Bishop John Moyes Versus Robert Menzies On Banning Communism And The Vietnam War

Paul Terracini teaches in the Department of Studies in religion at the University of Sydney. His PhD studies involved him in research on the role played by Bishop John Moyes and other clerics in the campaign to prevent the Australian Government from proscribing the Communist Party of Australia in 1950/51. Dr Terracini has also had an international career in music as an orchestral musician, composer, conductor and lecturer. On Monday 23 July, Paul Terracini spoke for The Sydney Institute on Robert Menzies and Bishop John Moyes.

BISHOP JOHN MOYES VERSUS ROBERT MENZIES ON BANNING COMMUNISM AND THE VIETNAM WAR

PAUL TERRACINI

Tonight I am going to speak about an Anglican bishop who was well known in mid-twentieth century Australia but largely unknown today, and two examples in which he clashed with the longest serving Prime Minister in Australian history. Before launching into the subject at hand, I should like to begin with a brief account of Bishop Moyes’ career. This should not be necessary for Robert Menzies.

John Stoward Moyes was born in Koolunga, near Port Pirie, South Australia, on 25 July 1884. After winning the dux award at St Peter’s College, Adelaide, Moyes earned a BA and MA at the University of Adelaide, excelling in Mathematics, Classics, Logic and Psychology. He then took his Licentiate in Theology in 1908. In the same year he was ordained as an Anglican priest and was sent to Port Pirie as Assistant Curate for two years. From 1911-1913 he worked as Assistant Curate at Lewisham, in London. The stark juxtaposition of poverty and luxury in this area was a determining influence on his vision for the role of the church. On his return to Australia he served as Rector in several parishes in South Australia before becoming Archdeacon at St Peter’s Cathedral, Adelaide, from 1925-1929. He was elected to the See of Armidale in that year and enthroned there as Bishop on St Andrew’s Day, 30 November 1929. His episcopate lasted until 1964. He was also one of the founding fathers of Australia’s first provincial university, the University of New England, serving as Deputy-Chancellor.

Moyes was part of a small group of loosely associated Anglican and Protestant clergy in the 1930s and 1940s, mainly in New South Wales, which promoted the Social Gospel. The Social Gospel in Australia emanated from the tradition of English Christian Socialism in which social, not merely personal, regeneration was seen to be necessary for a complete Christian life. This placed great emphasis on building the Kingdom of God on earth. The Social Gospel viewed the dispensation of charity in the face of disadvantage as admirable, but palliative and insufficient. It demanded structural change in order to eliminate the causes of societal inequity. This resulted in some of its proponents being labelled as left wing, pink or red.[i] Others associated with this group included the Anglican Bishop of Goulburn, and later, Canberra and Goulburn (1934-1960) Ernest Burgmann, and the Anglican Primate of Australia (1935-1946) and Archbishop of Perth (1929-1946), Henry le Fanu. While Burgmann was Warden of St John’s College, Morpeth, from 1918-1934, its journal, the Morpeth Review, was a vehicle for Social Gospel thought.

Moyes was the first senior clergyman in Australia to publicly challenge the second Menzies Government’s proposed law dealing with Communism.[ii] Ten years earlier, in May 1940,[iii] he had been a vocal critic of the first Menzies Government concerning the banning of communist literature. In 1946, Moyes had been a leading voice in the establishment of the Australian Committee for the World Council of Churches (WCC). During a spat with the editor of the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) after the Committee’s conference in February 1950, Moyes argued that neither faith in Communism, Socialism, nor Capitalism was the answer:

We find it in all three systems, the idea that “power through property” is the basis of social order, whether the property be held for power by individuals or by the State. We held that a true democracy recognising men as greater in value than goods, seeing they are God’s children, would want to go beyond this basis, and we urged that Australians should see each other in relation to God so that a responsible society might be evolved…The Christian faith doesn’t need us to defend it, but to live it, and that is a far more difficult task than to denounce (possibly quite correctly) evil in other people.[iv]

Banning Communism

The Communist Party Dissolution Act of 1950, its defeat in the High Court, and the Referendum of 1951, engendered one of the most torrid and passionate struggles in Australian political history. It was the opinion of the press, the political combatants, and the contemporary historians that a small group of church leaders and academics had influenced the result. Moyes was one of the most prominent of the church leaders who campaigned against the proposed Act of Parliament and the Referendum. Even though these events have been referred to by many historians as having been critical to both Australia’s political and legal history, there has only ever been one detailed and substantial analysis undertaken. This was made by Leicester Webb in 1954. Webb was a political scientist from New Zealand who at the time was Reader in Political Science at the Australian National University.

The Communist Party of Australia (CPA) had previously been banned on 17 June 1940 while Robert Menzies was serving his first term as Prime Minister. This did not cause a great deal of controversy at the time since communists were opposing the war effort. The USSR was at that stage not one of the Allies and its controversial non-aggression pact with Germany was still in force. The ban was lifted by Prime Minister John Curtin on 18 December 1942 by which time the USSR was bearing by far the greatest burden in the war against Germany.[v] The ban does not appear to have been rigidly enforced since CPA publications during the period of illegality are readily available in library collections.

After the war, Menzies, as leader of the newly formed Liberal Party, and Opposition Leader, argued against reintroducing the ban. In 1946 he stated publicly that it was not necessary.[vi] The Country Party, however, led by Arthur Fadden, was adamant that the CPA needed to be proscribed. Its NSW branch recommended this to the Labor Government in April 1946.[vii] By July 1949, Menzies had changed his mind, stating that if successful in the end of year elections, he would introduce legislation to the parliament banning the CPA.[viii] His fundamental argument, that Communism did not thrive in bad conditions, but was the cause of those bad conditions, was also in evidence at this time.

During the autumn of 1950, the recently elected Liberal/Country Party Government prepared to honour its pledge from the 1949 election campaign to introduce the legislation. Under this legislation, the CPA would be banned and individuals declared to be communists would be required to prove their innocence in a court of law. Menzies and Fadden argued that it was a necessary measure due to the clandestine nature of the CPA’s activities and that safeguards were in place to ensure that it only pertained to communists. This contention became crucial during the ensuing debate.

On 12 May 1950 John Moyes launched his campaign against the Communist Party Dissolution Bill. In opening the clerical opposition to the Bill, Moyes made his case to the SMH with the following:

Sir – It is obvious that Communists are doing what they can do to disrupt Australian industry and they cannot be allowed to do this as a first step to further disruption.

But it is essential that in seeking to defeat them we should not deny the principles of our way of life and thus give them a victory.

For the Australian Government to develop an order that has even faint resemblance to the Police State of totalitarian countries, with its hunting for victims, is to give Communism its first victory. For we shall be adopting its methods and using Satan to cast out Satan. That could only mean that Communism had debauched our way of life.

It may be replied that in order to break up this subversive group it is expedient to make people accused of being Communist prove their innocence.

Expediency is a treacherous guide. It may bring short-term success, it always brings long-term disaster; and the violation of an accepted axiom of British law, that a man is innocent until he is proven guilty, for the sake of the immediate safe-guarding of our security, may lead to untold trouble in the future. The history of Europe in the last twenty years is sufficient evidence of the danger of expediency as a guide; the story of Caiaphas in the New Testament is more than sufficient. [ix]

Apart from the above, very few coherent arguments were put forward by church leaders and academics until after the Bill became law. Legal challenges were issued on the day it passed through the parliament, 19 October 1950. In a case in which the future Labor Party leader, Herbert Evatt, represented the Waterside Workers’ Federation, the Act was declared unconstitutional by the High Court on 9 March 1951.

Following the decision, Menzies successfully petitioned the Governor-General for a double dissolution of parliament based on the Senate’s rejection of the Commonwealth Bank Bill. The government lost five lower house seats at the ensuing election, but gained control of the Senate. This was a remarkable result given that Menzies’ Government was struggling with rapidly rising inflation. By the end of the year it had reached 25 per cent. This is still the highest inflation rate in Australian history.[x] A referendum was announced for 22 September and the debate entered its most intense and decisive stage. The referendum proposals requested, amongst other things, permission for the government to enact the same law that had been declared unconstitutional by the High Court.

Bishop Burgmann opened the floodgates for a torrent of anti-Catholicism when his monthly diocesan epistle was published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 1 September 1951. Even after allowing for the contextual religious temperature of the time, it was a regrettable contribution:

The Roman Catholics are behind the present Government in this proposed legislation…the Labor Party also has an unduly large number of Roman Catholic members in the Federal Parliament…Rome has got both political parties on the spot, and unless the Anglicans and others awake in time and come to the rescue of our traditional British freedoms, Rome is likely to win a victory in this referendum that she will know how to use in the future.[xi]

This was followed by similar sectarian arguments put forward by Canon E. J. Davidson of St James’ Church, Sydney.[xii] The result was a barrage of letters to the editor. Catholics were understandably outraged and non-Catholic supporters of the referendum, such as politician Billy Wentworth, seized the opportunity to join the Catholics in an opportunistic and short-lived alliance. The Anglican Dean of Sydney, Stuart Babbage, then attempted to reduce the temperature of the debate by intervening with a more measured contribution.[xiii] The Catholic Church hierarchy, with few exceptions, was curiously reticent to commit itself one way or the other. Pre-referendum polling suggested that Catholics were split between their abhorrence of Communism and their traditional support for the Labor Party.

Others who weighed into the debate included former NSW Premier, Jack Lang, Minister for External Affairs and future Governor-General Richard Casey, and future South Australian Premier, Don Dunstan. Of critical importance was the legal opinion given in support of the No case by another future Governor-General, Zelman Cowen. A team of academics from the University of Sydney argued against the Referendum proposals as did Reverend Alan Walker and some other Protestant clergy. The attitude of the press was one of overwhelming support for the Referendum. Only two mainstream newspapers in the nation offered any support to the No case. These were the Melbourne Argus,[xiv] and the Newcastle Morning Herald.[xv]

Moyes’ September diocesan letter was reported by the SMH and the Age. He argued that a totalitarian measure was not necessary since the government had “all the means we need at our disposal in the Commonwealth Crimes Act”.[xvii] Two leading communists had in fact been jailed in the last year of the Chifley Government under the Crimes Act.[xviii] Moyes continued: “Our leaders are getting rid of the disease or trying so to do, but not clearing away the conditions that allow the disease to flourish…”[xix] Unlike some of his clerical colleagues, however, Moyes attempted to provide positive suggestions for a way out of the “time of urgency”.[xx] In conceding that many would find his ideas “unpractical”,[xxi] he nevertheless argued the Social Gospel view that human selfishness was at the root of the problem and that even if all the Communists were exiled, the problem would not be solved.

Moyes urged Australians to “consider every question, concerning work, money, taxation, from the point of view of others as well as ourselves…”[xxii] He went on to suggest that the trade unions be challenged to cleanse their own ranks and if they refused to accept that responsibility all the power of the nation should be harnessed to get the work done despite them. Moyes also warned the unions that they risked losing all of the gains that they had made in the previous fifty years. He concluded by stating his belief that securing cooperation from the unions was possible.[xxiii]

Years later Moyes wrote that Menzies was relieved when the “No” vote was successful.[xxiv] This view was certainly not contradicted by the actions of the Government immediately after the Referendum’s defeat. Despite predictions that attempts would be made to declare the CPA an unlawful organisation under the Crimes Act, and that suspected communists would be expelled from the public service, no government action was taken. Harold Holt, the Minister for Labour and National Service, had warned his colleagues in his Cabinet Submission of March 1950 that more extreme measures were being sought, and perhaps felt vindicated when he stated that the struggle against Communism would now be fought in the trade unions.[xxv] This had been the policy of the Labor Party during the entire campaign.[xxvi] Although communist influence in key trade unions was still considerable, it had actually declined since 1945.[xxvii]

Moyes’ contribution was crucial because of the fact that a quotation from him was featured in the Referendum pamphlet. In Australian constitutional referenda, the Commonwealth Electoral Office issues a pamphlet to all households containing an argument for both the Yes and No cases. Each argument must be authorised by a majority of members from both Houses of Parliament who had voted in favour, in the case of Yes, and against, in the case of No. An excerpt from Bishop Moyes’ argument from 12 May 1950 was featured prominently on the front page of the “No” case, with only quotes from President Harry Truman and former Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, listed above it. The quote from Moyes read as follows:

For the Australian Government to develop an order that has even a faint resemblance to the police state of totalitarian countries, with its hunting for victims, is to give Communism its first victory. For we shall be adopting its methods and using Satan to cast out Satan.[xxviii]

The majority of “No” supporters in both Houses of Parliament thus voted for Moyes’ argument to be included on the front page of the “No” case together with that of Truman, Chifley and King’s Counsel, Eric Miller. Three states, NSW, Victoria and South Australia voted No and the Yes case was defeated by 52, 082 out of 4, 687, 936 formal votes cast. The margin of victory in the popular vote was 50.5 per cent to 49.5 per cent.

1951 was arguably Robert Menzies’ lowest point in his second period as Prime Minister. He went on to win five more federal elections, retiring undefeated. Menzies’ actions indicated that he was very confident of the Referendum result. He only scheduled two public appearances in the final four days of the campaign.[xxix] One must bear in mind that the early opinion polling suggested a landslide victory for the “Yes” case[xxx] and polls were still pointing to a clear “Yes” victory until one week before the vote.[xxxi]

1951 was one of Bert Evatt’s finest years in Australian politics, if one sets his achievements at the United Nations aside. As advocate for the Waterside Workers’ Federation, he won the case in the High Court and, after the sudden death of Chifley on 13 June 1951, he led the campaign to defeat the Referendum proposals. However, Evatt did not do it alone. Church leaders and academics were very active in securing the Referendum’s defeat. Of the above, John Moyes’ contribution was arguably the most concise and well balanced, free from the regrettable sectarianism and vitriol that characterised the debate.

Vietnam

Early 1965 was a very volatile period for South-East Asia. Australian troops were participating in the defence of Malaysia against President Sukarno’s policy of “Konfrontasi”, and the situation in Vietnam was rapidly deteriorating. Alarming reports relating to the threat of all out war were being published in the Australian press. In March 1965, a group of Anglican bishops signed an open letter to the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, expressing its concerns about the rapid deterioration of the situation in Vietnam. The letter had been composed by the recently retired Bishop Moyes.

The bishops urged Menzies to use his influence with the United States government in order to ensure that the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the conflict could be explored to the full. The letter, and the Prime Minister’s public response, thrust John Moyes and his episcopal co-signatories into the centre of a national debate on Vietnam. Following Menzies’ brusque reply, Moyes composed a second and more critical open letter. The Prime Minister then issued a more detailed response one week before he committed Australian combat troops to the Vietnam War. The initiative taken by Bishop Moyes constituted the first major instance of public debate in Australia concerning the wisdom and morality of the government’s policy on Vietnam.

Moyes’ letter to Robert Menzies was published in the national press between 12 March and 16 March 1965.[xxxii] This was six weeks before the Australian government announced that it was sending combat troops to Vietnam. There were thirteen signatories to the first letter, including Moyes himself. The text read as follows:

Dear Sir Robert,

There are a number of us deeply concerned that our Government should be seen to be taking positive steps, with others, towards an honourable and peaceful settlement of the fighting in Vietnam.

Already His Holiness the Pope, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, and the governments of Canada, India and France have urged through both private and formal diplomatic channels their earnest desire for negotiations leading to peace.

We are not concerned here to canvass the merits of the respective attitudes of the North and South Vietnamese Governments, or of the Governments of the United States and China.

We have in mind, however, the attitude of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom at the time of the Geneva Agreements in 1954, and since.

We also realise that liberal opinion in the USA, as reflected by sober commentators like Mr Walter Lippman, by no means agrees with their government’s policy. Although the USA was not a signatory to the 1954 Geneva Agreements, yet in a statement made on 21st July that year they undertook to refrain from the threat of the use of force in the matter of Vietnam.

It seems to us that our Government, because we owe so much to our Ally, (sic) the United States of America, is morally bound to help our Ally, (sic) in the friendliest and most loyal spirit, to avoid a policy that can lead to an extension of hostilities. We would hope that our nation, living as we do in the Asian world, should join with the Pope, U Thant and the distinguished leaders of the other Western nations mentioned above, in bringing to a close a war that is costing so many lives and reducing the economy of Vietnam to chaos.[xxxiii]

Historian Peter Edwards has written that in different circumstances this gentle example of clerical meddling would have elicited little more than a disparaging remark in parliament. However, Menzies seized the opportunity to disseminate the government’s views in advance of its official decision to dispatch combat troops to Vietnam. The fact that Moyes, an old adversary, was the author may also have riled the Prime Minister more than usual. Menzies’ reply was quite severe in tone, stating that he was “surprised and distressed” by Moyes’ letter, which did not concern itself with canvassing the merits of the respective governments.

Menzies’ counter attack was characteristic of his debating style. He argued: “Well, all I can say is that the government is and must be concerned. Indeed, it seems elementary to me that unless we have some idea on the merits of these matters, our actions will be those of expediency and not those of principle.”[xxxiv] His reply went on to expound the views that had characterised his political career, at least as far as the Cold War period was concerned, emphasising the responsibility that North Vietnam and China must bear for the war and thus offering his flank to attack on grounds of demagoguery and ignorance, (which was exploited in the bishops’ second letter) arguing that: “The political views of Hanoi are not to be distinguished from those of Peking.”[xxxv]

Menzies also asked rhetorically: “How could they (the USA) negotiate with Communist China, the home of aggression?… There can be no true composition between atheistic and materialistic Communism and countries with deep religious beliefs.”[xxxvi] He concluded with: “Sir, the change of heart that is needed to lay a good foundation for a fruitful negotiation and a lasting peace must occur in the Communist bodies.”[xxxvii] Menzies sent copies to his ambassador in Washington with instructions to show them to the United States Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and President Johnson, as well as a copy to the British government.[xxxviii] He was assisted by the SMH when on 27 March it lent as forcefully as possible its support to the Prime Minister in a lengthy editorial titled: “The Prime Minister and the Bishops”.

Moyes’ reply to Menzies was published in the national press on 12 April, having reached Menzies with a covering letter, on 10 April.[xxxix] The primary sources reveal a wealth of confusion concerning the provenance of, and the signatories to, this letter. There were ten signatories when the letter was released to the press. Eight of them had signed the first letter.

Material found in Moyes’ private papers reveals a first draft that has not been discussed in previous scholarship. It included a section with far greater emphasis on the application of the Social Gospel to the situation in Vietnam than the revised version published in the press. In a serendipitous discovery, the Prime Minister’s Department file pertaining to this issue reveals that the Prime Minister saw this letter, signed by the Bishop of Kalgoorlie. Cecil Muschamp, of Kalgoorlie, had signed and sent this draft to the Prime Minister apparently before he had received the revised version that was released to the press.[xl] This first draft urged Menzies to be mindful of the fact that communists were also God’s children. Moyes was responding to a quote from Menzies’ reply to his first letter in which Menzies contended that there could be no true composition between atheistic and materialistic Communism and countries with deep religious beliefs. Moyes, evidently stung by the tone of Menzies’ reply, could not resist the touch of sarcasm present in the first sentence when he felt in possession of home ground advantage:

As bishops, with a passing knowledge of theology, we do not quite discern what atheism and materialism have to do with the present issue. We are not clear on the countries to which you attribute deep religious beliefs. On one thing all Christians are unanimous: God is the father of ALL (sic) mankind; not merely Western democrats. Our Lord Jesus Christ came into this world to save, and died for ALL (sic) men, including Marxists and materialists, black men and white, Russians and Americans and Australians alike. It seems to us preferable in this war, as with all wars, carefully to keep references to “deep religious belief” above the evil it may help to resolve, and not to misuse it to bolster one side of the case or the other. The Viet Cong and the U.S. Marines are alike God’s children, our brothers. We should be bound to remember this even were the right patently all on one side in Vietnam.

Despite the expurgation of much of its Social Gospel content when published on 12 April, this letter was hard-hitting and accused Menzies of not telling the whole truth concerning the violations of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and the refusal of South Vietnam to allow nationwide elections.

The Prime Minister’s second and final reply was published on 22 April. The government was extremely concerned after the publication of Moyes’ second letter. The Prime Minister’s Department file contains a flurry of activity led by the Department Head, John Bunting, and the Head of the Department of External Affairs, James Plimsoll. The government was hampered by the fact that Australia had no representation in Hanoi or Peking at the time. Advice on how to counter Moyes’ arguments came pouring in from the Australian Embassies in Saigon and Washington, and from the United States government. Bunting, afraid that Menzies had allowed Moyes to identify weaknesses in the government’s case, advised Menzies to delegate his final reply to the Department of External Affairs. The primary sources reveal that Menzies acted on this advice. External Affairs wrote the reply and Menzies approved it. The final paragraph ensured that the correspondence was thenceforth closed. Menzies announced seven days later, on 29 April 1965, to a half empty House of Representatives that Australia would be sending combat troops to Vietnam.

Conclusion

The historical consensus at the present time places John Moyes on the right side of history in both of the case studies presented here. There are not many historians today who argue that banning the CPA and declaring individuals as communists was a good idea. Likewise, there are not many historians who argue that the USA and Australia covered themselves in glory with their policies and actions in Vietnam.

However, in defence of Robert Menzies, it must be remembered that in the three years between his policy of not banning the CPA in 1946 and his change of mind in 1949, the falling out between the USA and its wartime communist ally, the USSR, had been swift and dramatic. In hindsight, it is easy to dismiss the fear of Communism in Australia during the Cold War as one of paranoid hysteria on the part of the conservative forces, but the perception at the time was very real, and the perception of the truth is usually far more powerful than the truth itself.

Regarding Vietnam, Menzies’ opponents are quick to point out that his arguments appear dated and simplistic, but he was pursuing a policy that he definitely considered to be vital to Australia’s security. One must be mindful of the fact that President Sukarno’s policy of “Konfrontasi” towards Malaysia was still in force in early 1965, and Australian troops were active participants in that conflict. His government was, however, hampered by its lack of diplomatic representation in North Vietnam and China, and its lack of a nuanced view of the perceived communist threat in general. Menzies saw Communism as an international monolith. He did not appear to appreciate the range of factors that often accompanied the drive for self-determination and independence in the developing world and the residual labyrinth of discontent left by the retreat of colonialism.

As far as Bishop Moyes is concerned, these two case studies of his involvement in Australian politics are not notable because it is rare for members of the Christian clergy to do so. What is notable is that Moyes, and a small number of likeminded clerics, had a vision of the role of the Church in society that differed from that of the majority of their colleagues. For those who held Social Gospel or similar views, the role of the Church was not only that of providing a vehicle through which individuals could acquire access to a heavenly afterlife, and of administering charitable organisations. Its role was also to build the Kingdom of God on earth, and to do that, it had to advocate structural change, as well as providing palliative measures.

Governments had to be held to account whenever their policies conflicted with this ideal. The obstacle that proved too great for most of the relevant clergy was that the Church had to remain aloof from party politics, and this was a treacherous path due to the fact that the Social Gospel reading of Christ’s message usually fell politically left of centre.  Moyes was one of the few who managed this delicate balance. He held himself above the sectarianism of the time, and most importantly, above tribalism and its many and varied manifestations. He regarded Christianity as useless if it ever became a comfortable, purely personal Sunday morning club, catering to the needs of the individual, and determining its success or failure by the size of its weekly attendances. As he reminded Robert Menzies, the Christian God was supposed to be the God of all mankind, not just the people who think, talk and look like we do.

Moyes did not defeat the CPA Referendum on his own, but he made a significant contribution towards precluding the government from promulgating a constitutional change that could have had very serious consequences, given the political temperature of the time. Neither did he prevent the Australian government from participating in the Vietnam War, a conflict in which between one and three million people were killed.[xli] He was, however, the first person in the nation to succeed in placing the morality of the issue on the national agenda. In the eyes of Bishop Moyes, God’s greatest gift was the gift of life, and this far outweighed any political ideology that demanded the taking of it. For those who argue that the decline in relevance of Christian churches in Australia is partly due to them having abandoned the public square, rather than being pushed from it, then the career of John Stoward Moyes is well worth a look.

ENDNOTES

[i] Many authors can be consulted for further study. For an introduction to the English tradition, see: Frederick Maurice, The Kingdom Of Christ, (London, SCM Press, 1958) [1838]. For the American tradition see: Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis in the 21st Century, ed. Paul Raushenbush, (HarperOne, 2007). This edition contains the complete text of the original work: “Christianity and the Social Crisis,” first published in 1907. In the Australian context see: Joan Mansfield, The Social Gospel and the Church of England in New South Wales in the 1930s, Journal of Religious History, Vol.13, No 4, (1985), 411-133

[ii] Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) 12 May, 1950

[iii] The Armidale Express, 10 May, 1940

[iv] SMH, 21 February, 1950.  Moyes’ reply to the SMH editorial was also printed in full alongside the original press release of the Australian Council of the WCC, titled: ‘Message to the Churches and People of Australia,’ in the March issue of Southern Churchman, the newsletter of Bishop Burgmann’s diocese of Goulburn and Canberra.

[v] Leicester Webb, Communism and Democracy in Australia: A survey of the 1951 referendum, F.W.Cheshire, 1954, 6-7.

[vi] SMH, February 16, 1946

[vii] SMH, April 15 1946

[viii] SMH, July 20 1949

[ix] SMH, 12 May 1950. For more on Moyes’ exegesis concerning Caiaphas, see: J. S. Moyes, Jesus and People: Five Studies in the New Testament, Australian Student Christian Movement Corporation, 1950, 17-18.

[x] http://www.rateinflation.com/inflation-rate/australia-historical-inflation-rate.php?form=ausir Retrieved 10 July 2012.

[xi] Southern Churchman, 1 September 1951 (my own italics).

[xii] SMH, 6 September 1951.

[xiii] SMH, 10 September 1951.

[xiv] Webb, 108

[xv] Newcastle Morning Herald, (NMH) September 21 1951

[xvi] Webb, 108

[xvii] SMH, 12 September 1951

[xviii] Webb, 21

[xix] Moyes, Diocesan Letter, Armidale Diocesan News (ADN), September 1951

[xx] Moyes, Diocesan Letter, ADN, September 1951

[xxi] Moyes, Diocesan Letter, ADN, September 1951

[xxii] Moyes, Diocesan Letter, ADN, September 1951.

[xxiii] J.S.Moyes, Diocesan Letter, ADN, September 1951.

[xxiv] Moyes, My Confessions, Unpublished manuscript, held at Armidale Diocesan Archives, 153.

[xxv] See: Cabinet Submission No 61, Legislation Against Communism, A4639, CRS 61, National Archives, Canberra.

[xxvi] The Age, 8 October 1951.

[xxvii] See: Daphne Gollan, Balmain Ironworker Battles, 1945-1949, in: Editors Ann Curthoys and John Merrit Better Dead Than Red – Australia’s First Cold War: 1945-1959, Vol.2, Allen & Unwin, 1986; The Advertiser, 4 September 1951; The Advertiser, 6 September 1951.

[xxviii] The Case For and Against, Referendum Pamphlet issued by the Commonwealth Electoral Office, 1951

[xxix] The West Australian, 17 September, 1951

[xxx] The Sun, 8 July, 1951, & 23 August, 1951

[xxxi] The Herald, (Melbourne) 20 September, 1951

[xxxii] The Age, 15 March 1965, Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) 16 March 1965, The Australian, 15 March 1965, Canberra Times, 12 March 1965

[xxxiii] Moyes, “Papers — 1875–1972,” MLMSS 2319,  textual records collection, Mitchell Library, Sydney.vol.5, 97. All of the major Australian broadsheets ran the story and some published the text of the letter in full. These included The Age, The Australian, and the Canberra Times, all on 15 March 1965. The SMH included excerpts from the letter and a brief interview with Moyes, on 16 March 1965.

[xxxiv] The Age, 26 March 1965.

[xxxv] Moyes, “Papers,” vol.5, 103. Note: The names, Peking and Saigon, for Beijing and Ho Chi Minh City, are used in this article in accordance with the usage in the primary sources drawn upon.

[xxxvi] Moyes, “Papers,”  vol.5, 107.

[xxxvii] Moyes, “Papers,” vol.5, 107.

[xxxviii] Peter Edwards, with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War  Memorial, 1992, 356.

[xxxix] Letter from Moyes to Menzies, received by Prime Minister’s Department on 10 April 1965, Vietnam – Correspondence with Anglican Bishops in Australia – March/April 1965.

[xl] Letter from Bishop of Kalgoolie to Prime Minister, received by Prime Minister’s Department, 12 April 1965, Vietnam – Correspondence with Anglican Bishops in Australia – March/April 1965.

[xli] Charles Hirschman, Samuel Preston, and Vu Manh Loi, ‘Vietnamese Casualties During the American War: A New Estimate,’ Population and Development Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, Dec., 1995, 783-812.