The Outbreak Of The Great War In The Pacific: Germany Vs The Allies

In our commemorations of the battles of World War I, there is little recognition of the Allied fight with the Germans in the Pacific, where Germany had territorial possessions and where sections of its fleet were based. Had Germany won the war, Australia’s sea lanes and neighbourhood would have changed drastically. Bartholomaeus Zielinski is currently involved with the United Kingdom end of a major collaborative research project with Australia on “Australia in War and Peace, 1914-18” as well as pursuing his PhD research on his project entitled “The Paris Peace Conference and the question of the South Pacific, 1914-1919 – a geopolitical approach”. On a visit to Australia, Bartholomaeus Zielinski addressed The Sydney Institute on Tuesday 31 March 2015.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE GREAT WAR IN THE PACIFIC: GERMANY VS THE ALLIES

BARTHOLOMAEUS ZIELINSKI

A short while ago, Australians were looking towards a place in western Turkey where their countrymen fought 100 years ago in a war theatre far away from home. The centenary of this most commemorated event in Australian history gives reason to remember those who have fallen, but also to reflect on Australia’s participation in the war more generally and to ask the question about what was at stake from an Australian perspective when Europe went to war in 1914.

I would like, therefore, to highlight the outbreak of the conflict, in August 1914, and focus on events that occurred much closer to Australian shores. The campaign I will explore, the short Pacific War from August to December 1914, is not even necessarily recognised as such in Australia, yet its legacy lasted until the next major conflict in the region between 1941 and 1945 and is even relevant today.

Looking at the inscriptions of campaigns during World War One at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, for example, a “Pacific War” does not appear. I would like to demonstrate that the conflict was of major importance to Australia and the Pacific region, how it became a matter of international diplomacy at the highest level, and why it thus deserves a more prominent role in our war memories. Although there was only limited military action, climaxing in the destruction of the German East Asia Squadron near the Falkland Islands, the naval race for the German Pacific in 1914 gives it a different, and much more significant complexion.

In this context, my argument will be that Britain had triggered certain diplomatic and military mechanisms in the area for the benefit of the defence of the British Isles, both before and in the early stages of the war, while leaving the security of the Pacific Ocean exposed to Japanese opportunism. The remaining powers, while engaged, lacked the will or leverage to exert greater influence over the events.

When the war broke out in Europe in early August 1914, the belligerents’ colonial possessions were drawn into the conflict with immediate effect. Thus, German Samoa as well as German New Guinea and German Micronesia were exposed to warfare against mighty Britain with her dominions in Australia and New Zealand, standing loyally on the side of the Mother Country.

The Committee of Imperial Defence had prepared the British and dominions’ governments for the case of a conflict in the Pacific before it broke out. Within this framework, and only days into the war, an Overseas Attack Committee was formed in London, setting the primary object as “to deprive the enemy of his distant bases and coaling stations as well as of his wireless stations”.^[i] According to this plan, Australia and New Zealand were to assist in the effort by seizing German New Guinea and Yap in the Carolines, the centre of German communications in the Pacific, and German Samoa and Nauru respectively.^[ii] The East Asia Squadron, Germany’s main naval asset based at Tsingtao, was to be destroyed or driven out of the Pacific.

Furthermore, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance from 1902 provided for Japanese support of Britain in case of a crisis. Foreign Secretary Grey was at first reluctant to invoke it, stating politely that Britain “should avoid, if we could, drawing Japan into any trouble”. He added, however, that “should a case arise in which we needed her help, we would gladly ask for it and be grateful for it”.^[iii] What Grey had in mind was that it should be Britain’s initiative to “ask for it” and that this should only apply to “an attack on Hong Kong or Wei-hai-Wei […]”.^[iv] This reflected the Foreign Office’s understanding that Japan was to be employed, if employed at all, in a geographically limited role.

Japan’s early signals concerning the conflict were ambiguous. Foreign Minister Kato emphasized that Japan was not interested in a European conflict, but he also stated that there would be Japanese support if the Germans attacked the British possessions in China.^[v]

Australia and New Zealand had their own views about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Frederic Eggleston, an influential Australian writer, commented in March 1914 that “a policy which disregards the Pacific, or leaves it to Japan, cannot be regarded as a truly Imperial policy”.^[vi] Previously, Billy Hughes, Australia’s Attorney-General at the time and later Prime Minister, had expressed his unease, writing that Australian security depended “upon the observance and the renewal of the terms of a treaty with a nation whom we have openly humiliated by declining to admit its people on terms of equality with those of other civilised nations”.^[vii]

New Zealand’s mistrust towards Japan is reflected in an article entitled “The Admiralty’s Broken Pledge” in the New Zealand Herald on 2 May 1914, commenting on Britain’s unwillingness to navally reinforce the South Pacific. The writer is scathing saying that “had Japanese protection been hinted at in 1909 [at the Imperial Conference], New Zealand would have repudiated with indignation that impossible policy […] and co-operated earnestly with Australia for mutual defence”.^[viii]

The most outspoken group in Britain in favour of invoking Japanese assistance at the outbreak of war was the Admiralty. Hoping to bring all major ships from the Pacific to the European theatre as quickly as possible, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill pressed his view upon Prime Minister Asquith, writing to him on 14 August that the “entry of Japan will of course make Pacific absolutely safe very soon. […] Any declaration against entry of Japan into war would harm”.^[ix]

The Foreign Office, by contrast, had been forewarned by the Ambassador to Peking in early August:

I presume that Her Majesty’s Government have fully considered the probable seizure by Japan of the islands lying between this country and Australia in the event of her declaring war. It seems very advisable that, pending the arrangement of a considered scheme of co-operation, the Japanese declaration of war should be put forward.^[x]

Germany, for her own reasons, hoped for Japan’s neutrality in a European conflict. When Foreign Secretary Jagow asked his ambassador in Tokyo, Count Rex, in early August about his impressions, the latter replied, “Should the war be confined to Europe, […] then Japan would presumably remain neutral.”^[xi] The German government stressed that it did “not seek war with Japan” and offered a truce in the Pacific and Far East.^[xii] The commander of the East Asia Squadron, Admiral von Spee, at sea in the South Pacific at the outbreak of war, announced that he would “not attack British territory in East Asia”, although the German pre-war orders had provided for attacks on British trade.^[xiii] Faced with an overwhelming opposition in the case of Japan’s entry into the war, Germany was clearly not on an aggressive footing in the Far East.^[xiv]

Meanwhile, the tendency in Japan had moved towards war against Germany within a matter of days. What the Japanese required, however, was a British invitation to invoke the treaty. Grey ultimately agreed to a statement that “the two governments are of opinion that action is needed”, but only if the action of Japan would “not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas […]”.[xv] Japan then issued an ultimatum on 15 August 1914 demanding that Germany vacate her naval base at Tsingtao on the Chinese Shandong peninsula and, when the ultimatum lapsed on 23 August, war was declared. Neither the ultimatum nor the declaration of war mentioned geographic limitations to Japanese action, however.

This caused significant irritation, not least in Australia and New Zealand. The Foreign Office attempted to reassure the dominions, informing them that “we believe” that Japanese actions would not extend beyond Chinese waters. Interestingly, Grey told the government in Tokyo at the same time that “these apprehensions [by the dominions] are absurd, but they exist […]”.[xvi] While this reflects Britain’s unwillingness to offend Japan as a strategic partner in a current conflict, whose continued assistance was also hoped for closer to Britain, it also foreshadows a growing Anglo-Australian rift with regard to the security assessment of the Pacific region.

In a parallel development, American opinion became preoccupied with events in the Far East. When the Japanese ultimatum of 15 August became known in the United States, the British Ambassador in Washington reported that:

Japan’s ultimatum to Germany has caused considerable concern. Press charges that Japan has seized opportunity of encroaching upon China, seizing possibly Pacific Islands with minimum of trouble herself. Stress is laid upon danger to United States strategical position should islands be occupied […]. These apprehensions […] seem to be shared in most circles […].^[xvii]

As a matter of fact, the US administration had suggested to neutralise the entire Pacific Ocean.^[xviii] Secretary of State Bryan was informed by Grey that this might be too ambitious, but that he would welcome an American initiative in China. Unwilling to accept American interference aimed at curbing Japanese ambitions, the Japanese Premier reassured the Americans via The Independent magazine in New York that “I have stated and I now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything they now possess.”^[xix]

Finally, President Wilson decided not to jeopardise American neutrality and interfere further, confident the United States would be consulted if action was taken in the area.^[xx]

Contrasting his reassurances on the international scene, Premier Kato expressed the view that the war was an “opportunity to sweep up bases in Eastern waters and to advance the Empire’s position in the world”.^[xxi] With hindsight, Kato’s biographer commented that the British invitation was “a godsend for Kato and those who wanted to take Japan into the war”.^[xxii]

Early war action in the South Pacific was reserved to Britain and the Dominions, however. The imperial effort was assisted by the French who had sent two cruisers under a previously arranged war plan between Britain and France.[xxiii] Thus, the German wireless station at Yap was destroyed (whereas the island was not taken) on 12 August by the Royal Navy from Hong Kong, while German Samoa was seized on 30 August 1914 by a New Zealand expeditionary force escorted by the Royal Australian Navy now under British command. A little later, on 11 September, Australians landed near Rabaul, initiating the seizure of German New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago. All German high-powered wireless stations had been dealt with by British, Australian and New Zealand forces by mid-September, although the Yap station had been repaired by the Germans in the meantime. Japan had meanwhile stayed clear of the area.

Despite these successes, the strain on British and Australian naval forces became evident when the German Squadron was unaccounted for, for over one month, in September and when Australian and New Zealand troops were preparing to sail to Europe. Uncertainty increased dramatically when the British submarine cable at Fanning Island, a vital part on the imperial All-Red route from British Columbia to Australia and New Zealand, was destroyed by a detached German naval unit, while the German main squadron appeared off Samoa, both in the middle of September.^[xxiv] Although the German position and plan to sail towards South America might have become clearer when Tahiti was attacked by von Spee on 22 September, the Anglo-Japanese naval cooperation had by now been set well into motion. At the same time, the uncertainty in the dominions bound precious naval capacity for the upcoming escort duty for the troops going to Europe.

The Japanese created two dedicated South Sea Squadrons, the first of which was sent out on 14 September tasked with searching German Micronesia for the German Squadron and destroying the remaining wireless stations in the area. The Second Squadron joined the effort on 1 October.^[xxv] Meanwhile, some British and Australian warships were cruising around Fiji conducting their search operation, whereas others were preparing for the troop convoys. This was in tune with Admiralty arrangements with Japan, dividing the search area in the Pacific Ocean between the Australian and Japanese naval forces at the equator.[xxvi] Although it had been initially planned that an Australian force sail north across the equator to seize the remaining German possessions in Micronesia, the scarcity of naval capacity, the remaining danger of German attack and the prioritisation of securing the troop transports to Europe had made the simultaneity of these operations impossible.

The Japanese South Seas squadrons occupied Jaluit in the German Marshall Islands in late September, followed by Yap in the Eastern Carolines and by Truk in the Western Carolines.^[xxvii] By the middle of October 1914, the Japanese were essentially in control of German Micronesia, although none of the previous arrangements had mentioned the Japanese occupation of territory.[xxviii] Nevertheless, it became clear after the fact that a removal of Japanese forces from the seized islands was not a desirable objective in London. Thus, the Admiralty wrote to the Foreign Office that “the Japanese Government may be asked for continued occupation of Yap by their forces”.^[xxix] While the Australian government, not being kept informed by London, was still expecting to send a force to German Micronesia to relieve the Japanese, Churchill wrote in all bluntness:

The Admiralty would strongly deprecate any action towards Japan that would appear suspicious or ungracious. We are deriving benefit from their powerful and generous aid. They have intimated that their occupation is purely military and devoid of political significance and there I trust we may leave the matter for the present.^[xxx]

A similar view was expressed by Greene in Tokyo when he cabled that

… it appears to me that it would be at once politic and graceful if we offered them some signal mark of our confidence […] without alarming American and Australian sentiment, to refrain from requesting at the present juncture the transfer to Great Britain of any islands which Japan may occupy for strategic reasons.^[xxxi]

Essentially, the British Foreign Office and Admiralty positions were now in tune.

It is consistent with this storyline of misunderstanding and miscommunication that the Australian government actually went ahead and prepared an expedition in November 1914 to relieve the Japanese in the islands north of the equator, called off by Colonial Secretary Harcourt in the following words:

[…] we consider it most convenient for strategic reasons to allow them to remain in occupation for the present, leaving the whole question of the future to be settled at the end of the war. If, therefore, Australian expedition would confine itself to occupation of German islands south of the equator, we should be glad.^[xxxii]

How predetermined the permanence of the Japanese occupation of German Micronesia was is difficult to assess, but there are hints. It seems as though an escalating process of growing naval necessity by Britain was met by a parallel process of growing military preparedness and imperial appetite in Japan. This is also corroborated by a cable from Grey to Greene in Tokyo, in which he claims that the Anglo-Japanese naval cooperation “has led by common agreement and desire to the occupation of various points for strategic purposes […]”.^[xxxiii] Ultimately, Kato claimed that “operations [in the Pacific] had been much more excessive than had at first been intended” and that Japan had been “obliged to enlarge these operations in the southern seas […]”.^[xxxiv] Disclosing Japan’s ultimate intentions, however, he then informed Grey that he hoped that Britain “will bear in mind […], it will […] not be possible for the Japanese Government to abandon and hand over islands in question to another Power when the time comes for considering final terms of peace”.^[xxxv]

When the dust began to settle, Harcourt wrote an apologetic letter labelled “private”, “personal” and “very secret” to the Governor-General of Australia, admitting that Britain “could not spare enough [in 1914] to deal with the Pacific […]” He then advised him “in the most gradual and diplomatic way to begin to prepare the mind of your Ministers for the possibility that at the end of the War Japan may be left in possession of the Northern Islands and we with everything South of the Equator”. As an imperial consolation, “it will be a great gain to add German New Guinea to Papua and to have the whole of the Solomon Islands group under the British flag”.^[xxxvi] What was more, seeds of mistrust had been sown between the Australasian Dominions and London over this question. The Colonial Office even had to reassure a suspicious Australian government in early 1915 that London had not made a secret deal with Tokyo regarding the future of the German colonies, denying a “secret agreement […] with the Japanese Government in relation to the eventual disposal of the late German islands north of the equator”.[xxxvii]

Thus, although the Great War was only a few months old, Japan had already seized the moment of British naval weakness and overstretch to remove an inferior Germany from the South Pacific and had, in the process, quietly turned provisional occupations into permanent ones. Having prioritised Home Waters defence over Australian and New Zealand geostrategic concerns or American uneasiness, Britain had continued on a trajectory of strategic withdrawal, while Japan had gained control of significant portions of the Pacific Ocean.

Meanwhile, the young Australian Commonwealth had received a sobering reality check with regard to its geostrategic remoteness from Britain and its future security. The various movements, having consolidated into an informal territorial arrangement, later proved to translate into the Versailles Peace Treaty with its mandate system in the aftermath of the war, creating a drastically changed security landscape in the Pacific Ocean.

ENDNOTES

[i]The National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter: TNA), CAB 38/28/51, Report on the Opening of the War, Committee of Imperial Defence, Historical Section, November 1, 1914, p.11; the German communications system consisted of the following stations: a submarine cable at Yap, going out to Guam, Shanghai and Menado in Celebes; high-powered wireless stations at Tsingtao, Yap, Nauru and Apia, a fifth station at Bitapaka near Rabaul was nearing completion in August 1914; low-powered stations at Angaur in the Pelews, Truk in the Carolines and Jabor in the Marshall Islands, see Arthur W. Jose, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, vol. 9: The Royal Australian Navy 1914-1918 (Sydney, 1941), p.21

[ii] For the request to New Zealand, see TNA, WO 95/5452, Correspondence relating to the occupation of German Samoa by an expeditionary force from New Zealand, No.1, Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies Harcourt to Governor of New Zealand, 6 August 1914; for the request to Australia: TNA, ADM 137/7, Folio 93: Telegram from Harcourt, CO, to Governor General Australia, 6 August 1914

[iii] TNA, FO 371/2016, Folio 359: Telegram from Grey, FO, to C. Greene, Tokyo, 4 August 1914.

[iv] TNA, FO 371/2016, Folio 330: Telegram from Grey to Greene, 3 August 1914; Folio 359: Telegram from Grey, FO, to Greene, Tokyo, 4 August 1914.

[v] TNA FO 371/2016, Folio 320: Telegram from C Greene, Tokyo, to Grey, FO, 3 August 1914; Folio 340: Telegram from C Greene, Tokyo, to Grey, FO, 4 August 1914.

[vi] Neville Meaney, Australia and the World : a Documentary History from the 1870s to the 1970s (Melbourne, 1985), document 104: ‘Naval Policy. Australia and Japan.’, by Frederic Eggleston, Argus, 31 March 1914

[vii]Gordon Greenwood and Charles Grimshaw (eds), Documents on Australian International Affairs 1901-1918 (Melbourne, 1977), p.241: ‘Extract from WM Hughes, ‘The Case for Labor’, Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 27 May 1911.

[viii] French Foreign Ministry Archives – Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), Nouvelle Série (NS) Océanie, Nouvelle Zélande 2, Letter from French Consul, Auckland, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 3 May 1914, with attached article ‘The Admiralty’s Broken Pledge’, NZ Herald, 2 May 1914

[ix] Canada, Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relation, volume I, 1908-1918, Doc. 62: Telegram from the First Lord of the Admiralty to Prime Minister, 14 August 1914

[x] TNA, FO 371/2016, Folio 415: Telegram from Jordan, Peking, to Grey, 9 August 1914.

[xi] Max Montgelas and Walter Schücking (eds), Outbreak of the World War, German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky (New York, 1924), Doc. No.545: Telegram from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador at Tokyo, 1 August 1914; Doc. No.785: Telegram from Ambassador at Tokyo to Foreign Office, undated, presumably 3 August 1914

[xii] Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter: FRUS) 1914, War Supplement (Washington, 1928), pp.169-170: Telegram from the Ambassador in Berlin Gerard to Secretary of State, 13 August 1914

[xiii] Erich Raeder and Eberhard von Mantey (eds), Der Krieg zur See, 1914-1918, Der Kreuzerkrieg in den ausländischen Gewässern, Volume I, Das Kreuzergeschwader (Berlin, 1922), p.76

[xiv] For German pre-war plans for operations in the Far East and the Pacific, see Peter Overlack, ‘The Force of Circumstance: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914’, Journal of Military History 60/4 (October 1996), p.659

[xv] TNA, FO 371/2016, Folio 449, Telegram from Grey to Greene, 11 August 1914

[xvi] TNA, FO 371/2016, Folio 479, Telegram from CO to FO, 11 August, with copy of telegram CO to Gov. Liverpool, NZ, 11 August 1914; Folio 534: Telegram Grey to Greene, 13 August 1914

[xvii] TNA, FO 371/2017, Folio 24: Telegram Barclay, Washington, to Grey, 17 August 1914

[xviii]FRUS 1914, War Supplement, pp.165-166: Telegram from Ambassador in Britain Page to the Secretary of State, 11 August 1914

[xix] National Archives of the United States in Washington DC (NADC), Record Group (RG) 38, Box No 453, Intelligence Division, Naval Attache Reports, 1886-1939, Doc. Ref. No: C-10-a, No 4494, Monograph ‘Japanese Declarations and Assurances Respecting Participation in the European War in the Pacific’, November 1914, published by the Asiatic Institute

[xx]Link, Wilson, Struggle for Neutrality, pp.195-6; Arthur S. Link (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 30, May 6-September 5, 1914 (Princeton, 1979), pp.390-2: Letter from Bryan to Wilson, [c. 17 August 1914], with enclosure: ‘A Telegram Received from Baron Kato’, 16 August 1914

[xxi]Ikeda Kiyoshi, Nihon nokaigun [The Japanese Navy]. 2 vols. Isseido (1967): vol. 2, pp.28-29, quoted in Mark R. Peattie, Nan’yo. The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945 (Honolulu,1988), p.38.

[xxii] Ito Masanori, Kato Takaaki, volume II (Tokyo, 1929), pp.78-80, cited in: Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline: a Study in Anglo-Japanese relations, 1908-23 (London, 1972), p.127

[xxiii] ‘Eastern Fleet Secret Instructions X’ from February 1914 regarding an Anglo-French naval cooperation in event of common war against Germany, see: National Archives of Australia (NAA) Melbourne, MP1049/1, 1914/0355, item 397047, Secret letter from Jerram, Hong Kong, to The Secretary, Naval Board, Melbourne, 4 August 1914

[xxiv]TNA, ADM 137/7, Folio 411: telegram from Honolulu to Admiralty, 1 September 1914;Raeder, Das Kreuzergeschwader, p.129

[xxv]Raeder, Das Kreuzergeschwader, p.162

[xxvi] Archives New Zealand (hereafter: ANZ), ACHK 16601 G46/1, item R10206869, Copy of letter from Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration to Naval, Wellington, 13 October 1914

[xxvii] Jose, Royal Australian Navy, p.130; Raeder, Das Kreuzergeschwader, p.168.

[xxviii] See, for example: ANZ, ACHK 16601 G46/1, item R10206869, Copy of letter from Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration to Naval, Wellington, 13 October 1914

[xxix] TNA, FO 371/2017, Folio 445, Confidential letter from JWS Anderson, Admiralty, to FO, 11 October 1914.

[xxx] Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, CHAR 13/27B/75:

Private letter Churchill to Harcourt, 18 October 1914

[xxxi] TNA, FO 371/2017, Folio 457, Telegram Greene to Grey, 12 October 1914.

[xxxii] TNA, FO 371/2018, Folio 422, Secret letter from John Anderson, CO, to FO, 4 December 1914, with attached copy of telegram from Harcourt to GovGen Australia, 3 December 1914

[xxxiii] TNA, CO 616/13, Telegram from FO to Greene (Tokio), 26 November 1914

[xxxiv] TNA, FO 371/2018, Folio 482, Telegram Greene to Grey, 16 December 1914.

[xxxv] TNA, FO 371/2018, Folio 482 Telegram Greene to Grey, 16 December 1914

[xxxvi]Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, Lewis Harcourt Papers, General correspondence, MS Harcourt 468, Harcourt to Munro Ferguson, 5 December 1914.

[xxxvii] ANZ, ACHK 16603 G48/20, N/18, item R19162215, copy of letter from Secretary of State for the Colonies Harcourt to Governor-General of Australia Munro Ferguson, 23 February 1915