THE TRUTH OF THE PALACE LETTERS: DECEIT, AMBUSH AND DISMISSAL IN 1975

In July 2020, the National Archives of Australia released the correspondence between Australia’s Governor General Sir John Kerr and Buckingham Palace during the constitutional crisis of 1975. This came about as the result of a High Court decision brought on by legal action from historian Jenny Hocking. In the wake of the Palace letters release, Australian columnists and commentators Paul Kelly and Troy Bramston published an analysis of these letters – The Truth of the Palace Letters: Deceit, Ambush and Dismissal in 1975. On Monday 2 November, days before the 45^th anniversary of the Dismissal of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, Paul Kelly and Troy Bramston addressed The Sydney Institute – via Youtube – to discuss the unfolding issues thrown up by the Palace letters. Their papers were followed by a discussion with Gerard Henderson, executive director of The Sydney Institute.

THE TRUTH OF THE PALACE LETTERS: DECEIT, AMBUSH AND DISMISSAL IN 1975

TROY BRAMSTON

Let me begin by thanking Gerard and Anne Henderson for inviting me and Paul Kelly here today to talk about our new book, The Truth of the Palace Letters: Deceit, Ambush and Dismissal in 1975. I have addressed The Sydney Institute several times. I regard it as one of the premier forums in Australia for the debate and discussion of politics, policy, culture and history.

The dismissal of Gough Whitlam’s government by Governor-General Sir John Kerr on 11 November 1975 remains the most dramatic, divisive and convulsive event in our political history. It was a dismissal by ambush, without warning, of the Prime Minister by the Queen’s representative in Australia. Kerr acted in the Queen’s name but she would not have done what he did. The testimony from those at Buckingham Palace, or those knowledgeable of its thinking, and the documentary evidence, confirms this view.

Australia’s political institutions were put under strain as precedents were shattered and conventions were smashed in the pursuit of power by the Coalition led by Malcolm Fraser and Doug Anthony. It was a contest that pitted two giants from a different age – Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser – against one another. But there are no political heroes in this crisis. Whitlam ultimately lost but won the adoration of the Labor faithful.

Yet his mistakes and missed opportunities, and his immense self-belief that he would prevail in a grand contest to protect Australian parliamentary democracy, are astonishing in hindsight. Fraser pushed the political system to the brink. He cloaked his ambitions in high morality – arguing it was necessary to terminate the Whitlam government – but he paid a price for his ruthlessness. Kerr – clever, calculating and cunning – was in the middle of this crisis.

Kerr wanted to make his mark on history. He was fascinated by the reserve powers. He saw himself – wrongly – as a constitutional referee rather than its guardian. He failed the ultimate test established by Walter Bagehot – to advise, to warn and to counsel … and to avoid confrontation. Kerr lived the rest of his life in fear of public demonstrations and was utterly obsessed about the events of 1975.

While the Coalition won the 1975 election, most voters never supported blocking supply or the Dismissal, and to conflate the election result as justification for the dismissal is to misunderstand the crisis and misinterpret the public mood.

This event never ceases to surprise or astonish from one generation to the next, with new interviews and archival discoveries, and assessments and interpretations. The High Court decision to open the so-called “Palace Letters” between Kerr and the Palace – an action initiated by academic Jenny Hocking – led to an avalanche of new material about the dismissal.

Paul Kelly and I wrote a comprehensive account of the dismissal five years ago. But the release of these letters meant that a new book-length account of the dismissal – factual and objective – was needed. Paul reported the Dismissal and had authored two previous books on the subject before our two-book collaboration. It was terrific to again work with Paul – the preeminent newspaper journalist and political historian of our time – and it was a true partnership.

We studied all 212 “Palace Letters”. We concluded there is no evidence the Queen or her advisers, including private secretary Sir Martin Charteris, knew about Kerr’s plan to dismiss Whitlam in advance or approved it with a “royal green light”. In truth, there are letters before the dismissal where Charteris:

• suggested Kerr talk frankly to Whitlam (3 February 1975);
• said he hoped a crisis would be avoided (2 October 1975);
• praised Kerr for not intervening and remaining impartial (4 November 1975);
• cautioned about using the reserve powers, saying they should only be used in “the last resort” when there is “demonstrably no other course” (4 November 1975);
• always said the crisis had “to be worked out in Australia” and the Queen has no “wish to intervene” (5 November 1975).

After the dismissal, Kerr confirmed to Charteris that he did not inform the Palace of what he planned to do (11 November 1975) And Charteris thanked Kerr for not giving the Palace advance notice of his dismissal (17 November 1975). In his letters, Kerr did canvas options with Charteris to resolve the crisis or any potential crisis. It has been missed by some commentators that Kerr did the same with Whitlam. That is, even before supply was blocked on 16 October 1975, Kerr talked to Whitlam about how any crisis might be resolved – including exercising the reserve powers.

We do think some of Charteris’ letters after the dismissal risked the Palace’s integrity and were heavy on reassurance and praise – but they do not constitute a conspiracy. It is important to distinguish between letters before and after the dismissal.

Paul Keating – one of just four ministers surviving from the Whitlam government – wrote the foreword to the book. He says there is no conspiracy implicating the Queen in the dismissal. He describes it as “tilting at shadows”. Bill Hayden – who was Treasurer in 1975 and later served as Labor leader and Governor-General – also agreed there is no evidence in the letters, or elsewhere, that suggests the Queen supported the Dismissal before or after the event.

The “Palace Letters” reveal new insights into how Kerr dealt with Whitlam and Fraser. He did not tell Charteris about all of their conversations. But he did provide pen-portraits of the two men, their psychology and assessments of their political options.

Kerr is patronising towards Whitlam and Fraser. He criticises Whitlam before the dismissal. And he complains about Fraser not supporting him after the dismissal. Kerr is two-faced: publicly friendly with Whitlam and Fraser while privately critical of them to Charteris. The letters also illuminate the dynamic between Kerr and the Palace. In short, the Palace was hostage to Kerr. It was not fully apprised of events, it was distant from Canberra and desired no role in resolving the crisis.

The key question never answered by those seeking to incriminate the Queen is: why would she want to secretly liquidate the Whitlam government? No reason is ever given. The truth is that the Queen had a good relationship with Whitlam. Charteris also had a good relationship with Whitlam. Moreover, if Kerr had sought and gained the “royal green light” he would have liked nothing better than to have upstaged Whitlam with the news that the Palace endorsed his dismissal. But, of course, he did not have the Palace’s approval.

The letters are just as important for what do not say. Kerr never reveals to the Palace his “running conversation” with High Court Justice Anthony Mason. Mason and Kerr discussed the reserve powers, when and how to engage Chief Justice Garfield Barwick to request formal advice and how to handle the series of events on the day of the dismissal. Mason even wrote a draft letter of dismissal for Kerr.

Mason’s reputation has been tarnished. Kerr unmasked him from the grave in his notes. Bob Hawke told us that if had been aware of Mason’s role, his cabinet would not have appointed him Chief Justice in 1987. Nor does Kerr reveal to the Palace his several talks with Barwick before the Dismissal.

While other governors-general had consulted chief justices, Whitlam told Kerr not to speak to Barwick and instead consult the law officers – the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General. Kerr did include Barwick’s advice on the exercise of the reserve powers in his letter to the Palace on 11 November 1975.

Kerr recruited the High Court to guarantee his dismissal. He had the endorsement of the Chief Justice. The talks with Barwick and Mason offered personal reassurance and legal reinforcement. But in doing so, Kerr compromised the High Court. Justices today are more attuned to the need to be impartial to maintain confidence in the court.

This underscores the fact that the “Palace Letters” are only one source of information for understanding the dismissal. In the book, we reveal that a young Prince Charles wrote to Kerr supporting his dismissal in a handwritten letter on 27 March 1976. Charles wrote: “What you did last year was right and the courageous thing to do.”

Kerr and Charles had developed a friendship. But the letter was unwise and improper. It breached royal protocol and convention. This letter was not written with the Queen’s approval. The Kerr-Charles relationship is dealt with in a newly discovered 11-page note that Kerr wrote in 1981. Kerr writes how Charles wanted to be Governor-General of Australia and he would step aside to facilitate this. It also documents how Charles wanted to buy a property in Australia. The Palace was not keen on either of these things.

Charles has become a key figure in the attempt to link the Palace with the Dismissal decision. Kerr spoke to Charles about a possible future crisis while in Port Moresby in September 1975. The 1981 note confirms that Kerr did not tell Charles he was thinking of dismissing Whitlam but did canvass possibilities in a potential crisis, including using the reserve powers. Kerr did raise with Charles his fear that Whitlam might seek to remove him as Governor-General. Charles found it difficult to accept the Queen might act to remove him on Whitlam’s advice.

But the view of the Palace was clear. Charteris wrote to Kerr on 2 October 1975 – a fortnight before supply was blocked – saying the Queen would follow Whitlam’s advice. Kerr cherished his relationship with Charles. The letter came at time when Kerr was under siege from critics. He could not go anywhere without fear of a hostile demonstration. We found new departmental documents which show the Fraser government was alarmed about the attacks on Kerr and the steps it took in response, such as increasing his security detail.

It is not surprising, therefore, that keeping Kerr in the vice-regal office became too much for the Palace and the Fraser government by 1977. Kerr had become a problem to be managed and their patience ran out. Kerr’s resignation was effectively sealed at a meeting with the Queen aboard the royal yacht Britannia, at Fremantle, on 30 March 1977.

We discovered a new “Palace Letter” written by Kerr, in his own handwriting, to Charteris from Paris on 4 May 1977. Writing from his hotel room in the city of lights, Kerr said he had decided to resign and thought this would “heal any remaining wounds resulting from the supply crisis of 1975”.

In tortuous drafts of this letter, Kerr said Fraser failed to give him the support he deserved. He said Fraser was “happy for me to go” and said he “never really had the support” he deserved. He called Fraser a “stern” and “arrogant” man.

Two months later, on 14 July, Kerr sent wrote to Sir Robert Menzies explaining that the Queen and Fraser thought he should resign “in the interests of the monarchy and the country”. Kerr was not forced to resign, or asked to, but he was shown the door. This is how the Palace operates.

This book presented an opportunity to debunk another conspiracy theory – that the US Central Intelligence Agency encouraged the dismissal, were involved in the planning or knew about it in advance. This conspiracy still gets currency in parts of the media. There was a crisis in the Australia-US security relationship, particularly over the future of Pine Gap, but it never connected with the supply crisis.

The “Palace Letters” are a wasteland for CIA conspiracy theorists. Kerr never discussed the US-Australia relationship with Whitlam or Fraser during the supply crisis. The only mention in the letters is to ridicule and reject the CIA link. A few years ago, the CIA released the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) given to Gerald Ford. This is the summary of foreign events and intelligence over the previous 24 hours. It was partly redacted.

We were successful in making an FOI request to have the PDB fully declassified. It shows the CIA was clueless about the dismissal. They said they were surprised, not forewarned, not involved and described it as “an unexpected shock”. We also reveal that Bob Hawke, when he became Prime Minister in 1983, investigated whether the CIA had any role in the dismissal during a visit to Washington.

I was born six weeks after Whitlam’s dismissal. My interest was sparked the death of Kerr in 1991. It led to me writing a high school project on the dismissal that year. I scrolled through spools of old newspaper reports on microfiche at my local library. I watched documentaries and searched YouTube for news reports of 11 November 1975. I read every book there was to read on the Dismissal and I wrote to Paul Kelly about his first book on the Dismissal. I made it my mission to talk to Whitlam and Fraser about the Dismissal – which I did many times – and also former ministers, opposition MPs, Labor and Liberal staff, public servants, party officials, and the officials at Government House and the Palace.

The events of 1975 still matter because this was an unsatisfactory solution to the crisis and undermined our democracy. Kerr’s intervention split the nation, poisoned our politics and compromised institutions.

The release of the “Palace Letters” and other new archival information has been met with extraordinary public interest. Interest in the dismissal transcends generations – I am testament to that. But it is each generation’s responsibility to tell this story accurately, with testimonial and documentary evidence, and to interpret it correctly.

This is especially important in a post-truth age where conspiracies excite the imagination and emotions often matter more than logic, reason and facts.

FOLLOWING THE PAPERS GIVEN BY PAUL KELLY AND TROY BRAMSTON ON THE PALACE LETTERS ON 3 NOVEMBER 2020 AT THE SYDNEY ISNTITUTE, A DISCUSSION FOLLOWED WITH INSTITUTE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR GERARD HENDERSON.

Gerard Henderson: Thanks, Troy, thanks Paul. It is a fine book, and an important foreword by Paul Keating, which I think is one of the better things he’s written – it’s very well put together. You know my position on this, so let’s go back to 5 pm on the 11 November 1975 on the assumption that Fraser hasn’t backed down and Whitlam hasn’t backed down. And Whitlam has advised the Governor-General, that supply will run out well before the 13 December, which would be the earliest time an election might have been held. What would you have done? Both of you, what would you do if you were John Kerr in such a situation?

Troy Bramston: I think it’s important to remember that this crisis was all about supply, and that’s often been forgotten. And it is incumbent upon governments to make sure that they can guarantee and secure supply. Where John Kerr went wrong was in the deception of the prime minister. There’s a number of elements to that along the way, where he wasn’t as fully frank and as open as he probably should have been. Kerr was more frank with the Palace about what he thought about the crisis and how it was unfolding and how it might be resolved. But the key thing John Kerr should have done is give Whitlam a clear warning; he should have said to him that, “Unless you can guarantee supply, I will have to call on another as Prime Minister who can.” And then recommend an election for both Houses of Parliament.

So that was where he went wrong. I understand that John Kerr was in a difficult position. But the idea that you ambush the Prime Minister without giving him options, I think was mistaken. It was interesting, just in the last week, that in Peter Cosgrove’s memoir, which Paul Kelly launched, he said the same thing – Kerr should have given Whitlam an opportunity to go to an election for both houses as prime minister. But he didn’t do that.

Gerard Henderson: Very briefly, Whitlam had an opportunity. He could have called an election, as he had done in 1974.

Troy Bramston: Well, he could have. But he had called an election eighteen months earlier. And, of course, any election for the House, he was going to lose. So that’s clearly the political reason why he wouldn’t do that. But if he was presented with the option, this is the only way supply can be passed. That is when the opposition gets the election for both houses, that would have been more fairly treating him by giving him that warning. It goes back to constitutional principles. The governor-general’s role is to advise and to warn and to counsel, and Kerr was not as upfront with Whitlam as he should have been.

Gerard Henderson: So Paul, what would you’ve done at 5 pm on 11 November if supply hadn’t been passed – and Fraser wasn’t going to pass it – and Whitlam was going to govern without it?

Paul Kelly: What I think should have happened is the Governor-General should have spoken frankly to the Prime Minister the day supply was blocked in mid-October, or the next day. And given that he knew then that Whitlam intended to remain in office and defy the Senate and try and secure a loss of nerve by the Senate, the Governor-General should have just said to the Prime Minister: “I understand what you’re doing. But if we get to a stage in this crisis, where the supply is going to run out, you will need to provide me with advice that resolves the crisis.” And so, Whitlam would have been then on notice right from the start, that there were limits to how long the Governor-General would tolerate his tactic of defying the Senate. So, the answer to your question is, that the Governor-General should have given the Prime Minister a warning. And when the Governor-General eventually decided that intervention was necessary, he should have told the Prime Minister that intervention was necessary. And that unless the Prime Minister recommended an election then, there would have to be resort to the reserve powers.

Gerard Henderson: So you have no problem with the dismissal itself? It’s just that it shouldn’t happened that way. But the actual dismissal of the government, if there had been prior warning, and Whitlam hadn’t acted, you don’t have a problem with that, or do you?

Paul Kelly: That’s essentially correct. Clearly, if supply is blocked, and you’ve got a prime minister who thinks that he can remain indefinitely in office, even if supply is exhausted, that is an untenable position. And no governor-general can acquiesce in a prime minister employing those tactics.

Troy Bramston: I think it’s worth unpacking that a little bit further, which is, I don’t think that the opposition should have blocked supply to force an election.

Gerard Henderson: Nor do I, but they did.

Troy Bramston: Of course, they did. There’s just one other brief point to make on this about what Whitlam’s options were, and what Kerr’s options were. One of the things that’s often been forgotten, which we write about in the book, is that Malcolm Fraser had offered a number of resolutions to the crisis, which essentially would have seen supply passed provided the government agreed to go to an election before mid 1976. This was a missed opportunity for Whitlam. He could have had at least another six months in office; he could have claimed victory with supply having been passed. Malcolm Fraser would have been seen to back down, and there wouldn’t have been a divisive dismissal. This has often been forgotten. We don’t exempt Gough Whitlam from his mistakes and blunders. That was one of them. He should have seized what was again presented to him on the morning of 11 November by the opposition. But he rejected it outright.

Gerard Henderson: At page 41, quoting Sir Martin Charteris, you make it clear that you regard this as the vital point: “If proper warning is given, there will almost always be another course, short of dismissal.” But you weren’t dealing with two reasonable people, as you say yourself, you’re dealing with two wilful and reckless men. The idea that Whitlam was going to give into Fraser because Kerr sort of warned him is not tenable. He would have sacked Kerr. Which Kerr was always worried about, partly for his own self-interest. He was always worried about his finances. But partly also, as he said to me, he didn’t want to get the Palace involved. And that would have happened if Whitlam had sacked Kerr. That would have become a huge controversy, which would have involved the Palace because people would have thought, well, the Queen did it.

Paul Kelly: We don’t know for certain what would have happened. This is essentially why I’ve argued that Kerr should have had a frank discussion with Whitlam when supply was blocked in mid-October, or the next day. I don’t think Whitlam would have moved against Kerr at that point in time. We can’t be certain, but I don’t think he would have. Whitlam would then have been put on notice that he didn’t have a blank cheque from the Governor-General. That would have influenced what Whitlam subsequently did.

But let’s take your argument. And it may well be right. If, at the end of the day, the governor-general had given a warning to the Prime Minister. One possibility is that the Prime Minister would have sought to remove the Governor-General and approach the Palace. That would have been an extremely unwise, divisive and counterproductive decision. There would have been upheaval in the country of course. And the Palace wouldn’t have appreciated that because they would have been involved. But I guess my point of view about that is that Kerr’s fear that that would have happened is not sufficient justification for not warning Whitlam.

Troy Bramston: In the book, we interviewed Kim Beazley, who of course is the governor of Western Australia and he made the very valid point that fear about your own position is not a sufficient reason to not warn the prime minister. And the worst thing that could have happened to Kerr was that he was recalled, and he would have gone back to his former life. It’s not the end of the world. Instead, he took a very cowardly approach to the crisis.

Gerard Henderson: But it wasn’t his only concern. He has written, and he’s said to others, that his concern, which is in your book, was not to get the Palace involved. Both of you in your speeches have made that clear. Kerr didn’t want to get the Palace involved in the Dismissal, and he certainly didn’t want to get the Palace involved in his own sacking. It was the same principle. He said to me on many occasions: “I wanted to keep the Palace out of this.” But if Whitlam had sacked Kerr, the Palace was right into it.

Troy Bramston: But the other side of that Gerard is that he deceived the Prime Minister. He wasn’t fully open with him. He didn’t give him a warning. And that’s not the way a governor general should behave.

Gerard Henderson: Well, if you’re Sir Peter Cosgrove dealing with John Howard, it probably isn’t. But if you’re Sir John Kerr dealing with Malcolm Fraser and Gough Whitlam, maybe different criteria apply. You’ve got two sources in your book. You’ve got Maurice Byers and you’ve got John Menadue, both saying that they thought that Whitlam would have dismissed Kerr, that is in your own book. And Menadue and Byers knew Whitlam very well. You’ve also got sources in your book saying that might not have happened.

Troy Bramston: We have a better source, which is Gough Whitlam, because he wrote a letter to Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, just weeks after the Dismissal, saying if he had of got wind of what Kerr was up to he would have had him recalled. Now it’s a hypothetical, we don’t really know because it didn’t happen. But back to the fundamental point, which is – it’s not the way for a governor-general to behave. To be totally absorbed and concerned about your own position, rather than doing the right thing by…

Gerard Henderson: But you’re ignoring the point. He wasn’t just concerned about his own position. He wanted to keep the Palace out of it. He may have been concerned about his own position. But that wasn’t his only concern. He wanted to keep the Palace out of it, you both said it.

Troy Bramston: That’s true. And Gough Whitlam was his own worst enemy. Of course, he had said, famously at a dinner for the Malaysian Prime Minister on the day supply was blocked, that “we may end up with a race to the Palace, via the telephone”. That was an unwise and silly joke to make. So, I agree with you.

Gerard Henderson: The point is, was it a joke? At the time, people didn’t think it was a joke. You make this clear in the book. The sacking of Kerr by Whitlam was being discussed, and Kerr did not regard that as a joke. So, what you’ve got are three sources. You’ve got Whitlam saying he would have done it, you’ve got John Menadue saying he would have done it, you’ve got Maurice Byers saying he would have done it. If you’re Kerr and that’s what people are saying later on, it wasn’t a crazy decision to think it would have happened. It was reasonable to be conscious that he was likely to be sacked. And that would, as Paul said, have caused a crisis in the country. And the monarchy would have been blamed well, to some extent, because people don’t quite understand it.

Troy Bramston: But it does get back to the central point. And this is a point made by Sir Paul Hasluck in an oral history interview that he made which we include in the book. Sir Paul says, “In the end, you’ve got to have a frank and open dialogue.” And if you have the frank and open dialogue, then Kerr would not have had the fear of recall because Whitlam would have been able to trust him, and he would have been able to trust Whitlam. I understand what you’re saying, but it does all get back to there being a better relationship on both sides between the Prime Minister and the Governor-General.

Gerard Henderson: The relationship is a two-way thing.

Troy Bramston: It is.

Gerard Henderson: Whitlam was very difficult to get on with. Kerr wasn’t difficult to get on with.

Troy Bramston: Paul Hasluck didn’t have any difficulty getting on with Whitlam, they got on famously.

Gerard Henderson: He didn’t have a crisis either.

Troy Bramston: Well he had a tumultuous government to deal with. In many ways unorthodox.

Gerard Henderson: He didn’t have. As you know, in 1974, when Bill Snedden lead the opposition and threatened to block supply, Whitlam just said, okay, let’s have a double dissolution. And Hasluck ticked it. It wasn’t a very tough decision to make. He took the advice of the government. And he gave a double dissolution, which was the right thing to do. But a year and a half later it had changed because Whitlam thought he would lose the election. In 1974, he thought he would win, and he was right. In 1975, he thought he would lose, and he was almost certainly right.

Paul Kelly: One of the really critical points here is that we can’t second guess what Whitlam would have done. You’re right, we’ve spoken to a lot of people. And some people surmise, or believe, that Whitlam would have moved against Kerr. Other people think that he wouldn’t have moved against Kerr. Such as Bob Ellicott, for example. The point is, we simply don’t know. And Gough changed his own version of this. Gough wrote to Harold Wilson straight afterwards implying that he would have moved against Kerr. But, later on, when I interviewed Gough, years later, Gough insisted that he would not have done it. So, essentially, you’re getting different accounts coming from Whitlam himself. So, this is a conundrum. We can’t be certain about what would have happened. All I’d say is that even if one assumes that Kerr had very lofty motives, and I think he was genuine in wanting to keep the Palace out of it, I still don’t think at the end of the day, deliberately deceiving the Prime Minister was justification, in that situation, for trying to keep the Palace out of it.

Gerard Henderson: Well he didn’t really deceive him. He didn’t warn him. But he didn’t say anything false to him.

Troy Bramston: Well, I think he did. As we describe in the book, John Kerr’s disgruntlement with Gough Whitlam goes back to the beginning of his time as Governor General. He was writing to the Palace about things not concerning the supply process. Of his concern about the change to the order of precedent, about the Australian honour system, about the relationship between ministers and public servants, about the general style of the Whitlam Government, the scandals and so on. There’s actually a litany of letters where Kerr is indicting Whitlam, even before the crisis begins. What this shows is that this was a dysfunctional relationship. Even Martin Charteris, to his credit, wrote to Kerr, at the end of 1974 or early 1975, advising him that he needed to have a better relationship with his prime minister.

Gerard Henderson: It’s got to be a two-way process. Kerr has written, and he said it to me, that his principal concern was being excluded from an important meeting of the Loans Council. And he was wrongly excluded. He regarded it as unconstitutional. He had very high regard for himself and his own legal abilities. But he thought that was a very improper action by his prime minister. So if the Prime Minister is not going to inform you of one of the most important meetings of the Executive Council taking place, you’ll get a bit pissed off.

Paul Kelly: But what did he do? This is the problem. Kerr was treated improperly by Whitlam over the loans affair. No question about that. Okay. And so, one can completely understand what Kerr felt about that. But what did he do? What he should have done was have a frank discussion with Whitlam and said, “Listen, I think that you’ve mishandled things, and your relationship with me as the Queen’s representative and the conduct of the Executive Council meeting was improper. And I think we’ve got to discuss this and address this.” That’s what he should have done. But he didn’t do it. What he did was to harbour resentments. And many of the resentments were justified. But you have a pent-up sense of resentment building in Kerr, this massive distrust towards Whitlam. Of course, when the crisis came, there was no framework for them as prime minister and governor-general, to have frank and honest discussions.

Gerard Henderson: You make the point in your book that Whitlam made no attempt to talk to Kerr.

Paul Kelly: That’s correct. I feel very, very strongly about this, that both individuals are culpable here. I’ve been criticising Kerr for not speaking frankly to Whitlam, but Whitlam’s behaviour was extraordinary. These public lectures he was giving the governor-general, that “you have no option but to take my advice” and so on. He did not open the door to frank discussions with the Governor-General. There’s no doubt about that.

Gerard Henderson: To be fair, the one behaving badly was Malcolm Fraser. Kerr said to me, and it’s in your book, that when Fraser made that statement in early November as to how Kerr should act, Kerr deeply resented it. So, you had both Malcolm Fraser and Gough Whitlam behaving poorly towards the Governor General, who has then got caught in this position. Your book’s terrific except for one aspect – you’ve been a bit soft on Whitlam.

As you will recall well Paul, and, Troy, you probably would have read about in your local library – after 1967, Lionel Murphy came in as head of the Senate and the Labor Party decided to go very hard against the Coalition government. There are a number of people who have confirmed that – many mentioned and quoted in Sir David Smith’s book Head of State. These include Gough Whitlam who said, in August 1970, “Labor’s purpose was to destroy the Budget [that is supply effectively] and destroy the government which had sponsored the Budget”. So, Whitlam was saying five years before the Dismissal that blocking supply was a perfectly reasonable thing to do if an opposition had control of the Senate. The reason why Labor failed to do it was because the Democratic Labor Party senators wouldn’t support Labor on blocking supply. But Whitlam thought this was alright, until he thought it wasn’t alright.

Troy Bramston: That is a legitimate criticism to make. Gough Whitlam and Lionel Murphy did have that view in the 1960s. There’s no doubt about that. And they obviously took a different view when they were in government. It’s important to note the legacy of this issue which is that no opposition since has ever contemplated doing it, let alone done it. Blocking of supply is kind of dead letter issue in Australian political conventions, and it’s unlikely to ever be repeated.

Gerard Henderson: I’ve got a couple of quick questions in from our members. In the context of constitutional crisis what was the latest date on which Kerr could have deferred acting, if he did? Are you saying it would have to be resolved by 11 November, one way or the other?

Paul Kelly: That’s right.

Gerard Henderson: Because if you had to call an election for 13 December, you had to resolve it by 11 November.

Troy Bramston: You could have had an election on the 20 December, but there was a judgement made that this was too close to Christmas. And of course, Whitlam and Fraser himself had been in touch with the electoral commissioner, and that was deemed to be the right date.

Gerard Henderson: What’s quite devastating, and you’ve covered both of them in your talk today and in your book, is the is the comprehensive demolition of the two conspiracy theories. The early one with John Pilger and extending up in recent times to Guy Rundle about the CIA involvement, you’ve effectively demolished that. And the latter one that came up later about the Palace, which is still being propagated by Jenny Hocking. And you’ve got some very strong detail about that. One of our members has asked, “Do Troy or Paul feel any guilt for publicising what are conspiracy theories?”

Paul Kelly: I think we feel no guilt. Let’s establish that to begin with. In relation to the CIA, it is a sign of enormous national immaturity that we still have people, 45 years after the event, wishing and hoping that it was all about the CIA, when there has never been any evidence linking the CIA and the Dismissal. We all know that there was a crisis at the time in security intelligence relations between Australia and the United States. We all know there was a constitutional crisis. Well, events running in parallel is not causation. We ought to grow up and get out of the CIA argument. But it’s sort of comforting. There’s something comforting about trying to pretend that this wasn’t our mistake. This was all done by the Americans. Well, it’s so juvenile. It’s just extraordinary.

In relation to the claims about the Palace, all I’d say about that is, in our book, we’re focusing on argument. We congratulate Jenny Hocking for her efforts in getting the Buckingham Palace letters released. That’s in the public interest, that’s in the public court and we’ve recognised that. We’ve just drawn upon the letters to reach what seemed to us to be the obvious and unqualified conclusions.

Troy Bramston: To add to that briefly, I think it’s very, very clear – anyone can now read these letters, there’s 212 of them – that the Palace didn’t have any prior knowledge of this specific planned dismissal, or approved it. The key thing, as I mentioned in my talk, is that there’s no reason given. You can look for hidden language, you can look for hints and clues in different paragraphs and sentences and words. But there’s no reason given as to why the Queen would want to do this. For those who purport to support Whitlam and idolise him, you dishonour him by running this kind of conspiracy involving the Palace. It’s not something that he ever believed or ever subscribed to. Nor did, obviously, John Kerr. Nor did Malcolm Fraser.

Gerard Henderson: Many thanks. All the best for the success of the book. It’s a great book and I’m glad you’ve come along here and discussed it today.