WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST – 7 OCTOBER AND BEYOND

Elliott Abrams is senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington, DC. He served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor in the administration of President George W. Bush, where he supervised U.S. policy in the Middle East for the White House, and as Special Representative for Iran and Venezuela in the administration of Donald Trump. During a visit to Australia sponsored by the Australia Israel & Jewish Affairs Council on Tuesday 17 October 2023, Elliott Abrams addressed The Sydney Institute to discuss the Israeli response to the attacks by Hamas on 7 October 2023 and the implications for Israel and the Middle East.

WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST – 7 OCTOBER AND BEYOND

ELLIOTT ABRAMS

What I’d like to do tonight is to make six points about the situation in the Middle East today, and the war in the Middle East. We agreed that I would come to The Sydney Institute a couple of months ago. I wrote a very nice speech. I rewrote it and rewrote, and it was very lovely. But, of course, then came the war. So, it was not what we should be talking about tonight.

Let me begin with the war in the narrowest sense. How did this happen? In the press, certainly in the United States and Israel, there has been a lot of use of the term “conception”, or “conceptzia” in Hebrew, as being the fundamental error. I think that’s right. What is meant by it is, the Israelis had an understanding of their situation with respect to Hamas. It was that both sides had developed a modus vivendi. Hamas wanted violence and terror in the West Bank, but not in Gaza. Not in Gaza because they governed Gaza. They ruled Gaza. They had to worry about jobs and the economy, and schools, and public services. Yes, things would blow up every few years for a week or two, or sometimes even longer. But the basic structure was there. That was not an idiosyncratic view, it was a consensus view in Israel and outside of Israel. It was certainly the consensus view in the US as well.

But it turned out to be completely wrong – tragically wrong. Modus vivendi is a way of living, and it turned out that this was actually a way of dying. They could not live with Hamas. It turned out that hundreds and hundreds of Israelis died because of Hamas. Why did Hamas do it now? It seems clear, and there is even some evidence, that this has been in the planning for at least a year, maybe two years. Because it was a very elaborate plan coinciding with the 50^th anniversary of the 1973 war, which was 6 October 1973. I don’t, therefore, think that they decided on it a few months ago because they thought the Israeli political system seemed to be in some disarray, with many demonstrations against the government. I don’t believe that.

When you have a plan that you’ve been working on for a year or two, you can always call it off. You can always change the date. Seeing that political disarray may have encouraged them. “Let’s not postpone.”, “Let’s go on with it”, “Let’s do it”. It was the same thing with respect to the concert/rave event which led to the deaths of well over 200 Israelis. Hamas didn’t know of that when they started planning for the 50^th anniversary, but it may have been an encouragement to go on and not cancel.

If I’m right about this conception being wrong, the conception that a modus vivendi had been reached, then it raises questions for the Israelis, first, about Hezbollah. They have a kind of modus vivendi with Hezbollah too, since 2006. Hezbollah came across the border and war started. They killed several Israeli soldiers, and prime minister Olmert struck back. The head of Hezbollah, Sheikh Nasrallah, said later famously, “If I had known the Israelis were going to counterstrike in such an enormous way, I wouldn’t have done it.”

Since that period, Hezbollah has become much more powerful. People estimate that, in Lebanon, it has about 150,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel, and its forces have been much better trained. The Israelis may rethink if they can live with that, waiting for the day when Hezbollah decides what Hamas decided – to a start a war. I also think that, after this war, the Israelis will have to rethink the Iranian nuclear weapons program. They have said repeatedly that they won’t permit Iran to get a nuclear weapon – so has President Biden. But, having watched Hamas do the damage it did, and having seen that when they said they wanted to destroy the state of Israel, they meant it, having seen the savagery with which they killed Jews, I think the Israelis will take another look at the Iranian nuclear program. The chance that they will decide to strike at some point will rise. That’s point one.

I want to turn now to Israel, which has had about nine or ten months of terrible political division. You’ve seen the many demonstrations, including reservists who said, “We will not serve”. Of course, all of them are now serving. But that’s over. In texts and emails with Israeli friends, former colleagues who were in government there when I was in the Bush administration, there is a sense of great national unity. People say, “I am so glad this terrible period is over.” The whole nation has come together. Under the most tragic circumstances, but still, there is an enormous amount of national unity. Unity around defeating Hamas. Unity around the view, “We cannot allow a situation where this could happen again.” So, Hamas as a military force simply has to be eliminated. That does not mean that the unity will continue indefinitely. After the 1973 war, Israel named a commission of inquiry, which took about nine months to deliver its report. Golda Meir, the prime minister, was forced to resign at that point, as well as others in the military and intelligence services. There’ll be a lot of that.

Even those who are the angriest now about the government failures, however, are all saying that’s for later. That’s for after the war, no politics now. Obviously, Israel now has a government of national unity. They have to win this war. That is a consensus, and it’s not just a consensus in Israel. Because what they’re fighting is not just Hamas, but the family of terrorist groups of which it is a part. It includes Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and some other groups that Iran supports. You have already heard speeches, statements and press releases by Arab governments saying, “What Israel is doing is terrible”, “It’s a war crime”, “It’s a crime against humanity”. But, almost without exception, they want Hamas defeated too. They want Hamas defeated because, in most cases, they know Hamas is now a creature of their enemy, Iran. They don’t want the kind of Middle East in which a group like that can conduct such savage military attacks. Most of them want stability in the Middle East. The exception, I would say, is Qatar. It’s an interesting exception, because you would know that Qatar is trying to negotiate the release of hostages and has called for the release of all women and children. But when you hear statements from the leaders of Hamas, many of them are sitting in Doha, living in Doha.

Al Jazeera is broadcasting incitement, as it did during the Iraq War. We thought Al Jazeera was costing the lives of Americans in Iraq, by inciting people to kill them. So, it’s striking that, though they claim neutrality, allowing themselves to be a haven for Hamas leaders is not neutrality. What Al Jazeera is broadcasting – which is completely under the control of the government, there’s no free press issue here, this is a government-controlled station – is also inciting violence. What is agreed on in private by almost every Arab government and Israel is that Middle East peace depends, in part, on crushing Iran’s proxies, these terrorist groups. It’s impossible to think of peace while Iran is sponsoring terrorism and war. There will be a terrible humanitarian toll – there already is – in Gaza. And not just in Gaza – something like 60,000 Israelis have been driven out of their homes by the fear of war and have been relocated elsewhere in Israel. The numbers are, of course, much higher on the Gaza side. I’m struck by this.

The greatest number of refugees right now is probably Syrian refugees. Venezuelans are a close second, almost a tie. But in the Middle East, it’s Syrian refugees. Where did the Syrian refugees go? Neighbouring countries. In Jordan, for example, which opened its borders, the United Arab Emirates set up a refugee camp called the Zaatari Camp, which they paid for. Eighty thousand Syrians are there right now, and it’s a very well-run camp. No one wants to be in a refugee camp, but they have a place to go. It’s striking to me. Israel does not encircle Gaza, because there’s a border with Egypt. One could imagine the establishment of refugee camps in Sinai where the population density is 18 people/km². It’s empty. Northern Sinai is empty. That’s not happening. The Egyptians don’t seem to want it to happen. Other Arab governments are also saying that’s not the answer. Why is it not the answer. There is no answer. But why is it not an amelioration of the condition of Gazans? Why wouldn’t it help? Well, you hear the argument, this is a trick to diminish the importance of the Palestinian problem. That’s interesting because what that means is that the Palestinian cause is more important than Palestinians. That’s what that’s saying. It’s saying that what happens to these real, living people is not as important as the cause. That’s shameful. Much more could be done for people in Gaza.

You will hear more and more about the ways in which Israel is violating international law and the law of war. The Israelis did what they’re supposed to do, which is say, “There will be a war in northern Gaza and civilians must remove themselves”.  This is something Hamas never does since the goal is to kill as many civilians as possible. But you’re supposed to tell civilians, “You’re in danger, get out of the way.” Far from being a war crime, it is required by the laws of war. I wish those civilians had more help than they’re currently getting from the international community. This war will come to an end, whether it’s a month or two months or more. And when it ends, Gazans will face, and any government that is concerned about it will face, a very large problem which is who governs Gaza?

I was in the Bush administration in 2005 when Prime Minister Sharon forced all Israelis out of Gaza; all of the settlers and the military bases. In Washington, we had an answer to who would govern Gaza – the Palestinian Authority. It seemed like the right answer. Arafat died at the end of 2004. In January 2005, they had a presidential election. Mahmoud Abbas won a four-year term which has been rather extended. But that 2005 election was a good, fair election. It wasn’t the way Assad or Mubarak were winning 99 per cent of the vote. Mahmoud Abbas got something like 63 per cent. The opposition candidate got about 35 per cent. So, the Palestinian Authority seemed to be in relatively good shape.

The Palestinian Authority took over Gaza when the Israelis left and ruled it for a year and a half, before being kicked out by Hamas. They were brutally kicked out – you can look up contemporary news stories about Hamas throwing Fatah leaders and fighters off the roofs of buildings. But it was a very short conflict between Hamas and Fatah even though the Fatah forces outnumbered Hamas between five and ten to one. Most of them went home and took off their uniforms. The Hamas people fought, and they won and took over Gaza. The United States government asked Prime Minister Sharon to cooperate on this with the Palestinian Authority to help them prepare for taking over, but he didn’t want to do it because he was under a massive attack in Israeli politics for pulling people out of Gaza. He said, “I have got to do this as something that’s being done alone by Israel in Israel’s interests. It’s not a gift to the Palestinians, and I don’t want to talk to them about it.” That was perhaps a terrible mistake.

We also thought that Egypt would have a guiding role in Gaza. I remember meeting with the head of the Egyptian Intelligence Service in Sharm El-Sheikh. He was adamant that Egypt had everything under control in Gaza. It was a case of saying don’t worry about Gaza after the Israelis leave. We can handle it. We can help the Palestinians. This was completely wrong, obviously.

So, what now? That’s a very difficult question. Could the PA just go in and take it over? Not easy. For one thing, it would look as though they were going in under Israeli bayonets. For another, the PA of 2023 is not the PA of 2005. It’s really discredited in the eyes of most Palestinians. I looked at the most recent polls, which were from March; 77 percent of Palestinians wanted President Abbas out, 44 percent think Hamas and Fatah do not deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people, 26 percent think Hamas deserves to represent and lead the Palestinian people, 24 percent think Fatah deserves to. These are really low numbers of confidence in the government. The Palestinian political system of 2023, before this war, was a broken system. In both Gaza and the West Bank, people seem to view their governments as oppressive and corrupt.

So, what can be done? My advice to the US government would be, start talking to the Gulf Arabs, who would have to pay for a new government in Gaza and the reconstruction. Speak to Egypt, as the neighbour, to the EU, to the United Nations, to the Arab League. If the PA is going to try to return and govern as they do in the West Bank, they need to do it under some kind of legitimate cover and the Arab League is probably the best, better in some ways than the UN. But that’s no panacea, and I think no one has really thought about the problems. The Israelis didn’t, because they didn’t think they were going to have to do this. They didn’t think that, at the end of 2023, Hamas would not be in control of Gaza. It is one of the most difficult questions. It relates, also, to another question that’s coming around the corner pretty fast. What, in any event, is the future of the Palestinian Authority? President Abbas is 88, so there will be a change in leadership at some point in the next few years. Some 82 percent of Palestinians think Palestinian institutions are corrupt. That is high. Some 63 percent, or around two thirds, believe the Palestinian Authority is a burden on the Palestinian people. What comes after President Abbas? A power struggle.

Like Arafat, Abbas has three roles: President of the Palestinian Authority, head of the Fatah Party and head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. My guess is that, in the power struggle after he leaves the scene, it’s going to be really hard for one person to dominate all three roles. So, they’ll split it up; one person will get the PLO, one will get the party, one will get the PA. Those people will then set about what they will all view as their most important job, which is getting rid of the other two people. It’s natural, that’s politics. They are your natural enemies.

During the power struggle, which could last years, the last thing you want to do is make compromises with Israelis. Trying to do some kind of peace agreement with Israel would require compromises on both sides. You can’t do that in the middle of a Palestinian power struggle, in which the new leader has to legitimise himself. That power struggle means that what we have for decades called “peace negotiations” will not be coming anytime soon. What is happening now in Gaza also means that anyone who thinks there is an easy solution here, a two-state solution, is kidding themselves because there is a question that must be posed after what happened on 7 October. The question is who is going to prevent terrorism and make sure that law and order prevail in a Palestinian state?

Until you can answer that question, calling for the two-state solution is an unserious approach to the problem. This is not true just for Israel, it’s equally true for Jordan. Is it possible that Israel would permit a group like Hamas to take control of the West Bank? Adjacent not to these kibbutzim in Southern Israel, and to the town of Sderot but adjacent to Jerusalem. Adjacent to Ben Gurion Airport, overlooking the coastal plain where most Israelis live and the Israeli economy is essentially located. It’s unthinkable, and it’s not going to happen.

It’s a folly to say what just about every head of state in the whole world is saying now; “After this, we need to get back to the two-state solution.” We need to get back to thinking about Palestinian Israeli relations. We need to get back to thinking about decent government and decent lives for Palestinians. Waving this banner of a two-state solution is not a serious approach to a problem that just cost so many lives.

My final point is about Iran. Without Iran, there’s no Hezbollah and no Hamas as we know them today. Most estimates say that Iran spends about $700 million/year on Hezbollah and about $150-200 million on Hamas, and there is training in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran. There is planning. There is equipment. In fact, peace in the Middle East will never arrive while Iran is fighting peace in the Middle East. Think of Iraq without the Iranian-supported Shia militias trying to steal power and preventing Iraq from settling into an electoral democracy. Think of Lebanon without Hezbollah supported by Iran. Think of what Lebanon used to be and could be again. Think of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if Iran were not supporting Hamas and Islamic jihad. The people of Iran pretty clearly hate that regime. In the last 14 years, there have been three major uprisings – 2009, 2014, and the beginning of this year – and there will be more. What should we be doing? I think it’s clear that we should be on the side of the people of Iran. We are rhetorically in favour of human rights and democracy in Iran, but do we do enough?

I’m thinking of things like broadcasting to Iran, steps to make sure that Iranians have good internet access, to get access to the news and each other. I am also thinking of what in the Trump administration was called maximum pressure, economically. It’s off now. Three years ago, Iran had $4 billion in foreign currency reserves that it could reach. Now it has about $50 billion because of oil sales. If you look at a chart of oil sales, it’s up and up. The US government has not been enforcing the economic or oil sanctions. I think we need to rethink Iran; the US government does, the Australian government does, the governments in the EU do. It’s this modus vivendi problem again. We need to realise that we should be politically and morally on the side of the Iranian people. That regime will fall. Whether it falls in 5 years or 50 years, will determine the future of the Middle East in many ways. After the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, President Carter announced a change in his policy towards the Soviets. We have not seen that from any Western government, but we ought to. People ought to be saying “This is Iran’s contribution to the Middle East: Hezbollah, Hamas and Shia militias in Iraq. Are we doing everything we can, peacefully, to help the people of Iran and to try to diminish the resources available to that regime?” If you think of a Middle East without that regime, the chances of peace of democracy are much stronger. Iran is at the centre of just about every problem in the Middle East.