Non-Muslim Minorities and The Arab Spring

Lydia Khalil was born in Cairo and is a native Arabic speaker. She is an internationally recognised expert in international politics and security and currently a visiting fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and an adjunct lecturer at the University of Sydney. Lydia Khalil also served as a political advisor for the US Department of Defence in Iraq, where she worked closely with Iraqi officials on political negotiations and constitutional drafting and has worked as a counterterrorism advisor for the New York Police Department and in the Office of Homeland Security in the White House. On Monday 13 August 2012, Lydia Khalil addressed The Sydney Institute to discuss critical issues in the Middle-East, focusing on the travails of non-Muslim minorities in the region. 

NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING 

LYDIA KHALIL

 Thank you very much Gerard for the kind introduction and the opportunity to address you today. It’s really an honour to speak before such a distinguished and good-looking group here at The Sydney Institute.

Our topic today is critically important to the future of the modern Middle-East, but one which is often overlooked. It’s a testament to The Sydney Institute that it is highlighting this topic –  the future of non-Muslim minorities in the region.

Since the uprisings that rocked the Middle-East, almost two years ago now, the focus has understandably been on stabilising the region after the entire foundations on which it has functioned – a conglomerate of dictatorships – crumbled. The key now is for governments around the world, including Australia, to try to understand and to build relations with the new power players that are in the region. Obviously, that includes many Islamist parties that have come to the fore.

The paradigm of autocracies who have maintained regional stability and relations with the West, at the expense of genuine governance, is gone. But there’s a big question looming for us now and that is, “What’s next?” We don’t know what the new paradigm is going to be. What will replace the old one? Will we see successive forms of Islamic government? Will these be a secular, democratic, pluralistic society that the original revolutionaries had envisioned, and the mass protests demanded? Or are we going to see a return to neo-autocracies and dominance by military councils? We just don’t know right now. It could well take years and, even decades, to sort out this question.

What we do know, though, is that uprisings and revolutions are never linear; they’re always messy. And the intentions of those that began them rarely, if ever, end with the result they had intended. When observing the Arab revolutions, I am reminded of a very relevant quote from Pierre Vergniaud, a lawyer and a statesman during the time of the French Revolution. He said, “Citizens, we have reason to fear that the revolution, like Saturn, will successively devour all of its children.”

If we apply this sentiment to the Arab uprisings, the Shabab, the Arab youth at the forefront of these revolutionary movements who bravely ushered in eras of Arab revolt in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, have pretty much been elbowed out of the way by more organised Islamist forces and the leftovers of previous regimes. Those groups have deftly inserted themselves into the opening that the youth fought so hard to carve out. The original revolutionaries managed to overthrow old leaders; but, unfortunately, they were unprepared and unable to translate their revolutionary zeal and protests into real political power.

So, one and a half years after the events of the Arab Spring, the youthful optimism and the energy that transformed the region has mostly gone. In its place is a grey pale of uncertainty and the instability of transition. What many people are asking now is, “Has the Arab Spring settled into a prolonged Arab Winter?”

During these tumultuous times of transition, minorities – and in the Middle-East that usually means non-Muslim minorities – are especially vulnerable. The Middle-East has a long history as a crossroads of many different religious traditions. But its diversity over the decades has been slowly eroding. Even the tenor of the dominant religion of the region (which is Islam) has changed – it’s become more rigid, more puritanical. A lot of that has to do with the influence and money coming out of established and puritanical governments in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. Unfortunately, non-Muslim minorities have been the first to flee the region against this backdrop of political upheaval and violence. They have also been first targeted by both authorities new and old.

Non-Muslim minorities have usually played contradictory roles in Middle-Eastern societies, where they are both marginalised while, at the same time, a select sub-stratum occupies very influential positions. In Egypt, for example, you have Coptic Christians making up the most marginalised community of all, a community called the Zabbaleen who are trash collectors, who literally live on garbage heaps on the margins of society, and who are Christians. But there are also Coptic families, like the Sawiris family, who head Orascom and who are responsible for the largest private sector employment in the country. They are worth about $2.5 billion. The chairman, Naguib Sawiris, has even started his own political party called the Free Liberal Egyptians Party.

Both poles of non-Muslim minorities have been pressured since the Egyptian uprisings. Churches and communities of the Zabbaleen have been attacked by violent mobs on many, many occasions and a rich man like Naguib Sawiris is also not protected. He, for example, was the target of a lawsuit filed by Salafist parties for purportedly insulting Islam, when he tweeted a picture of Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse dressed in traditional Islamic garb. So neither the marginalised nor the influential minority are spared from pressure.

At the moment you have a situation in the Middle-East where political freedoms are expanding but where, paradoxically, religious freedoms and tolerance are contracting. The fact is that an upswing of political participation in the Middle-East could very well mean Islamist populism instead of a vibrant civil society. It could mean tyranny of the majority instead of the true pluralism that we often associate with democracy; the pluralism that guarantees the rights of all of its citizens.

We have only to look back on history to see example after example of minority elements within society penalised or discriminated against through the democratic process. The focus of many Western governments has understandably been on the role of Islamist political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and those groups that are inspired by them, and how we can adjust our foreign policy to more effectively engage with them. Islamist parties are the parties who gained the most political power after the uprising. They’ve come to power in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen. They’re also a significant presence in Libya, Jordan and Syria. So, it’s understandable that the foreign policy of Western governments, like the United States and Australia, has to re-orient itself in some way to deal with these new power brokers. Because it’s these Islamist parties, more than anyone else, more than the youthful revolutionaries who began the whole process of change, who will be responsible for shaping the new Middle-East.

Western governments haven’t had a very good track record of establishing relationships with these groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. The relationships are marked by a deep seated suspicion of their true commitment to democratic values. The opaqueness of the organisations themselves, whose internal workings are often secretive and hierarchical, makes transport engagement difficult. Western governments can’t make the same mistake they made when they dealt with the region’s old dictators.

Many Western governments dealt with dictators because it was the easy thing to do; they did this to address and balance real political concerns while holding their noses and ignoring their autocratic excesses. Now, governments might be doing the same thing when they deal with Islamist parties. They may be tempted to focus on establishing relationships with these new power brokers to guarantee short term interests while ignoring their values at the expense of long term interests.

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton hit a spot of trouble in this regard during her recent visit to Egypt for appearing to do such a thing. During a routine foreign trip she spent time with many of the political parties in question and spent a significant amount of time with the Muslim Brotherhood. But it caused a growing conspiracy theory in Egypt. If any of you know the region, you know that conspiracy theories flourish in that part of the world. The conspiracy asserted that that the United States was colluding with the Muslim Brotherhood, to help them take over power, and pressuring the military councils to step back. This view has taken a very strong hold among Egyptian liberals and Coptic Christians even though the Secretary has repeatedly advocated for religious freedom and pluralism.

The Egyptian Coptic community is one of the oldest Christian communities; the Egyptian Copts have always been a very vital part of Egypt. But, since the rise of Islamist influence in the 1970s, they’ve seen their standing within Egyptian society decline. Last year’s revolution promised to usher in a new Egypt, but for Coptic Christians it’s increasingly looking like an Egypt that does not include them. Copts now face what many Egyptians faced under successive authoritarian regimes since Gamal Abdel Nasser – unemployment, lack of opportunity, government repression. They also face the added burden of semi-sanctioned discrimination that has become pervasive across all sectors of Egyptian society.

With the Muslim Brotherhood in power and Salafist parties growing in influence, the worst fear of Copts in Egypt seem to be coming true. Salafists in Egypt have been gaining ground steadily and they have open hostility towards Copts and they make no secret of the fact that they should be treated – they the Copts – as second class citizens and even forced to pay a special tax as non-Muslims living in a predominantly Muslim country.

For years, the Muslim Brotherhood has issued ambiguous statements on their views of Copts in society. Ideologically, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist parties believe that Egypt should be governed by Sharia law. This leaves little room for the protection of minority rights. Though the Muslim Brotherhood’s freedom and justice party has opened up its membership to Coptic members, the official slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood remains “Our laws are objective, the prophet is our leader, the Quran is our law, Jihad is our way and dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope”.

Because of their long history in dealing with the Brotherhood, most Copts dismiss these overtures to join their party and remained distrustful of the group’s intentions regarding future governance. The calls for dialogues with Copts is viewed less about a genuine shift in their democratic values and more about window dressing to improve their image with secular parties and in the West. And this position is formed by many decades of experience with discriminatory practices of the Muslim Brotherhood held against Copts currently and in the past. So there’s no denying that there was, and is, a growing culture in Egypt that’s decidedly hostile to Copts.

Coptic students routinely face discrimination in universities, as job applicants are often overlooked in favour of Muslim ones and within state institutions Copts rarely rise to positions of authority, especially in the military and security services which if you see following events in Egypt are very, very important actors. Coptic businesses and places of worship are routinely attacked.

During the last year’s revolutionary process, Copts played a very early and active role. Along with most other Egyptians, Copts were dissatisfied with what Egypt had become and they longed for a better society but there was a caveat to the sentiment – though Copts were persecuted under Mubarak as well, even more so than their Muslim compatriots there is a general attitude among the community that the Devil you know is better than the Devil you don’t know.

Mubarak, some argued, at least kept Islamist forces in check. He didn’t allow them to openly operate and the security service was very aggressive in pursuing and jailing radical Islamists. However, this ignored the fact that Mubarak played a very clever sectarian game to remain in power. Despite the security service’s actions against radical Islamists, violent acts against Copts actually increased and did not decrease under Mubarak. He allowed radical Islamists room to permeate Egypt’s institutions. He also positioned himself as the only force who could secure the Copts. Never mind that the Mubarak regime ruthlessly clamped down on any viable secular opposition to oppose them.

Since the revolutionary protests, the wishes of Copts for a better society and indeed many of their Muslim compatriots haven’t come ture and attacks against Copts have increased. For the first time ever the US commission on international freedom designated Egypt as a country of particular concern in the latest report in 2011. According to the US CIF chairman, “In the case of Egypt, instances of severe religious freedom violations engaged in and tolerated by the government have increased dramatically since the release of last year’s report with violence including murder escalating against Coptic Christians and other religious minorities.” Since President Mubarak resigned from office, in February, such violence continues without the government bringing perpetrators to justice.

There have been numerous incidents of violence against Copts since the revolution, almost too many to name. But there are three that stand out in my mind. The first is the Maspero Massacre, perpetrated not by Muslim extremists but by the Egyptian government itself, and the Egyptian army. Military forces opened fire on peaceful Coptic protesters who were demonstrating against a slow security response to an attack against the church. The army killed 28 people. In addition, they encouraged their fellow Egyptian citizens to fight with the military to push back what they described as violent Coptic hoards. Video evidence clearly shows army tanks running over peaceful protesters and killing unarmed, peaceful civilians.

Another instance, beginning on 15 April, over 10,000 demonstrators of mostly Salafist background, protested in the Southern province of Qena against an appointment of a new governor, Emad Mikhail, a Copt. The previous governor, Magdy Ayoub, was also a Copt. The protestors blocked main roads, stopped buses to separate men and women passengers and disrupted the main rail route from Upper Egypt for about eight days. There were threats to ban Mikhail from the province, even to kill him.

It is true that many of the demonstrators were, protesting the fact that Mikhail was a lackey of the old Mubarak regime. But the majority of the protesters were Salafists who protested loudly that, “A Copt won’t implement Islamic law.” Also that, “We will never be ruled by a Christian governor.” They called Mikhail an “infidel pig”. The armed forces refused to intervene and the interim prime minister at the time, Essam Sharaf, said he would freeze the appointment for three months.

In Qena, also, in March 2011 a group of extremists cut off the ear of a Coptic Christian. The group claimed that it was applying Sharia punishment. The Christian man agreed to be compensated during a subsequent reconciliation session instead of pursuing criminal charges, because the extremists allegedly threatened his family.

The third instance, in Egypt, occurred in January 2012 when a group of radical Islamists attempted to empty an entire village near Alexandria of its Coptic population – some 62 families. The Copts were attacked by a group of around 3000 extremist Muslims, led by Salafist leaders, who set fire to Coptic houses and shops. This violence was sparked by allegations of a Muslim barber who claimed that a Coptic man had illegal photos of a Muslim woman on his cell phone. The Coptic man Mourad, who had denied the charges, turned himself over to the police in fear of his life. Muslims set fire to his house and his shop and his whole family was forced to leave the village. Mourad is still under police custody. The woman involved denied the allegations and, upon examining his phone, there was no evidence of any of these photos. No arrests were made.  Mourad had another reconciliation meeting, compensation was refused. Innocent Coptic victims, who supported him, ere faced mob violence, and had their homes and businesses destroyed.

Following these unfruitful reconciliation meetings, crowds of Muslims attacked another village. They set fire to three Christian homes under the eyes of the security forces. Instead of arresting the perpetrators who had destroyed houses, property and businesses, the authorities issued arrest warrants for the sons of very wealthy Coptic merchants living in the area. These Copts were then accused of firing weapons while their homes were under attack. Though the Coptic men denied these allegations, and no one was injured, during yet another reconciliation meeting Salafist representatives demanded the eviction of all of the Coptic families. Many of the Coptic families agreed to hand over their businesses and their property for fear of future reprisals and also because they were refused police protection.

This is what’s happening in Egypt with the Muslim and the Coptic communities. Egypt is the most pressing and obvious situation for minority rights in the new Middle-East. This is because of the relatively large numbers of Coptic Christians in the area. They are the largest minority in the Middle-East. The concern for minorities is also crucial in Egypt because of the prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood and the fact that Egypt, as one of the major countries in the Middle-East, often acts as a bellwether for other countries in the region.

But the challenges of non-Muslim minorities go far beyond Egypt. Syria, for example, is steadily deteriorating. What began as political protests against the Assad regime has now morphed into a full blown sectarian civil war of the style of Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s. Syria has always been a rich mix of the many diverse religions of the area – Jews, Sunni, Shiites, Baha’is, Christians of varying stripes, many of whom still speak Aramaic, the ancient language of the New Testament. These groups have worshipped side by side relatively freely in Syria over decades. But the Assad regime, of both father and son, saw an Alawite minority ruling over a Sunni majority population. Though people were free to worship as they wished, political repression was rife. This created a fundamental resentment, especially among the majority Sunni community. And it fostered extremists in the area.

Since the uprising in Syria started – 14 months ago – the relatively peaceful co-existence between different sects has shattered. Political repression of the past has developed into violent sectarian tensions, leaving an armed opposition movement, dominated by the Sunni majority and fighting against the Assad regime and a besieged Alawite community, still supporting the current government for fear of reprisals should the government fall. Non Muslim minorities, such as Christians and Jews, are caught and squeezed in the middle.

Sunni extremists and a growing presence of foreign fighters of the Al-Qaeda variety now dominate the Syrian armed opposition making fear of reprisals very real. Al-Qaeda fighters from Iraq have joining the armed opposition and foreign fighters from around the region are also in the fray. According to some reports, there are about 45 foreign fighters operating in Idlib alone. Fighters are coming from extremist groups around the region including Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Jordan. Many of those who oppose the Assad regime are, however, reluctant to support the armed opposition because of the growth of religious extremism and the uncertain future they face if the Assad regime falls and Sunni extremists take over government.

Now that the Syrian conflict is a sectarian civil war, the Syrian conflict is no longer a popular uprising against a despotic government in support of greater democracy. The Assad government is relying on an Alawite militia called the Shabiha to suppress the uprisings, with many of their group making targeted violent attacks against Sunni villages and civilians.

The armed opposition now defines itself through religious language and ideology. They have also committed violent and unprovoked attacks against Alawite and Christian civilians. Much of this push towards extremist religious ideology is not inherently or indigenously Syrian. In fact, it’s driven by the need for outside funding and arms. Much of it is coming from well established Muslim networks tied to Salafist organisations from abroad. Invoking Islam, particularly the more rigid and extremist brand, is also a useful way of instilling discipline among the fighters. As one Syrian rebel commander said, “Religion is the best way to impose discipline; even if the fighter is not religious, he can’t disobey a religious order in battle.”

So the bottom line is that the regime retaliates more brutally against the resistance and relies on outside help from the likes of fellow Shia powers, such as Hezbollah, Iran while the armed opposition radicalises and identifies even more strongly with extremists, straining and framing the opposition against the Assad regime as a jihad. In this environment secular and moderate voices are being sidelined.

Syria is becoming increasingly fragmented and the prospect for it to continue to be a pluralistic society where its many groups can coexist peacefully is waning. Especially since Syria is also fast becoming a proxy war for the region’s powers – along the lines of Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s.

Until now, Syria’s Christians have lived a relatively good life in the Middle-East, as far as Christian minorities go. There has been no restriction on their right to worship; they have enjoyed good relationships with their Muslim compatriots. But the civil war has them squeezed between an unpopular and repressive regime and a rebel movement with extremist undertones.

The community is being pressured to take sides, but neither side is an attractive option. Those Christians who have supported the regime have faced reprisals. One family sheltered regime forces in its homes, resulting in a backlash against all Christians in the area by rebel forces. The town has been completely emptied of Christians. Conversely, when one priest helped evacuate wounded rebels from the area, government soldiers killed him using snipers. Syrian Christians have only to look at what happened in neighbouring Christian communities in Iraq.

In response, many are fleeing, so far to other areas in Syria or to Lebanon. But permanent displacement is a very real prospect. The Middle-East over the past 18 years has gone from being one of the most diverse regions in the world to being one of the most monolithic. The region was the birth place of three of the world’s major religions – Islam, Christianity and Judaism. But now it only seems to have room for one. Middle-Eastern Christians have been immigrating to Western countries in droves, especially to the US, Canada and Australia. All of this uncertainty following the Arab uprising has caused a flood of minority populations from around the region.

The sectarian violence since 2003 in Iraq resulted in what the UNHCR has called the largest dislocation in the Middle-East since the Palestinian flight following the creation of the state of Israel. The greatest impact has been on Iraq’s religious minorities: Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis and others. Some 90 per cent of these groups have been displaced. This is an outstanding number. One unfortunate result could be that the religious communities and their customs and languages could disappear forever. Since the Arab uprisings, thousands more of Coptic Christians, Syrian Christians, whatever miniscule community of Jews is left, Baha’is and other minorities have fled and are seeking asylum elsewhere.

This issue of religious conversion is also an important one in the Middle-East. The push for political freedom has not been matched by an increase in religious freedom. This includes the status of converts. Conversion away from Islam is considered apostasy and is often punishable by prison or death. Proselytising other religions beside Islam is practically out of the question. Converts to non-Muslim minority faiths are often more discriminated against and the subject of violence than those born into minority religions. Converts in Yemen, for example, have been jailed and harassed. Converts in Egypt face a life lived in secrecy. The same is true for many others in the region.

To conclude. Given all that’s happening in the Middle-East and the moment, the travails of minority groups can seem very trivial in comparison to the greater upheaval that’s happening in the region. But this issue of minority rights goes to the heart of what kind of new society and government is going to emerge in the region, in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings.

As Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said, “Religious freedom is not just about religion. It’s also about the right of people to think what they want, say what they think and come together in fellowship without the state looking over their shoulder.” Religious freedom speaks to the capacity of the individual to define him or herself and their role within the community. That includes the choice to be an unbeliever. In the Middle-East, identifying as an unbeliever is often far worse than being a member of a minority community.

In a society that disrespects religious freedom, or the freedom of thought of others, tends to bring out the worst tendencies in its citizens. The belief that there’s only one true way to think and to be engenders hatred and violence at worst, and intolerance and arrogance at best. It stifles the growth of the body politic, it appeals to our basest instinct of the fear of the other and our need for certainty while it absents compassion. The charges of apostasy and blasphemy are used to stifle debate and dissent of any kind. Interestingly, these charges are often levelled at those who are normally part of the majority. In the Middle-East, those who dare to even divert slightly from the orthodox majority opinion are also singled out for persecution, Muslims included. We shouldn’t forget that religious extremists often target members of their own religion just as much, if not more, than others. Religious freedom is respected in Australia and it’s important that we don’t ignore or brush aside the fact that this is not the case in many other countries.

This issue will affect how Australia forms its foreign policy and its relationship toward the Middle-East. The upheaval in the region will create more asylum seekers and displace more people. It will affect the ever important asylum seeker debate in Australia. Especially, as Australia decides how and whether to increase its intake of asylum seekers and how it goes about doing so. It will impact the advocacy of non-government organisations and aid and aid work out of Australia.

So, how Australia chooses to deal with other countries that don’t espouse the same values, and that paradox of non-pluralistic democracies will severely stretch and challenge our governments. Australia’s response will impact on our society even more than it impacts on the societies in the Middle-East. How we respond to intolerance elsewhere and whether, or how, we advocate for greater freedoms elsewhere will define our own values and how Australia balances this with other foreign policy and national security priorities will send a very clear signal.