World War II: How It Began And Why – Adam Rotfeld

In June 2009, an article on Russia’s Defence Ministry website blamed Poland for commencing World War 11. In August 2009, on the 70th anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, senior Polish officials spoke directly of the Soviet Union’s complicity in the commencement of World War 11. Professor Adam Rotfeld is Co-Chairman of the Polish-Russia Group for Difficult Matters – which deals specifically with such issues as Katyn and the current strategic situation in Eastern Europe. During a visit to Australia, Adam Rotfield addressed The Sydney Institute on Monday 28 September 2009 and explained the background to the debate over the outbreak of the Second World War and the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

WORLD WAR II: HOW IT BEGAN AND WHY

ADAM ROTFELD

History matters. The 70^th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War and the preliminary events that led to it recently opened a great public debate (it reminded rather a great quarrel) between Russia and Poland. What is remarkable is that there is no great dispute in understanding of the causes of the war between Poland and Germany.

Most disputed is the turn that took place in relations between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939 and which led to the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The last 20 years has seen much progress in historical research into the causes and the outbreak of the Second World War. Today, we know significantly more about the policies of the Third Reich, the Soviet Union, Great-Britain, France, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. There are now many new approaches based on in-depth research sources, and previously unknown archival documents made accessible to historians following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Many of these new approaches constitute a significant departure from prevalent and seemingly well-entrenched interpretations. I would like to focus my presentation on three main issues which some researchers consider to be of key significance for the understanding of this event.

• First: the German-Soviet rapprochement of 1939 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
• Second: the role and significance which Hitler and Stalin accorded to their agreement of 23 August 1939.
• Third: Ribbentrop’s attempt, during his second visit to Moscow, on 28 September 1939, to further intensify German-Soviet cooperation by sounding Stalin on the possibility of giving German-Soviet cooperation a dimension clearly aimed against the British Empire.

French and British policy

Following Hitler’s breach of the Munich agreement and the Wehrmacht’s entry into Prague, on 15 March 1939, the Western powers were forced to rethink, very rapidly, their policy with regard to Germany, and one could even say chaotically. In the event, it turned out that their lack of credibility limited their policy options to a considerable degree. France had lost  credibility in 1936 by capitulating in the matter of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, and by ignoring Warsaw’s offer to activate the Franco-Polish alliance. As the Locarno Treaty had led to the integration of France and Great Britain’s foreign policies, with regard to Germany, their passivity in response to Hitler’s marching into the Rhineland initiated a process by which the two Western powers lost their credibility as guarantors of European security.

When the reaction of the system’s guardians was increasingly in doubt, this led the use of faits accomplis as instruments of change in the Versailles order. The passive stance of France and Great Britain in March 1936 pre-determined the failure of appeasement as a policy, one that could have been effective and appropriate otherwise. The annexation of Austria in March 1938 only reinforced the impression that Paris and London had silently acquiesced to the idea of Anschluss. The Munich Crisis was thus an attempt by the Western powers to gain control of the process of dismantling the Versailles order. So, what is the significance of these events for reflections on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact? They are fundamental for understanding the international situation after 15 March 1939, and especially after Great Britain and France extended security guarantees to Poland.

Firstly, the insurance policy was granted by a broker of doubtful credibility. Secondly, with the exception of the Poles, who had no other choice, few people believed that Great Britain’s attitude to Hitler’s ambitions had changed. Thirdly, I think that Great Britain made a mistake by extending guarantees to Poland in March 1939. Of course, the guarantees strengthened the position of Warsaw, which was facing a German ultimatum – and this was an important Polish diplomatic success – but in terms of the logic of the political process underway in Europe this was an ill-prepared and premature act.

On the one hand, by extending guarantees to Poland, London gave up the possibility of using such an option as a political threat. In truth, it would not have been a particularly lethal weapon in British policy towards Germany, as Hitler had already formed an opinion of British and French politicians with which he had dealt in Munich. Firstly, however, London and Paris did not have an abundance of policy instruments to choose from at the time, and even this one could have proven significant. Secondly, reserving the option to extend guarantees to Poland – or perhaps even to other countries bordering on the USSR – for a little longer would have strengthened the position of the Western powers in their negotiations with the Soviet Union. It would also have made attempts at a German-Soviet rapprochement more difficult although, of course, it could not have prevented them. With this option open, the Western powers could, for a bit longer, stay in control of the game, whose stake was the nature of the Soviet Union’s role in the mounting European crisis.

The British guarantees extended to Poland and Romania ruled out the prospect of such a fulfillment of German territorial aspirations in Eastern Europe as might have, in the longer perspective, formed the foundation for anti-Soviet cooperation between Germany and the Western European powers. At the same time, they protected the USSR from the eventuality that the Third Reich would direct its imperial aspirations towards the east, while France and Great Britain remained passive. It is thus difficult to resist the impression that – considering the entirety of British policies and particularly the necessity of maintaining a field of maneuver in London’s policies toward the USSR – the granting of guarantees to Poland and Romania at the end of March 1939 was a mistake from the point of view of British foreign policy goals. London handed Stalin, for free, an advantage that allowed him to decide the fate of Europe. Hitler did not have any real possibility of attacking the USSR without previously overcoming Poland and its western allies.

The Kremlin’s anxiety could have been aroused by the theoretical possibility of settling “the Polish crisis” by way of a “new Munich” – an international conference held without the USSR’s participation. Thus the goal of Soviet efforts from April 1939 on was to preclude the possibility of such a scenario. Of fundamental importance for this tactic was, on the one hand, to confirm Hitler in the conviction that an armed confrontation with Poland would not lead to any conflict of interests with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, this tactic was furthered by Moscow’s giving the appearance of being interested in building, along with France, Great Britain, Poland and other states of Central Europe, some sort of barrier to German aspirations in Central Europe. Taking into consideration the evolution of the political situation in Europe in the spring and summer of 1939, holding back Hitler, who was pushing for war with Poland, would only have been possible through veritable cooperation between Great Britain, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union, based on the Soviet Union’s unambiguous guarantee to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its neighbors. The problem lay in that such a solution would have led to some sort of multilateral settlement, most certainly to an international conference, to a “new Munich”, but this time with the participation of the USSR.

Heading in this direction, the Soviet Union would de facto lengthen the functioning of the Versailles-Riga order; at the same time, however, the strengthening of the USSR’s position achieved in this manner would not necessarily have been lasting. Stalin could not rule out the possibility that after the end of the crisis over Poland, European policy would return to the beaten Locarno path, and the Soviet Union might once again find itself outside the main current of developments. A second possibility, which the Kremlin must have considered, lay in supporting the process by which Germany alienated itself from France and Great Britain, fanning the flames of the resulting antagonisms and encouraging the Germans in their aggressive designs with respect to Poland. The realisation of these goals was certainly furthered by Moscow’s acceptance of the German proposition to normalise German-Soviet relations and the USSR’s support of Germany’s plans to liquidate Poland. The continuation of talks with the Western powers in the matter of an anti-German bloc was thereafter treated by Stalin exclusively as a means of pressuring Germany.

German-Soviet agreement of 23 August 1939

For the Soviets, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was of strategic importance. Toppling the status quo in Europe could – by making Hitler’s plans come true – create an opportunity to revise the western borders of the Soviet Union and help Bolshevik Russia attain superpower status. Destroying Poland would move the borders of the “Proletarian State” further to the west, and Stalin’s influence on European politics would thus considerably increase. The possible alliance with the Western powers would have had the opposite effect for the Soviets; it would have resulted in preserving the existing status quoin Europe, which the Bolsheviks had consented to for the previous twenty years for tactical reasons only. In spite of different motivations, the understanding between Hitler and Stalin was based on the shared conviction that their non-aggression pact would ultimately deprive Western powers of a chance to intervene in the German-Polish war, which would mark a definite end of the Versailles order.

The content of the treaty was originally of lesser importance for both sides. The main purpose of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was its psychological and propaganda impact. Consequently, the August 1939 talks at the Kremlin did not include a detailed discussion of the technical aspects of the Pact. The precise interpretation of the term “sphere of influence” was never agreed upon and neither were the terms of realisation of the secret protocol.

It should be stressed, however, that the potential benefits which the Soviets could have gained by signing a non-aggression agreement with Hitler, were in large measure dependent on the final position of the Western powers with regard to the German invasion of Poland. All things considered, the situation in the second half of August 1939 called for caution: Firstly, there was always the possibility that the German-Polish crisis would not degenerate into armed conflict but would be resolved by peaceful means, through an international conference modeled on Munich, for example. The existence of a non-aggression agreement between the USSR and Germany would have made Soviet participation in such a conference difficult. Also, in the event, the Soviet Union could not have counted on any territorial concessions in East-Central Europe and the secret protocol would have immediately become immaterial. Secondly, there was no certainty that the Western powers, the wiser for their experience in Munich, would once again shirk from armed intervention. Furthermore, if they opted for intervention, its outcome would be far from certain. Many contemporary historians think that the defeat of the Third Reich would have been very probable. In such a situation, the Soviet Union had to remain outside of the conflict at all costs so as to avoid being perceived as a German ally.

The signing of the Polish-British Common Defence Pact on 25 August 1939 and the increasingly active attempts to organize a “second Munich” put in question the understanding about the division of East-Central Europe into spheres of influence. If Berlin expected that the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact would have a destructive impact on the Western system of guarantees to Poland, a mere two days later, such hopes turned out to be illusory. In spite of the pessimistic news flowing from all directions, the Western powers no longer had any intention to give in to Hitler or to pressure Warsaw to acquiesce to the German chancellor’s dictate.

The Führer now feverishly sought a way out of the situation that he had himself created. The Soviet option, on which he had counted, turned to be a false trump card. As if this were not enough, on 25 August, the Swiss daily Neue Züricher Zeitung carried news that the Soviet Union had withdrawn 250,000 soldiers from the Polish boundary in an effort to dispel rumours about the possible participation of Red Army units in another partition of Poland. In order to gain time and, on the one hand, to find a way to keep the Western powers from intervening in the German-Polish war and, on the other hand, to clarify Moscow’s position, Hitler postponed the date of invasion of Poland. He then once again attempted to drive a wedge between the West and its eastern ally. He communicated new “generous proposals” to Paris and London. Warsaw was to cede the corridor to the Germans and acquiesce to the incorporation of the city of Danzig to the Reich. The entire arrangement was to be guaranteed by the powers, including the Soviet Union. Hitler’s aim was evident: to create uncertainty in London and Paris. In turn Warsaw, for which the “offer” was obviously unacceptable, was to be shouldered with responsibility for the outbreak of a local war.

At the same time, German diplomats made energetic efforts to obtain from Moscow an official démenti of the reports about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Polish border. At first, Molotov was approached by Schulenburg. On 28 August, he received assurances that the information carried in the western press was inconsistent with the facts. On the following day, Köstring managed to obtain a confirmation of this statement. Berlin must have been in a state of considerable nervousness, however, as this information was judged as insufficient.

Still, on the evening of 28 August, Ribbentrop personally called the Soviet embassy, though he knew that no high-ranking Soviet diplomat was present in Berlin at the time, and steadfastly demanded an official denial of the rumor about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Polish border. Most obviously, the Germans were not so much interested in Moscow’s diplomatic clarifications as in a loud and public démenti by the Soviet government.

This gives rise to a question: Could a reaction so unusual and so out of step with diplomatic practice on the part of the Germans have been caused by such a trifle as a report in a Swiss paper? As this does not seem very likely, one should assume that the information of the Neue Züricher Zeitung complicated German plans in some specific manner. If Hitler’s greatest expectation in connection with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was to achieve a loud propaganda coup and, as a result, even a short-lasting psychological advantage over the western powers, the dissemination of information about the Red Army’s retreat from the Polish border was not in his interest. Thus, this apparently insignificant event seems very telling. On the one hand, it can serve to corroborate the thesis that Hitler intended to make use of his agreement with Stalin in a purely instrumental fashion and, on the other, it is indicative of the level of tension with which developments on the international stage were followed in the German capital during the last days of peace.

It seems that in Berlin, the signing of the alliance between Great Britain and Poland gave rise to fears that, in this situation, the Soviet Union could view the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as a document that had lost all meaning. We should remember that such doubts did not necessarily have to be justified by Soviet behavior. The Germans, disenchanted that information about their 23 August agreement with the Soviets had produced an opposite reaction on the part of the Western powers than the one they hoped for, could easily have feared that a similar mood might have emerged at the Kremlin. One thing that may bear this out is the fact that, on 29 August, Ribbentrop summoned the Soviet temporary plenipotentiary in Berlin, Ivanov, and unequivocally stated that, in connection with the German-British negotiations on the subject of the “Polish problem” the German obligations with regard to Russia remained in force. In other words, he confirmed the effectiveness of the agreement concluded in Moscow. Had Ribbentrop not feared that Moscow’s position, which had favored Berlin’s plans, would change under the influence of international developments, he would rather not have felt the need to give the Soviet diplomat his personal assurances about the lasting nature of the obligations assumed by the Reich.

The German minister of foreign affairs used the same occasion to inform Ivanov that “the ‘Polish question’ would be resolved in a matter of days and at any cost”. By so doing, he assured the Soviets that war with Poland would take place in spite of everything, even if it were to mean that the Reich would find itself in a state of war with the Western powers. The Soviet leadership could breathe a sigh of relief – Hitler was determined to assault Poland, so the Soviet Union could still count on the commission agreed upon.

On 30 August, the Soviet news agency issued a press release, denying the report of the Swiss paper on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Polish border. The press release stated that the said rumors are untrue and, furthermore, that “in connection with the growing seriousness of the situation in the Eastern part of Europe and the possibility of surprises, the Soviet high command decided to increase the number of troops in its garrisons on the USSR’s western border”.

Moscow must have subjected the public text of the British-Polish accord to in-depth analysis. In the first article, the signatories undertook to grant each other assistance in the case of aggression by a European power. Undoubtedly, the Soviets must have wondered if, by any chance, the British guarantees to Poland did not include a possible aggression from the East. This would not be surprising if the Kremlin also came to doubt the lasting nature of the accord it had concluded with the Germans. Any backtracking by Hitler or ending the ‘Polish crisis’ by way of a peace conference, thus depriving Moscow of its expected benefits, could have seemed probable to the Soviets in the existing situation. For this reason, Ribbentrop’s assurances to Ivanov were doubtlessly greeted in Moscow with some satisfaction.

On 28 August 1939, Hitler set the date for the invasion of Poland to 1 September. On the same day, in Moscow, Schulenburg and Molotov signed a document delimiting the line separating the spheres of interest of both powers on Polish territory. The river Pisa was added to point 2 of the secret protocol, thus settling the last remaining matter. Hitler could begin war operations.

The Soviet Union’s embarking on “parallel military action” in Poland, as the Soviet aggression on Poland was termed by Weizsäcker in a discussion with Italian ambassador on 27 September, put an end to military operations on the banks of the Vistula, helped the Germans in wrapping up their military operations in the East, and reduced the threat to Germany of a war on two fronts.

Stalin on the possibility of German-Soviet cooperation against the British Empire

During his second visit to Moscow, on 28 September, Ribbentrop, acting on his own initiative, i.e., without instructions from Hitler, offered Stalin an intensification of German-Soviet relations by the conclusion of an alliance against the British Empire:

[…] We think – he said to Stalin – that in the English [problem] complex there exists a parallel between German and Soviet interests and that in this sphere, close cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union is not only beneficial but specific agreements are possible. […] Should the Soviet government share such a point of view, it would be possible to formulate a platform for a closer development of Soviet-German relations, in the sense that, based on the common settlement of the Polish question, Germany and the Soviet Union could presently consider the possibility of cooperation with regard to England. […] This would entail long-term cooperation, as the Führer thinks in a historical perspective.

Perhaps Ribbentrop wanted to suggest that it was possible for the Third Reich and the Soviet Union to set a new “demarcation line” dividing not Poland, but the British Empire into spheres of interest. Of course, this would require a more “intense” coordination on the part of both sides. The German foreign minister added, however, that the Reich does not expect the Soviet Union to join the war against England. “Germany can deal with England on its own,” Ribbentrop said to Stalin, and immediately clarified that the point would be to “demonstrate before the entire world the cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union and their agreement in fundamental foreign policy questions. […] At present, the task would consist of reaching a mutual understanding on the form and method of announcing an appropriate common declaration”. The German foreign minister then showed Stalin a draft of such a declaration, which he had prepared while still in Berlin.

Undoubtedly, Ribbentrop presented his offer to Stalin with great skill. He emphasised that London would probably not resist for long as it was not appropriately prepared to do so, in connection with which Germany is in a position to deal with England on its own, following which he declared that the Third Reich is ready to share the British Empire’s “bankruptcy estate” with the Soviet Union. All these proposals were presented to the Soviet side along with a draft declaration of both governments mentioning both countries’ intention to end the war in Europe. In this manner, the German foreign minister sounded the Soviet position on the subject of a possible alliance using Göring’s idea of a common German-Soviet peace initiative.

But what did Ribbentrop expect to obtain in return? German-Soviet cooperation against Poland was quite “intense” in nature so any further intensification would have produced, at the very least, a “silent” alliance. The proposal for demarcating Berlin’s and Moscow’s spheres of interest on territories belonging to the British Empire additionally shows that Ribbentrop intended to a give the Soviet Union an appropriate place in the “continental bloc” aimed against London.

That the German minister of foreign affairs acted on his own initiative and not following Hitler’s directions is indicated by, among other things, his wire sent to the Führer from Moscow after the discussions had ended on 28 September, and in which he wrote in rather general terms that after discussing issues connected with setting out the border, he “presented Stalin with several proposals concerning the deepening of German-Soviet friendship”.

It seems obvious that had Ribbentrop acted on the basis of the Hitler’s personal instructions, he would not have failed to inform the German leader that he had just presented Germany’s offer of alliance to Stalin, as this information would have been eagerly awaited in Berlin. Moreover, all accessible sources concerning Hitler’s views on the subject of German-Soviet relations at the time do not provide any grounds to think that, following the collapse of Poland, he had any intention of concluding an alliance with Stalin aimed against the British Empire. Quite the opposite, one can show that Hitler felt rather constrained by his cooperation with Stalin.

In Alfred Rosenberg’s diary, the entry for 29 September includes a passage indicating that Hitler had doubts if the price he had paid to secure the USSR’s “benevolent neutrality” during the Polish war had not been too high. He feared that should the Soviets take a stand against the Reich, the Germans would not be in a position to oppose it on account of the fact that the Baltic States, especially Estonia, had fallen under Soviet control. Weizsäcker, who was in frequent contact with the Führer during Ribbentrop’s trip to Moscow, also noticed Hitler’s distrust of Stalin and, on 28 September, mentioned it to general Halder, OKH Chief of Staff. It is thus difficult to suppose that the German chancellor could have agreed to an alliance with Stalin, whose true intentions he distrusted.

All appearances to the contrary, Ribbentrop did not risk all that much. Had Stalin accepted his proposal for an alliance, the German minister of foreign affairs could always claim that the idea was put forward by the Soviet side. If, in the spring of 1939, German diplomats had made use of a similar maneuver, as seems very probable, to convince Hitler to come to an understanding with Moscow, Ribbentrop could again resort to this effective, as he may have thought, method to influence the German chancellor’s decisions. On the other hand, presenting the Soviet side with such a far-reaching offer was, from the German point of view, beneficial irrespective of Stalin’s and Molotov’s response. The Soviet side would have to respond and this would allow the Germans to obtain important information about the manner in which the Soviet leadership viewed the existing international situation.

In answer to the proposals made by Ribbentrop, Stalin stated that a

…fundamental element of Soviet foreign policy has always been the conviction that cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union was possible. Even in the initial stage, when the Bolsheviks came to power, the world accused them of being paid German agents. The Rapallo accord was signed by Bolsheviks. It contained all the grounds for the widening and deepening of mutually beneficial relations. When the National-Socialist government came to power in Germany, relations worsened, as the German government saw the necessity to give priority to internal matters. After a time, these matters exhausted themselves and the German government showed good will to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet government immediately declared that it is ready for measures aimed in this direction. If there is to be any talk of blame for the worsening of relations, it should be noted that, in its historical concept, the Soviet government never ruled out the possibility of good relations with Germany. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet government, also today, embarked on the renewal of cooperation with Germany with a clean conscience. This cooperation holds such power that all other combinations should give way before it. If the German government shares this point of view and will proceed in keeping with the views expressed [here] by Mr Foreign Minister, then all the necessary preconditions for good and friendly cooperation exist. […] As far as the English problem complex is concerned, the Soviet government would like to note that it has never felt any affinity towards England. It is enough to look into the works of Lenin and his disciples to understand that the Bolsheviks always loathed and hated England the most, including times when there was still no talk of German-Soviet cooperation.

As Stalin noted, Ribbentrop delicately suggested that “by the term of cooperation, Germany did not mean military assistance and has no intention of drawing the USSR into the war. This was very skillfully and well said”. The Soviet leader understood immediately the real intentions of his German guest and, just as skillfully, wiggled out from declaring such an ‘intensification’ of relations with Berlin as would have led Moscow straight in the direction of a German-Soviet alliance:

It is a fact that Germany presently needs no one else’s assistance and possibly won’t need any in the future [either]. However, if, contrary to expectations, Germany finds itself in a difficult situation, it can be certain that the Soviet people will come to Germany’s assistance and will not allow for Germany to be smothered. The Soviet Union is interested in a strong Germany and will not allow Germany to be brought to the ground’.

In spite of appearances, this statement meant that Ribbentrop’s proposal aimed at the building of a German-Soviet alliance on the eve of Hitler’s offensive in the West was rejected by Stalin. Instead of the desired acquiescence to this project, Ribbentrop obtained foggy promises of future Soviet assistance should victory seem to favor the western powers. In reality, Stalin put off the entire matter ad Kalendas graecas. Moreover, his talk of the assistance with which the “Soviet people” would come to the rescue of the embattled Third Reich could easily have caused his German interlocutors some anxiety.

Conclusion

In the years 1939-1941 the Soviet Union attempted to use the non-aggression pact with Germany and the collapse of the Versailles-Riga order to acquire the status of a full-fledged European power. The basic thrust of his policy consisted in stirring up the armed conflict under way in Europe while simultaneously avoiding a situation that might lead to the USSR’s direct involvement in that conflict. In exchange for his support of the Third Reich, Stalin obtained Germany’s withdrawal from Eastern Europe, including the withdrawal of its economic interests, and eliminated the Western powers’ political influence in Eastern Europe. Thanks to this, Stalin could take over the political assets of both belligerent parties on this part of the continent.

Endnotes

Slawomir Debski: Rethinking the Molotow-Ribbentrop Pact: Between Tactics and a Grand Strategy. Lecture given at SSEES, London, 5 Dec. 2008. The presented text is based mainly on the S. Debski monograph Miedzy Berlinem a Moskwa. Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie1939-1941. Warszawa 2007.

We know today that the change was fundamental. Both in September 1938 an in the spring of 1939, Chamberlain’s policy was consistent with the dominant currents of public opinion. Insofar as in the fall of 1939 most Britons were against involving Great Britain in a war in defense of the Versailles order, in the following spring, British public opinion equally strongly supported a policy pre-supposing such an involvement.

I thus agree with the conclusion reached by Adam Ulam in Expansion… . p. 267 et seq. In contrast, Michal Zacharias thinks that such consequences for Soviet foreign policy only came with Hitler’s renunciation, on 28 April 1939, of the Polish-German declaration on the resignation from the use of force. M.K. Kaminski, M.J Zacharias, W cieniu zagrozenia. Polityk zagraniczna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1918-39, Warsaw 1993,p. 256. About British guarantees to Poland as a source of greater negotiation possibilities for Moscow, see W. Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin, Princeton 1984, p. 290 et seq.

Anna Cienciala, in ‘Polska w polityce Wielkiej Brytanii w przededniu wybuchu II wojny swiatowej’, Kwartalnik Historyczny, R. XCVII, 1990, z. 1-2, pp. 92-98, writes ‘… Although the British government could not resort to the same pressure and threats with regard to Poland that it had used – along with France – against Prague in 1938, and could not, considering its distrust of Hitler, propose a new conference à la Munich, it still, as in 1938, pushed for both a compromise at the cost of the victim as for a comprehensive arrangement with Germany’

Slawomir Debski, ibidem.

D.C. Watt thinks that these attempts were futile from the very outset, because both France and Great Britain were petitioning Moscow. It is they who required Soviet assistance, whereas the USSR did not need the assistance of the Western powers.  See W.C. Watt, ‘Bledne informacje, bledne komentarze, brak zaufania. Z dziejów brytyjskiej polityki zagranicznej w latach 1938-1939’ Kwartalnik historyczny“, vol. 85, 1978, z. 1, no. 4, p. 961-985, and Idem, How war came, London 1989.

This is indicated by, among others, by Stalin’s instructions to Voroshilov on 7 August 1939, drawn up prior to the military consultations with Great-Britain and France. See Dokumenti Vneshniei Politiki, vol. XXII, 1939, kn. 1, doc. 453.

See R. Raack, Polska i Europa w planach Stalina…, p. 33-34; M. Kornat, Polska 1939 roku…, p. 473.

S. Zerko, op. cit., p. 437.

J. Tebinka, Polityka brytyjska wobec problemu granicy polsko-radzieckiej 1939-1945, Warszawa 1998, p. 57.

S. Zerko, op .cit., pp. 445-447, H. Batowski, Agonia pokoju i poczatek wojny, sierpien-wrzesien 1939, Poznan 1984, pp. 123 et seq.

ADAP, Serie D, Bd. VII, doc. 360.

Ibidem, doc. 383, 413.

Ibidem, doc. 471.

ADAP, Serie D, vol. VII, doc. 431. See God krizisa, 1938-1939, Moscow 1990, doc. 617, kn. 2, p. 617.

God krizisa, kn. 2, doc. 617, p. 338.

Pravda, 30 August 1939, p. 1.

J. Tebinka, op. cit., p. 56. That such fears really existed is indicated by the substance of the note justifying the Red Armys entry into Poland, which Potiomkin attempted to serve on Polish ambassador in Moscow, Waclaw Grzybowski, on 17 September 1939. See K. Sword, ‘British Reactions on the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939’, Slavonic and East European Review, 1991, no 1, p. 87.

See M.I. Semiriaga, ‘Sowietsko-giermanskije otnoszenija (1939-1941 gg.)’ in B.M. Tupolev (ed.), Rossija i Giermanija, Moscow 1998, pp. 324-325; idem, Tajny stalinskoj diplomatii, 1939-1941, Moscow 1992. See also Polish ambassador in Moscow Waclaw Grzybowski’s assessment of the existing situation in Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka, vol. IV, London 1972, pp. 771-772 and Agresja Sowiecka na Polske w swietle dokumentów 17 wrzesnia 1939 (hereafter ASP), vol. 1, doc. 46, pp. 95-96. This last publication, given the very mediocre level of translation of both German and Soviet documents, is of only limited value for the historian. For this reason, I try to refer to the original version of cited documents.

God krizisa, kn. 2, doc. 614, p. 335.

Attolico to Ciano, 27 September 1939, DDI, serie IX, vol. 1, doc. 458, p. 275.

See J. v. Ribbentrop, op. cit. p. 159.

The entries in Alfred Rsenbergs’s diary indicate that there was talk of this idea in Berlin before Ribbentrop’s trip to Moscow. See A. Rosenberg, Das politische Tagebuch…., entry for 24 September 1939, pp. 79-80.

Ribbentrop to ministry of foreign affairs, 28 September 1939, ADAP, Serie D, Bd. VIII, doc. 152.

‘[Hitler] habe sich das sehr überlegt. Er hätte einige Zugriffe (Häfen i.[n] Estland) nicht hindern können. Stalin m.[it] England gegangen wäre. Er habe kleinere Übel gewählt u.[nd] einen riesigen strategische Vorteil erzielt. […] Stalin hätte doch die führende Schicht ausgerottet, vor einem Krieg fürchte er sich.’ See A. Rosenberg, op. cit., entry for 29 September 1939, p. 81.

F. Halder, Dziennik wojenny…, vol.. I, entry for 27 September 1939, p. 132.

Indirect evidence that Ribbentrop acted without powers from the German leadership at the time may also be found in the fact that the German minutes from the discussions conducted at the Kremlin by the German minister of foreign affairs were only discovered at the end of the 1980s in the personal papers of ambassador Schulenburg. There is no trace of it either in the surviving archives of the Auswärtiges Amt, or on the microfilms of German diplomatic documents that were compiled on Ribbentrop’s instructions in 1944. Perhaps the German foreign minister took care in this manner to remove all evidence that he had proposed an alliance to Stalin. After the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in 1941, the existence such a document could really have constituted a threat to him. The fact that Schulenburg also had a copy could have been a simple oversight. In this context, it is easier to explain the lack of Soviet minutes from these discussions, as they must have been drawn up as well. Russia continues to make its archival resources accessible only with great reluctance and it is difficult to resist the impression that, more often than not, Soviet diplomatic documents are only declassified when they deal with matters that have already been disclosed by diplomatic sources of other countries and when the existence of a Soviet version an not be denied.

I. Fleischhauer, ‘Der Deutsch-Sowjetische Grenz- und Freundschaftsvertrag vom 28. September 1939. Die deutsche Aufzeichnungen über die Verhandlungen zwischen Stalin, Molotov und Ribbentrop in Moskau’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 1991, no. 3, pp. 447-469. See J. v. Ribbentrop, op. cit., p. 159.