Remembering The Dismissal

Paul Kelly is editor-at-large at The Australian, journalist, commentator, author of numerous books and co-author of The Dismissal – in The
 Queen’s Name. With Troy Bramston, Kelly has pulled together a comprehensive version of the story of events of 11 November 1975 from fresh interviews, new archival material and a reinterpretation of events. On Monday 9 November 2015, Paul Kelly joined Professor Anne Twomey, The Hon John Howard and Gerard Henderson at The Sydney Institute to discuss the constitutional ramifications of the dismissal of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by Governor-General Sir John Kerr.

REMEMBERING THE DISMISSAL

PAUL KELLY

 

It is a great pleasure for me to be back at The Sydney Institute for this event. I thank Anne and Gerard Henderson for the invitation. I recognise the other distinguished participants tonight, Professor Anne Twomey and Gerard Henderson himself and former prime minister, John Howard, who was a young MP at the time of the 1975 crisis.

My colleague Troy Bramston and I have written a new book that we characterise as a new history of the Dismissal. It coincides with the 40th anniversary of the political crisis in 1975. We decided to write it because of the sheer extent of new documents, letters and files that have become available mainly through the National Archives, but also through the National Library.

 We have examined literally hundreds of pages of new material from Kerr. Obviously, we give more credence to Kerr’s notes written during the crisis or recently afterwards, although his writings and diaries in the 1980s are fascinating. Many of his notes provide the foundation for what became his memoirs, Matters for Judgement.

Other documents we have uncovered relate to the Palace, Malcolm Fraser and the public service advice to the Whitlam Government, in particular from John Menadue and Clarrie Harders, the heads of Prime Minister and Cabinet and Attorney General’s departments respectively. Some of this material sheds new light on the event; some of it confirms our existing views.

Let me start by asking the question, what’s new? We start with Buckingham Palace.

 There is further evidence to this effect in the interviews we have conducted with Sir William Heseltine, the Queen’s assistant private secretary at the time. Moreover in 1975 Palace officials, Heseltine and private secretary, Sir Martin Charteris felt that dismissal by surprise was not a satisfactory solution.

Kerr’s papers show that post-Dismissal he had an obsession about his position, and a profound worry as to whether or not he should resign. Kerr fretted over this from virtually the time of the dismissal. He worried about whether or not Malcolm Fraser was really supporting him. He offered to resign in late 1975, dug in during 1976 and finally decided to resign in March 1977, with both Fraser and the Palace keen to see his departure.

Our book has significant new material concerning Kerr’s dealings with the High Court and Sir Garfield Barwick. This evidence, I believe, repudiates Whitlam’s view that Barwick put the steel into Kerr for the Dismissal. It is pretty clear to me that Kerr recruits and manipulates Barwick, who was keen to get involved and offer his own opinion. We call the chapter on Barwick “Manipulating a Willing Chief Justice”.

But Kerr’s most important source of advice in the crisis is his friend and High Court Judge, Sir Anthony Mason. Kerr made detailed notes of his discussions with Mason that covered Mason’s role at some length. Some of these notes were made at the time, others were made years later. Kerr believed Mason’s role to be historically important and he wanted it made public far earlier.

Kerr and Mason had many discussions before and during the crisis, culminating in their 9 November talks two days before the Dismissal. They discussed, in particular, the tactic of when and how to approach Barwick. Mason even drafted a letter for Whitlam’s dismissal. When you compare the Kerr and Mason accounts, however, while they affirm their vital running dialogue, there are some very significant and unresolved differences between them.

 In Kerr’s notes, there is no reference to this.

Kerr even spoke to Mason on the afternoon of the Dismissal about how to handle the House of Representatives “no confidence” resolution in Fraser. Kerr spoke to Barwick on 11 November, the morning of the Dismissal, about tactics over how to handle Whitlam when he dismissed him.

This was a Governor General who was anxious and deliberate in involving the High Court in the Dismissal. Mason and Barwick were his friends. For Kerr, their views and advice were pivotal in his dismissal strategy.

Let me move to Kerr and Fraser. Their dialogue during the crisis is, I believe, fundamental and a much underappreciated dimension of the situation. There are important signals and messages sent in the Kerr-Fraser dialogue. There are also significant disputes between the two of them about exactly what was said.

We have a new document from Kerr about the night of the Tun Razak dinner on 16 October, right at the start of the crisis.

That is a pretty important piece of intelligence for Kerr to give Fraser.

We argue in the book – and I have always believed – that Fraser played Kerr brilliantly. At the start of the crisis, Fraser signals his respect for Kerr and defers to Kerr. Unlike Whitlam, he flatters Kerr. Fraser said he believed that Kerr would intervene but only at the final moment.

Towards the end, certain Kerr is near ready to act, Fraser threatens Kerr in order to push him to the final step. This was a very acute judgement. Fraser’s last meeting with Kerr was on 6 November.

 They were his exact words. We have other new material about Fraser-Kerr phone discussions on the morning of 11 November that made clear Fraser was tipped-off about the dismissal.

In this most recent book, we’ve written there are no heroes. I commend to readers Chapter 10 called “Whitlam’s Blunders.” We show with many new documents and interviews the extraordinary scale of Whitlam’s folly. He would not let anyone in the government near Kerr. Whitlam felt that only he could manage Kerr. John Menadue wrote:

Mr Whitlam was insistent on all occasions that he was the adviser of the Governor General on important constitutional and indeed other matters. The advice given by Mr Whitlam in all instances was oral and in the expectation that the opposition would give way.

All this was the opposite of what a wise prime minister should have done. Whitlam failed to engage with the Governor General on options for resolution of the deadlock. He had a poor grasp of human nature and never played to Kerr’s vanity or ambitions. Whitlam, incredibly, failed to grasp the real nature of the crisis. He believed it was about the powers of the House of Representatives while Fraser and Kerr believed it was about the powers and duty of the Governor-General.

We found no evidence of any arrangement between Kerr and the Palace on the Dismissal, contrary to some recent claims. What we did find, however, was the sheer depth of Kerr’s paranoia that Whitlam would approach the Palace to have him removed if he felt the Governor-General was contemplating an intervention. For years and years after the Dismissal, in hand-written note after hand-written note, Kerr writes of Whitlam’s intransigence, his threats and the Governor General’s total conviction that his position was in jeopardy. Kerr’s writings confirm his view of the crisis as a debased and elemental shoot-out between Kerr and Whitlam. For Kerr, the burning question was: who would get in first?

I have never wavered from the view that fear of job security and suspicion that Whitlam would approach the Palace was not a justified reason for the Governor General to abandon the proper counselling and warning rule, that is, speaking frankly to his Prime Minister about the deadlock. Kerr should have given Whitlam the choice of going to the election as PM thereby making a dismissal unnecessary. Kerr offers only a poor excuse for not doing this.