resolving disputes.
The future force
I would like to conclude this evening with a few observations about future organisational and force structure challenges for Defence. I started my remarks by explaining why national self-reliance is a key tenet of Labor’s approach to Defence. We recognise that self-reliance can only be achieved by having certainty in Defence funding – the certainty necessary for Defence to make substantial investments in personnel and capability.
Labor has previously committed to increasing Defence funding towards a target of two per cent of GDP. And earlier this year, Bill Shorten urged the government to set out a credible trajectory to two per cent of GDP in its forthcoming White Paper that is capable of bipartisan support.
Since then, the White Paper has been delayed and the government is yet to explain how it will achieve its funding target. I hope this does not portend a diminution in the government’s commitment because Defence needs certainty to prepare for a range of challenges now and into the future.
As the region modernises, maintaining Australia’s capability edge will become more challenging. At the same time, Australian forces are increasingly required to operate across the spectrum – from high-end counter-terrorism operations to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
If Australia is to meet the security challenges I have outlined this evening, we need a force at the cutting edge of electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and research and technology.
If Australia is to meet the security challenges I have outlined this evening, we need a force at the cutting edge of electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and research and technology. We will need a defence force that is networked from satellite to soldier, and equipped with fully integrated and secure systems. And we will need to be able to manage data on a huge scale, while maintaining its integrity and security.
Meanwhile, emerging areas like space and cyber will continue to pose new challenges. Indeed, as we were reminded in the past week with the hacking of the Bureau of Meteorology, others will use cyber space as a new attack vector and as a way to reveal our secrets.
Across the three services, our defence force is undergoing a significant program of modernisation and change. Navy is in the process of renewing its fleet – there is hardly a class of ship that will not be replaced or upgraded in the coming decades. Under Plan BEERSHEBA, Army has been transitioning from three specialised Brigades to a balanced force of three multi-role Brigades. And the Air Force is undergoing significant modernisation, with new capabilities like the P8s, Growler and Joint Strike Fighter progressively entering into service.
Looking ahead, I see the next wave of change being driven by increased use of unmanned systems across the air and sea – and, potentially, land – domains.
Looking ahead, I see the next wave of change being driven by increased use of unmanned systems across the air and sea – and, potentially, land – domains. For now, remotely piloted systems will complement crewed platforms – but the long-term trend is likely to see automated and remotely piloted systems take an increasingly prominent role in force design.
Some of these systems will very likely be armed, which will pose new legal and ethical challenges as we develop methods of use that accord with community expectations.
But the most pressing challenge facing Defence is integration. This has been recognised by successive governments and by Defence. That is why Labor has been supportive of key elements of the First Principles Review process – particularly the “One Defence” model. I see merit in a strong strategic centre in Defence and a greater degree of contestability in capability decision-making.
Put simply, there is no point having the best helicopter for Army, if it cannot work effectively on Navy’s Landing Helicopter Dock ships.
These steps, I hope, will help ensure that decision-making focuses on enterprise-wide rather than Service-specific objectives. Put simply, there is no point having the best helicopter for Army, if it cannot work effectively on Navy’s Landing Helicopter Dock ships. As with all reform, the proof will be in implementation – and much of the hard work arising from the First Principles Review lies ahead.
Labor will be watching closely as Defence implements the First Principles Review. Consistent with our approach to date, Labor will be constructive participant in this process. As we will in the broader debate around Australia’s national security.
That is, quite rightly, what the Australian public expects from its political leaders. And it is an expectation Labor will continue to fulfil.