US Policy Priorities and the ‘Rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific

Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia in the Washington DC Freeman Chair in China Studies, a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the US government on East Asia. Prior to joining CSIS, Bonnie Glaser served as a consultant for various US government offices, including the Departments of Defense and State. Bonnie Glaser has written extensively on China’s foreign policy, Sino-US relations and US-China. Her articles have been published in the Washington Quarterly, China Quarterly, Asian Survey, International Security, Problems of Communism, New York Times, and International Herald Tribune, among others. On Friday 24 May 2013, Bonnie Glaser addressed The Sydney Institute to discuss the US’s strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific.

US POLICY PRIORITIES AND THE “REBALANCE” TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC

BONNIE GLASER

It’s a pleasure to be here at The Sydney Institute in this lovely building. Thank you, to the US Consulate, the US Embassy and of course the US Studies Centre for inviting me to be here – not only in Sydney but to travel around your lovely country.

One of the most interesting aspects in Australia, is interacting with so many parts of your society and understanding how you see the challenges that we, the US and Australia, face in the Asia-Pacific region – especially how people in Australia view China. There’s a deep divide in the United States, as in many countries, about the emergence of China and what it means for the world. So, today I would like to talk about the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, focusing on the issue of China’s rise.

As you all know, in November 2011, President Obama announced that his administration would shift its strategic focus away from the wars in the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. This was called the strategic rebalancing but often came to be labelled “the pivot to Asia”. I would say “rebalancing” is probably a better term, even though our president prefers pivot.

But the word “pivot” created some anxiety, in part because the policy is actually a strategy aimed at, in part, reassuring countries of the region that the United States is a resident power and that we have deep and enduring interests in this region. The United States has played a stabilising role in the region, and has enabled the great economic growth that has taken place in this region. The US has contributed to this by creating or helping to shape an environment in which countries can focus more on their economic development and not have to worry about security challenges and threats.

The pivot, of course, suggests that not only can the US turn towards the region, but might very abruptly turn away from the region. And that is not as reassuring as it was intended to be. It also implies that we can turn our back on our European partners, which is not the case – although there were those fears in Europe.

In Washington, as I have watched and listened to the discussion of this policy, and observed its emergence, I would say that initially there really wasn’t any comprehensive strategy document that guided the policy. It evolved over time. The US has a multi-dimensional strategy towards the region, with not just military elements, which is the way the strategy is portrayed in many newspapers around the world. It has economic, security and diplomatic components. 

National Security Advisor Tom Donilon has spoken publicly about the US rebalance at least twice. The first time was late in 2012 at the CSIS. He said that even before President Obama was inaugurated, there were discussions among his advisors about what the priorities of the United States should be when the Obama Administration took office. A very early consensus was reached that the United States had over invested in the Middle East in an abnormal way and become bogged down there in wars lasting a decade. But our interests were increasingly in the Asia-Pacific region.

The US was underinvested in this region. Tom Donilon was recognising that this region would be a new priority for the United States. But how new was this? In 2001, in the Quadrennial Defence Review, released just after the September 11 attacks in the United States but largely written before, there was also a recognition of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to the United States and the need to rebalance.

I want to talk a little bit about some of these elements or components of the rebalance strategy. First, the economic elements which are underappreciated but a real driver of this strategy. By 2025, Asia is projected to account for almost half of the world’s economic output. Among the top export partners of the United States over the last decade, 9 out of 19 were in the Asia-Pacific region. And, having taken office at a time when we were facing the global financial crisis and deep unemployment in the United States, President Obama recognised that this was a region where we have significant trade and export markets. In March 2010, President Obama set a target to double US exports to $2 trillion in five years, further highlighting the importance the president and the United States attached to the US economic relationship with the region.

Initially, the Obama administration did not have a clear trade strategy. Thus, the dimensions of the rebalance evolved over time. Now there is a great deal of emphasis on trade, not only globally but particularly in this region. The centrepiece of the strategy is the Trans-Pacific Partnership where the United States with Australia and ten other Asia-Pacific economies, are working to create a new type of free-trade agreement based on a shared commitment to high-standards and the elimination of market access barriers to goods and services as well as an agreement based on respect for a rules-based economic framework.

There are, of course, many models and different types of free-trade agreements – bilateral, multilateral, trilateral – that exist in this region. They’re not, by any means, mutually exclusive. All can contribute in various ways to promoting trade liberalisation and regional economic integration. There has been some concern, for example, in China that somehow the TPP is aimed at excluding China. This is nonsense and very early on senior American officials made it clear that if China, and other countries, would like to adopt these standards and seek to bring their own economies and their own standards in line with the requirements of the TPP that China would one day be welcome to join.

There are other of economic aspects of this policy. The US is increasingly involved in economic projects in the region. The Lower Mekong initiative was an early effort that is continuing to grow. In this we are trying to strengthen co-operation in the areas of environment and health, education infrastructure, development in the lower Mekong region. We’ve recently established a new food security project in Burma. This is another element of the economic component of our rebalance to the region. And there are other trade endeavours in which we are engaged. The US-ASEAN E3 –the Expanded Economic Engagement – designed to expand trade and investment times between the US and the ten members of ASEAN – is also very important but underappreciated, in this Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy. And critical for American interests.

The second component I’d like to talk about is the diplomatic element of the Asia-Pacific rebalance. I will emphasise China but also other aspects.  When I analyse the US policy towards this region, and identify some of the newest elements of this policy, I note that we haven’t been a very active player in the area of multi-lateral regional institution building, particularly in the security field. We’ve been an active member of APEC, but at the security institutions we’ve historically emphasised our bilateral security relationships. Indeed, the Bush administration debated whether or not to become a member of the East Asia Security Summit when it was first established. A decision was made to sit it out, be an observer and see how the organisation evolved before determining whether or not there was an important role for the United States to play.

Obama administration officials adopted a very different approach. They wanted to shape regional institutions, particularly in the security realm, to try and influence them and use them to work together with like-minded countries to address some of the growing security issues in this region such as North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the maritime disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea. So the East Asia summit is growing, and continues to develop as a platform. And the United States is working closely with Australia and other friends to promote a multi-lateral agenda in these institutions and make them more effective.
The second diplomatic component is strengthening our alliances. Everybody knows that the alliances remain the core of the US approach to this region. Very important alliances are with Japan, Australia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. And, we continue to expand diplomatic coordination, and security cooperation with our allies, in many ways.

The third element is forging deeper partnerships with emerging powers, particularly with India and Indonesia. The United States has been especially supportive of India’s Look East policy and India’s interests are growing in East Asia. We very much welcome that.  There are many countries in the region we’d like to see India play a more important role with. We’ve now seen much greater coordination among the United States, Japan and India, the US and Australia and Japan and India. There’s been a growth in efforts to work with emerging powers and promote their constructive participation in the region.

I’m going to talk now about the fourth diplomatic element which is the US relationship with China. How the US is trying to build a constructive relationship with China. I would say that the overarching goal of US policy is to integrate China into the international system, and to ensure that as China rises that it behaves in accordance with what are widely held international norms and international law. The US has a very complicated relationship with China. A lot of it is very positive. That often doesn’t capture the headlines, but, increasingly, the United States and China share a lot of common interests around the world. Our presidents sit down in June, in California, for their first meeting since Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the party and President of China. There will be much to talk about.

Initially the two presidents were to meet in September, on the margins of the G20, The June meeting is a recognition that this relationship is the most consequential relationship in the world. For the United States to succeed in achieving the goals that it has, globally and in this region, China and the US must promote their shared values and common interests. We have to get China right. It’s remarkable to look around this region and see that almost every country has China as it’s number one trading partner. Many of them are our allies – Australia, Japan and South Korea. It is very much in the United States’ interest to have all of the countries in the region enjoying a positive and productive relationship with China.

The United States is not asking countries to choose. Although Beijing often puts pressure on some countries to give preference to China’s interests. We see examples of Chinese pressure as Chinese power grows. We have seen China put pressure on Japan in 2010. When the Japanese arrested a Chinese fisherman, the Chinese put not only political pressure but also economic pressure on Japan and tried to limit the export of rare earth minerals to Japan. This was an extremely risky move for the Chinese. Again, there was the case of the Philippines which had a confrontation in the South China Sea in 2012 with China over their disputed territories. The Chinese quarantined tropical fruits imported from the Philippines to the Chinese market.

It is in everyone’s interests that, as China becomes stronger not just economically but politically and militarily, that China is more integrated into the international system; that it doesn’t act only out of self interest. I have visited China every year for over 30 years. My deep impression is that China is very much self-focused. Xi Jinping talks about the Chinese dream. The Chinese Dream is not what the American Dream was when I was growing up. In the American Dream, you hoped to have a car and a house and provide a good education to your children. The Chinese people want that, but Xi Jinping’s dream is the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

The Chinese suffered what they refer to as the century of national humiliation. This began with the Opium Wars in the nineteenth century. The Chinese believe there are wrongs that need to be righted. We have to accommodate some of China’s interests but also understand that it is important for China to recognise the interests of other countries around the region. In many ways that the United States can encourage China to take on a more proactive role, to become more involved in regional security, as well as globally. Combating climate change would be an excellent example; demilitarising North Korea is another example where China has so much leverage over North Korea. The United States and China are working together on these issues.

I’ll talk briefly about the military component of the rebalancing strategy. When the United States made a decision, with Australia, to deploy a rotational contingent of Marines, this was in part a recognition that we have been concentrated militarily in North-East Asia – in Japan and Korea. This move then was not just rebalancing from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, but from the northern part of the Asian Pacific to the southern area. Many in Australia, as well as in Washington, talk about the broader Indo-Pacific region and the sea lanes that flow and connect the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. So the US has an important interest, as does Australia, in keeping these sea lanes open and ensuring that commercial traffic runs freely.

In a crisis, the United States seeks to ensure access to this region. If we have to deploy more forces here, in support of our ally Japan or perhaps our security partner Taiwan, or if the Chinese were to use force, we want to be able to continue to have access for the US navy and air force. We believe in freedom of navigation.

One of the elements of the US-China relationship that worries me is growing strategic competition. It’s not the predominant element of the relationship, but it is part of a security dilemma that the Chinese, as they grow, are defending their interests. They are taking specific measures, developing a suite of capabilities, that will make it difficult and costly for the United States to ensure access in a crisis. Chinese missiles and stealth fighters, surface ships as well as submarines are an evolving anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capability. From the Chinese point of view, they are defending their interests. They call this a counter-intervention strategy.

So the United States has developed, and continues to develop, ways to ensure that it would be able to access this region and operate in a crisis, in support of peace and stability. The security dilemma is where one power acts in defence of its interest and the other reacts and the result is increasing competition. It will be important going forward in the US-China relationship to manage this emerging security dilemma.

I’m quite optimistic about US-China relationship. The bigger China grows, the more its interests will expand outside its borders. Not long ago, I would go to China and my contacts would talk about layers of interests and their immediate interests were only those with countries with which they had contiguous borders. All that has evaporated. China’s interests are now global, in part because they are dependent on resources and minerals, which they import from countries like Australia.

China has a great deal at stake in its relationships, not just with the US but with all countries in this region. China understands it needs to get along with its neighbours and with the United States. It is here that Australia, and other countries, have a role to play to encourage China to continue to adapt to the norms, practices and procedures that dominant this part of the world. That would serve all of our interests.

The military elements of our strategy also include military deployments – we have already deployed two out of four literal combat ships in Singapore. US forces, in addition, have a rotational presence in the Philippines while maintaining our presence in Japan and Korea. Enhancing the US presence in South-East Asia is an important part of the military element of the rebalance. In addition, we are strengthening the capabilities of US partners – countries, historically, that have had weak militaries and who are potentially vulnerable to coercion and intimidation.

Enhanced capabilities enable them more readily to defend their interests – the Philippines is one such example.

The US can help the Philippines improve its situational awareness, so it can protect its interests. The Philippines, a very small country with very limited capabilities, is courageous in standing up to China in the dispute over islands in the South China Sea. It has brought a case to the UN arbitral tribunal. And Japan has just come out in support of this case as well. Secretary Kerry has also spoken in support of the application of international law, including arbitration, to solve disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law.

This is a good trend and I hope, whatever the outcome, the United States government does not take a stance on these sovereignty issues. We have a very deep interest in how they are managed but we should not take a position on sovereignty.

You will have heard that the US is increasing its naval deployments in this region. By 2020, 60 per cent of US naval assets will be deployed in the Asia-Pacific. By then, Chinese ships will probably have increased by three to four times. The United States will maintain the capability here to preserve peace and stability and to deter and dissuade any other country from using force to solve disputes.

China is not the target of this strategy, although the Chinese often think that they are. However, China is an element or a consideration. The US wants to ensure that China emerges in a way that is not to the detriment of other countries in the region or the world. The overarching goal is to win the peace.

As President Obama said in Canberra, US goals in the region are to sustain a stable and secure environment, a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes and the respect for universal rights and freedoms. To achieve all these goals, the US needs to have a multi-dimensional strategy – economic engagement and co-operation, a strengthening of the multi-lateral architecture in this region, enhancement of regional partnerships and a strengthening of our alliances. A military rebalance is also an important part of this strategy.