Syria: The Assad Regime And The Rebels

Dr Jonathan Spyer is a Senior Fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Centre in Herzliya, Israel and the author of Transforming Fire – The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict. In early 2012, Dr Spyer made visits to Syria and Lebanon and gained first hand information on the situation there. On a visit to Sydney for the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AJAC), Jonathan Spyer addressed The Sydney Institute on Wednesday 30 May 2012

SYRIA: THE ASSAD REGIME AND THE REBELS

JONATHAN SPYER

It’s a topical and interesting time to be discussing Syria. I want to cover a number of issues – the current situation in Syria and the background to the uprising and where things currently stand. I also will touch on the balance of power as it currently is between the regime and the rebels as well as look at the international support, or absence of support, for each side. Finally I’ll attempt to speculate and make a very small advocacy regarding the chances for regime survival or, conversely, a successful toppling of the Assad Regime.

The Assad Regime declared itself immune from the Arab Spring in a famous interview with President Bashar al-Assad by the Wall Street Journal, on 31 January 2011. Assad went into great detail as to why there had not been an uprising in Syria and why there would not be an uprising in Syria. But, having declared itself immune from the Arab Spring, the regime was caught badly unawares by the outbreak of large scale protests in the southern Syrian town of Daraa in March 2012.

It’s fair to describe the attempt to placate the protestors at this time as fairly ham-fisted. First of all the sacking was the sacking of the Governor of Daraa, the unfortunate Faisal Kalthoum. Then the regime granted nationality to thousands of Syrian-born Kurds after which it scrapped a ruling banning teachers from wearing the Islamic niqab headwear. And, finally, it rescinded the emergency laws in place since 1963.

After these cosmetic concessions, in the first weeks of the uprising, in mid-April the regime went into a frontal confrontation with the protestors. This confrontation, in essence, continues to this day and it has now been going on for nearly fourteen months. Between 11-12,000 people are dead. Ten of thousands have become refugees in Turkey and Lebanon. Unknown numbers are in regime custody.

The pattern on the ground has become clear and familiar. The revolt is taking place not throughout the entirety of the territory of Syria, but rather in certain specific areas of the country. The regime first places areas in revolt under closure and then moves to pacify them. The armed element among the rebels withdraws. The civilian population of the area in question is left to bear the brunt of the retribution that follows. But, when the regime moves on, the rebellion reignites. Neither side can deliver a fatal blow to the other. The initiative in this ongoing contest has ebbed and flowed between regime and opposition in the course of the year.

Now to observe some of the most important recent events.

Starting in late 2011, following months of demonstration and repression, the opposition and Free Syrian army – the armed element among the opposition – began to establish precarious control over a number of areas of Syria. First to come under rebel control were are number of towns and villages in Idlib province in the north near the Turkish border.

Later, in January 2012, the Free Syrian Army succeeded in taking control of the town of Zabadani in Damascus province, following intense clashes with the regime army. On 21 January, the Free Syrian Army temporarily captured the town of Duma near Damascus city and also, famouslyas people are aware, for three months controlled around two-thirds of the city of Homs, Syria’s third-largest city. In January, some of the city suburbs in Damascus also fell under partial and precarious opposition control.

Once under rebel control, the regime effectively ceased to have any visible existence or presence in these areas. But this control was precarious in the extreme. The Free Syrian Army admitted from the outset that it was quite incapable of holding ground against frontal assault from the Assad regime. This meant it was clear that it would be only a matter of time before the regime would move to retake these liberated zones.

In February, I spent a week in the liberated zone of Idlib province – as it was at that time but it has since been recaptured. In late February 2012, the regime began a concerted campaign to reconquer rebel-held areas. It began by retaking Duma, near Damascus. It moved on to Homs, with the shelling which killed the journalist Marie Colvin and her colleague. It then began the pacification of Idlib province, all in time for the beginning of the so-called “cease fire”, Kofi Annan’s UN plan scheduled to come in to effect on 10 April 2012.

As described by Human Rights Watch, in a recent document based on field research carried out in Idlib province, prior to the cease fire of 10 April 2012, the regime’s retribution in recaptured areas – often carried out by the Alawi irregulars, the so-called shabiha who side with it – is extremely brutal and includes the summary execution of civilians.

Human Rights Watch described how 95 civilians died and hundreds were wounded in the period between 22 March and 6 April as Syrian armour and infantry swept methodically through the towns of Sarmeen, Saraqeb, Taftanaz, Hazano and Kelly. The report describes, for example – and people can find the report online as it’s freely available – the execution of 19 members of the Ghazal family of Taftanaz, in their home , on 3 April 2012.

Similar actions have taken place throughout the country in areas affected by the uprising. In Homs, Hama, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor, Rastan, Daraa, Duma (near Damascus), and in Houla in the last few days. The pacifications involve the use of helicopters, artillery and armour against civilians, large scale round-ups, disappearances and many deaths. But, as has become apparent, the regime does not have sufficient wherewithal to place all areas in revolt under permanent occupation. So, once again, when the armed forces move on the uprising remerges.

Syria is now in a state of civil war with the two sides grossly mismatched and the outcome much depending on the international response.

What of the opposing forces in this contest? Let’s take a look first of all at the Assad regime and then at the rebels that oppose it.

Bashar al-Assad has succeeded in maintaining the minimum key elements required for its survival. The political circle around the president has seen no major defections since the start of the uprising. No senior ministers and no army chiefs have yet gone over to the rebels. The Syrian Arab Army – that’s the official name of the regime’s army – notionally numbers 280,000 troops and twelve divisions, plus an additional 280,000 reserves. But this army has been haemorrhaging troops from desertion since the start of the uprising and continues to do so.

The problem, however, is that this regime does not require the entirety of its notional 280,000 men in order to defend itself and survive. Rather, certain forces – the Republican Guard, the famous Fourth Armour Division of Maher al-Assad, the President’s brother, the special forces – all of which are overwhelmingly Alawi in ethnic complexion and which are the best-trained and equipped of all the units of the army, are the elements needed and used for active moves against the rebels. In addition to these divisions, the regime maintains a force of an estimate 60-70,000 armed Alawi irregulars known as the Shabiha, the Arabic word for “ghost”.

The internal security forces and intelligence services also play a key role in maintaining the fear of the regime, at least in areas outside the hotbed of the rebellion. Syria has four internal security directorates: Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, State Security and Political Security. These four directorates operate under the umbrella of a body called the National Security Council, headed by a Shia general, Hisham Ikhtiyar, who reports directly to Assad. In total, they’re thought to number 65,000 full time employees, plus a vastly larger army of agents and informers.

So Assad’s security structures remain standing, in existence and active, and currently adequate for the defence and survival of his regime. In terms of its domestic standing, the regime maintains the support of the 12 per cent Alawi minority – that is to say, the sectarian group to which the Assads themselves and their closest allies belong. In an uprising which is taking on increasingly sectarian overtones, because of the growth of sectarianism, the ten per cent Christian minority, and the 10-15 per cent Kurdish minority have also stayed largely outside of the uprising. They don’t want to get involved in what they regard as a battle between the Alawi regime and the Suni Arab majority of the country. Assad also depends on, and to a degree has succeeded in, maintaining the acquiescence of the Suni middle and merchant class, in the key cities of Damascus and Aleppo. That acquiescence has partly frayed – Damascus and Aleppo are seeing demonstrations in growing numbers – it’s frayed but it’s not yet broken as of now. The bottom line is that the Assad Regime, while severely stretched, shows no signs of collapse or of impending collapse.

What of the rebels? The Syrian opposition has found difficulty in uniting. A single opposition framework, able to bring together the various disparate elements, does not yet exist.

The main external opposition body is the Syrian National Council led, until his recent resignation, by former Sorbonne professor Burhan Ghalioun and headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey. Additional elements among the opposition which should be considered are the network of local co-ordination committees and revolutionary councils within Syria, loosely and problematically associated with the Syrian National Council, the National Co-ordinated Body, which is a rival umbrella group to the Syrian National Council and, of course, the armed element or Free Syrian Army.

The Syrian National Council was formed on 23 August 2011 as a coalition of seven opposition groups under Turkish tutelage, and with a heavy presence of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in its ruling council. The Syrian National Council has been beset from the outset by claims, largely justified in my estimation at least, that it represented no one inside Syria, and by additional claims that it was a front for the Muslim Brotherhood. It has failed to attract the membership of minorities, particularly the Kurds; it has failed to seal the loyalty of the Free Syrian Army; and it has failed to keep the loyalty of the local co-ordinating committees who joined it but are currently threatening to resign from it. Opposition politics as usual, you may well be thinking to yourselves.

The SMB – or Syrian Muslim Brotherhood – is a less significant body consisting of thirteen leftist Syrian political parties which opposes external intervention and maintains willingness for dialogue with the regime and its allies. It supports, it says, “peaceful reform” and it is regarded consequently by other opposition groups as collaborationist with the regime.

More importantly, the uprising has an armed element. The formation of the Free Syrian Army was announced on 29 July, 2011 by former Air Force Colonel, Riad al-Asaad. Despite the name and the notional command in Antakya, Turkey, this army consists for the most part of a loose conglomeration of armed initiatives, centred around local power structures in parts of the country. The members of these structures include both recent army deserters and civilians who have decided to take up arms against the regime. A number of high-ranking officers have joined the Free Syrian Army, including General Mustafa al-Sheikh of the Syrian Army, who joined on 6 January 2012, and at least one other general who is thought to have come over.

The strategy of the Free Syrian Army is evolving, at least according to statements by its officers and leaders. Initially holding to the modest goal of offering protection to demonstrators, in an interview on 12 January 2012, al-Sheikh said, “If we get 25-30,000 deserters mounting guerrilla warfare in small groups of six or seven, it is enough to exhaust the army in a year to a year and a half, even if they are armed only with rocket propelled grenades and light weapons.”

In interviews with me, in Antakya, a number of officers repeated this. It is of course highly questionable as to whether this strategy is workable, or if the Free Syrian Army has the ability to pursue a coherent nationwide strategy of any kind, given the divisions within it.

The Free Syrian Army which claims to number 70,000, but probably has between 20,000, is active in certain parts of the country, those parts affected by the uprising. The largest concentration is in the central region around Homs and Hama, with nine or more battalions thought to be active there.

So the opposition has clear structures. It’s determined and it’s proved that it’s capable of absorbing blows and continuing. Still, it remains particularly stymied by the very glaring absence of unity.

What of international response and assistance to the two sides? Here we see, in my estimation at least, the most glaring imbalance between the two forces arrayed against one another in Syria. The Assad regime has benefited, and will probably survive, as a result of the firm and united backing of its international allies, above all Russia and Iran. Syria is a central member of the Iran-led regional alliance in the Middle East and Iran is playing an active role in supporting its ally. Much evidence has emerged to indicate this.

As early as 14 April 2011, a US official confirmed that Iran was aiding the repression in Syria. State Department spokesmen spokesperson Victoria Nuland accused Tehran of providing the Syrian Regime with the knowledge for monitoring and shutting down communications by activists. A classified United Nations report has stated that Iran is covertly shipping arms to Syria, in violation of international sanctions. The report listed six out of an alleged nine incidents in which Syria was the final destination of illegal arms shipments coming from Iran. One arms shipment, intercepted by the Turkish authorities in March, contained 60 Kalashnikov rifles, 14 BKC machine guns, 7920 rounds of Kalashnikov ammunition, 560 60mm mortars, 1288 120mm mortars.

An Iranian opposition group, the Green Experts of Iran, reported that the revolutionary guards deployed a 65 man team along with four cargo planes, loaded with arms to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps operational base in Damascus. The report identified an IRGC commander as leader of the IRGC mission in Damascus.

I have a long list here and I won’t torture you by going through all the details. Suffice it is to say that in the public sphere there is a massive amount of available evidence indicating active Iranian support for the regime in Syria. These allegations have been borne out both by eye witness reports and by footage obtained of Iranians captured and held by the opposition. This footage can be seen by anybody with access to YouTube.

Iranian aid to the regime has also taken a financial form, with one source suggesting that two billion dollars has been given to Syria over the last two years. And Iran’s allies and proxies, chief among them the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, have also been mobilised to act as go-betweens and to actively aid the regime.

Russia too has been aiding the regime, overtly and covertly, since the outbreak of the uprising. Russian has been most telling and notable in preventing a coherent international response via the United Nations Security Council on Syria. Russian aid to the regime in terms of arms has also been substantial. Between 2007 and 2011, imports from Russia accounted for 78 per cent of all Syrian arms imports, according to a recent study by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute.

The second-largest supplier of arms to Assad in that period was Belarus, which accounted for a further 17 per cent of imports. What this means is that 95 per cent of Syrian arms purchases come either from Russia or its satellite client regime in Minsk, Belarus, which of course does not decide its own independent arms policy.

Russian companies are also heavily engaged in infrastructure projects and oil and gas exploration in Syria. Total investment by Russia in Syria amounted to a sum of $US19.4 billion in 2009. Given all this, it’s not hard to understand the scale of Russia’s commitment to the survival of Assad.

There is also a very significant and important strategic element behind Russian support for the regime. The naval base at Tartus gives the Russian navy the capability to operate in the Mediterranean and thus to reach rapidly the Red Sea via the Suez Canal and the Atlantic through the straits of Gibraltar. Russia has no immediately available alternative to Tartus and if Assad goes the base will go. The nearest base after that which the Russian navy can use is in Sevastopol on the Black Sea, with a far less advantageous position.

For these reasons, the Russians have been determined to keep Assad in place and have been aiding him systematically in both the diplomatic and military realms. Arms ships loaded with weaponry for the regime are leaving the port of Oktyabrsk in southern Ukraine, crossing through the Bosporus straits to Limassol in Cyprus and then to the port of Tartus. Four such ships have reached Syria since the beginning of the uprising.

This is the life blood of the Assad regime. Behind Assad stands a determined international coalition, pledged to keeping him in power by all means available.

The Western response, despite verbal support for the opposition, has been very different in nature. The US Administration clearly wants to avoid any direct involvement in Syria. As a result, throughout 2011 policy appeared rudderless, with Washington tentatively trying out a variety of options and then abandoning them. Not until August did President Obama even call on Assad to depart unequivocally.

The US sought first of all to rely on Turkey. But Turkey made clear that while it was prepared to sponsor and domicile the opposition and the FSA on its territory, it would take no unilateral steps without United Nation Security Council sanction. US and EU sanctions were incrementally increased in the course of the year-long uprising and, along with the collapse of the tourism sector in Syria, these have had a heavy impact on the regime. The economy is expected to contract by 3 per cent in the course of the coming year, but with the help of Iranian donations and Russian arms supplies, the regime does not seem to be about to run out of funds.

Two abortive international plans, supposedly for international mediation, have been supported by the West. The first Arab League plan failed to call for Assad’s replacement and saw a small number of Arab League observers inserted into the country. These were led by a Sudanese general, Mustafa al-Dabi, whom it later transpired was himself a suspected war criminal. The observers were withdrawn when the failure of the plan to impact on the reality of situation became apparent.

The second plan, currently in the process of failing, is the UN-supported Kofi Annan Six Point Plan. It’s been in operation since 10 April 2012. The regime has ignored its provision for removing troops and armour from populated areas. It has ignored its provision for allowing free access for journalists to the territory of Syria. The plan itself contained no call for the removal of the dictator in order to enable it to pass through the otherwise inevitable Russian or Chinese veto in the Security Council.

The bloodshed has continued apace. Two hundred and fifty UN observers under Norwegian General Robert Mood have proven quite powerless to stop it. The tepid nature of this response may now be altering to a degree and there is evidence filtering out – specifically in the Washington Post which is a good source on this stuff – to indicate that the West and the Arab states, most importantly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have realised that sponsoring the squabbling external opposition is leading nowhere. Instead, money and arms – if these reports are to be believed – are now being made available directly to elements within Syria. Saudia Arabia and Qatar are providing the funds and the weapons and, if the Washington Post is to be believed, the American administration has people on the ground helping to identify elements that will receive these, in Syria itself.

Even if these reports are accurate, they pave the way for a long civil war with uncertain results, rather than the rapid removal of the dictatorship. The armed opposition remains loose and divided. The Saudis and the Qataris have little experience, to put it mildly, of successful support of insurgencies. Indeed, Riyadh’s track record on this in recent years has been fairly poor, particularly when up against Iran and associated forces. And we can think of the events in Lebanon, in May 2008, if we want a precedent where the Saudis and the Iranian proxies clashed head on. They clashed head on in Beirut in May 2008 with the result that Hezbollah went through the Saudis’ friends like a knife through butter in 48 hours, and took over the city.

The Muslim Brotherhood is also understood to be the recipient of much aid and to be engaged in gaining political power on the side of the insurgents, through the channelling of money and resources to the armed groups. The disunity and local nature of many of the armed groups facilitates the building of influence through the channelling of arms and resources. It seems much less likely to facilitate the building of a coherent, united insurgency to conduct the war against the Assad regime.

Let me then move to a number of conclusions. Syria’s alignment with Iran and Russia are the core of a successful regional policy. Through it, Damascus has magnified its local and regional influence and obtained an insurance policy against paying any price for its activities. It is now clear that this policy made sense in other ways too. Indeed, it is currently paying dividends. Syria’s alignment with the regional axis, led by Iran and its alliance with Russia, represents Assad’s best hope of survival. Western hesitancy to confront Iran and its allies and Russia is the crucial factor making possible the crackdown in Syria and hence the survival of the regime.

How so? Let’s look back for a moment to the trajectory of the Arab Spring of 2011. The pro-Western Arab authoritarian rulers, Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, were forced aside by a combination of internal and subsequent Western pressure.

Assad by contrast – who is aligned with the coalition of anti-Western states and movements led by Iran – has faced only minor Western pressure. The Syrian dictator is thus currently getting away with murdering thousands of his people because of Western desire to disengage from the region, fear of Iran and its proxies, fear of Russia and active Iranian and Russian assistance.

The fall or weakening of the Assad regime in Syria would constitute a serious blow to Iranian regional ambitions. Its resurgence under the protective tutelage of Tehran, by contrast, would prove that membership of the Iranian alliance provides a handy guarantee for autocratic rulers hoping to avoid the judgement of their peoples.

It may well be that Western commentary will prefer to ignore the power politics and implications of this. It may be assumed, however, that regional leaders and elites will play close attention to them. If Assad survives, it will mean that the Arab Spring in the main countries of the Arab world will offer a near-perfect lesson to regional political elites regarding who it is worth aligning with. Pro-Western Mubarak was abandoned and fell. Pro-Iranian Syrian Assad, meanwhile, will have dug in, helped enormously by his Iranian and Russian patrons, and prevailed. This will represent a major defeat for the West and its remaining allies in the Middle East region.

The effort to bring Assad down is likely to be a marathon, rather than a swiftly concluded contest. There is little or no likelihood of military action of any kind from the West but other forms of pressure can – here my small advocacy that I promised you – and should be applied. For example, increased covert support for the rebels; support, perhaps, for the establishment of a no-fly zone, a humanitarian corridor or a no-heavy-armour zone in Syria’s north.

Civil war has begun in Syria. It should be obvious, this should be a truism. But, for some reason, when one listens to the statements of the international community and former heads of the United Nations, you’ll still here the phrase used – William Hague used it, Kofi Annan used it – “Syria is on the edge of civil war”. I have news for both gentlemen – Syria has been in a state of civil war for at least the last six months and it’s time we called it by its name.

Civil war is underway in Syria. This war sees Iran and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and, to a much lesser extent, the US supporting one or another of the sides. It is a war with increasingly sectarian overtones, it looks like having a long time to run, it has already consumed anywhere up to 12,000 lives. Its outcome will be of vast importance, not only for the people of Syria but also for the future balance and strategic direction of the Middle East as a whole.