TWENTY YEARS AFTER 9/11

Speaker

John Howard

Speech Date

August 31, 2020

Issue

Special Issue

After 20 years fighting in Afghanistan, the pull out of US troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 – as in South Vietnam decades earlier – became overwhelmed with ordinary citizens seeking to abandon the they feared, reprisals under the incoming Taliban government, because of their engagement with the occupying forces over two decades. Former Prime Minister John Howard was in Washington at the time of the horrific attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 – now known as 9/11 – which led to the US offensive against the Taliban and its war on terror. To look back on that day of shock and horror, and to re-evaluate the outcome, The Hon John Howard AC led a Sydney Institute Zoom Meeting, on Tuesday 31 August 2021. What follows is an edited transcript of the briefing and discussion.

TWENTY YEARS AFTER 9/11

John Howard

Thank you very much Gerard. It’s a real pleasure to join The Sydney Institute and to reflect on those dramatic events which will be 20 years ago in a few days’ time.

I remember it very vividly because I was in Washington DC when the attacks took place. I had gone to the United States to mark the 50^th anniversary of the signing of the ANZUS Treaty and had been invited to address a joint sitting of Congress on Wednesday 12 September. It was a terrific visit until the morning of 11 September.

We’d had a wonderful reception at the ambassador’s residence. Everybody who was anybody in the administration turned up, from the Vice President down. Colin Powell, Condi Rice, two or three judges of the Supreme Court – I don’t know whether they were liberal or conservative. The only person who wasn’t there was the President. Protocol precluded that. The next day, 10 September, we were to have a ceremony at the naval dockyard during which President George Bush handed over the bell of the USS Canberra to me as Prime Minister of Australia. The USS Canberra was the US cruiser named in honour of the HMAS Canberra which was damaged beyond repair in August 1942 during the Battle of Savo Island. That was the first time I had actually met the president, although we’d spoken on the phone a couple of times.

The next day, 10 September, we were to have a ceremony at the naval dockyard during which President George Bush handed over the bell of the USS Canberra to me as Prime Minister of Australia.

President Bush then gave me a lift to the White House and we talked in the car. We then had a formal session and talked about everything except terrorism. That’s first-hand evidence that nobody knew what was about to happen – he certainly didn’t. I was joined after this at lunch by Vice President Richard Cheney, National Security Adviser Condi Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell. In the afternoon, I went to the Pentagon and met Donald Rumsfeld. I had met him once before. He was an interesting character. That evening I had dinner with Rupert Murdoch in a restaurant next door to the hotel I was staying at, right beside the White House. When I got back to my room, Janette said, “What was it like?” I told her we had talked about anything and everything. On the way out we’d been door stopped by the media who asked Rupert Murdoch if News Limited papers would endorse me at the next election and he simply replied: “That’s a matter for my editors.” It was a very fair answer and it turned out to be true. Some of them did, some of them didn’t. I then said to Janette, “Well, I guess our dinner might get covered in the press tomorrow.” And, of course, it was rather overwhelmed.

I went for a walk in the morning, as I normally do, and I was getting ready for a news conference to talk about domestic politics with the Australian media. Tony O’Leary, my press secretary, had come round to brief me about it and at the end of the briefing he said, “Oh, by the way boss, terrible accident in New York; a plane has hit one of the Twin Towers.” I thought, “Gee, that’s bad navigation.” We just both assumed an aerial accident of some sort. A quarter of an hour later, he was banging on the door saying, “You’d better turn on your television; another plane has hit the other tower.” We both knew then it wasn’t an accident. I went ahead with the news conference and briefly mentioned what had occurred; I didn’t know the ramifications of it.

At the end of the briefing he said, “Oh, by the way boss, terrible accident in New York; a plane has hit one of the Twin Towers.” I thought, “Gee, that’s bad navigation.”

While I was having that news conference, a plane slammed into the Pentagon. I was told about it by my security detail who picked it up on those things they have in their ears. I looked out the window after we pulled up the blinds and you could see the smoke rising. My first thought was for Janette and Tim, my elder son. He’d come over from England where he was working to have a look at his dad addressing this joint sitting. He and Janette were doing some sightseeing. I knew they were planning to go to the Pentagon to have a look from the outside. But they were tracked down and whisked off, as I was, to a bunker in Washington.

I can recall my American security boss, George Edwards, saying to me, “You’re out of this hotel room.” I said “Why?” He said, “I haven’t lost anybody yet, and I don’t intend to start today. We’re taking you somewhere else.” A lot of other Australians joined us. Michael Thawley, our ambassador, Tom Schieffer, who was the American ambassador and a very close friend of George Bush, a fellow Texan although they were on different sides of politics. It was quite an extraordinary experience. I was impressed with the calmness of the Americans. I rang John Anderson, who was the acting Prime Minister, and talked to him. He told me what he’d done and the many meetings they’d had. I had a brief news conference. I shot off a note to the President as it was impossible to talk to him. He was under guard because people thought anything could happen. That’s one thing you’ve got to remember. We now know what did happen and what didn’t happen but, at the time, it was such a shocking, unexpected, audacious event that people were just stunned.

The point that has to be made, again and again, is that the greatest fear that Americans had for months after was when and where would the next attack occur on their homeland? That was an overwhelming fear. The next day I went to Congress, as promised. Not to address them, obviously. But they had convened in order to pass a resolution condemning the attack and expressing support for any retaliation. I was really quite touched. I was given a standing ovation by the joint sitting. They were all there and it was really quite a moving occasion. As it turned out, it was an opportune and symbolic expression of our support for America at a time when she really did feel quite vulnerable. I remember going on to the floor of the Senate afterwards, where the joint sitting had taken place. I sought out Hillary Clinton and Chuck Schumer, who were the two Democrat Senators for New York, because New York had been attacked, just to stress my condolences.

As it turned out, it was an opportune and symbolic expression of our support for America at a time when she really did feel quite vulnerable.

I remember Hilary saying to me that her husband Bill had been in Port Douglas in Australia when the attack had taken place. Of course, he was whisked away to wherever he was by whoever looks after former presidents. He was probably by that time on his way back to America. Janette and I went to a memorial service at the National Cathedral in Washington with Tim and, in the afternoon, I had a news conference. It was at that news conference I said we would stand by the Americans, we would help them, and that it wasn’t a time for an 80 per cent ally, it was a time for a 100 per cent ally. After that news conference, my travelling party and I hopped on Air Force Two, which the Americans had made available, and flew from Andrews Air Force base to Hawaii. It was the first plane to leave American air space after the attack. During that flight, I spoke at length to Foreign Minister Alexander Downer about how we should respond. I think it was Alexander himself who said we should invoke the ANZUS Treaty. I readily agreed. When we got back, we had a Cabinet meeting and authorised it. It seemed an appropriate thing to do, it was certainly an attack upon the metropolitan territory of one of the Anzac Treaty signatories. There’s no doubt about that.

After that news conference, my travelling party and I hopped on Air Force Two, which the Americans had made available, and flew from Andrews Air Force base to Hawaii. It was the first plane to leave American air space after the attack.

There are many other recollections I’ve have, but that is just the summation. Did I think Iraq was involved in the attack? Did anybody say that to me then? No. I don’t think anybody was blaming Iraq or Saddam Hussein. Probably within a few hours of the attack, in discussions I had with Michael Thorley and others, Al-Qaeda was fingered as a probable source of the attack. That turned out to be very accurate. In time, in fairly short order, it was decided by the Americans that there would be some retaliation into Afghanistan. It was an event that nobody expected. It utterly shocked the American nation; it claimed 10-20 Australian lives in the World Trade Centre, and it was just one of those events that literally and metaphorically came out of the clear blue sky. They’re just some of my random recollections, Gerard, you might want to pursue something about it, or I’m happy to take any questions, but there’s no doubt that being in Washington when it happened meant that the impression on me was more than indelible.

It utterly shocked the American nation; it claimed 10-20 Australian lives in the World Trade Centre, and it was just one of those events that literally and metaphorically came out of the clear blue sky.

DISCUSSION

Gerard Henderson: Right at the end, you mentioned Iraq. As you know, the feeling that Saddam Hussein, which was widely held, had weapons of mass destruction was a concern. So, what actually drove that decision? Was it a concern that what had happened to the United States from Al-Qaeda might happen if Saddam Hussein gave weapons of mass destruction to something like Al-Qaeda? Or was there another reason? Because, within a relatively short time, the Coalition of the Willing went into Iraq.

John Howard: There were some people in the American administration who thought that, perhaps indirectly but nonetheless materially, that Saddam had been involved in the attack of 11 September. That’s not a view I held. That’s not a view that the President ever put to me or the Defence Secretary or the Secretary of State. Although, it has been suggested that some of the people around the Vice-President held that view. The great concern that developed about Iraq was precisely the one that you identify. If Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction, given Saddam’s track record. That included the payment of US$25,000 to any Palestinian family who had a member who engaged in a terrorist attack against Israel, along with the use of poison gas against some of his own citizens – the Kurds and others. The fear was that he might, if he had those weapons, hand them to a terrorist organisation, whether Al-Qaeda or any other, and that they would be used principally, but not only, against the United States.

The fear was that he might, if he had those weapons, hand them to a terrorist organisation, whether Al-Qaeda or any other, and that they would be used principally, but not only, against the United States.

That was a well entertained fear. I have to stress again that, for a very long time after this, the fear of another terrorist attack was very strong. The other emotion that many people had, certainly the day it happened, was that the attack in America could be the beginning of a series of attacks around the world. Would the next attack be on London, on Paris, or Tokyo, or even Sydney, or Canberra? This was the feeling that people had. And it was understandable because nobody had expected this. It’s all very well in these situations to say, “Well, later on, this and that bit of intelligence was discovered.” What matters is what is immediately available at the time, and what your emotions and reactions are at the time. There was certainly a feeling that there would be another attack. And that feeling didn’t go for a very long time.

Gerard Henderson: You made the point that you invoked the ANZUS Treaty. I think that was the first time that it had been done formally. To what extent was New Zealand involved in that? Because we often forget what the NZ in ANZUS is, if it’s still there.

I certainly did not have a discussion with the New Zealand Prime Minister at the time. That would have been Helen Clark, with whom, despite our political differences, I enjoyed a very good relationship.

John Howard: I think the answer to that is New Zealand wasn’t, except probably at a diplomatic level. I certainly did not have a discussion with the New Zealand Prime Minister at the time. That would have been Helen Clark, with whom, despite our political differences, I enjoyed a very good relationship. She had been very helpful in relation to our border protection policies. It could have been that I did have a discussion with her on the basis of letting her know what we had done, but I don’t recall that. Certainly, our decision to invoke the ANZUS Treaty was not conditional on New Zealand going along with it. Although, to be fair, New Zealand, in relation to Afghanistan, certainly had a very similar view to ours. They had a different view in relation to Iraq, but not Afghanistan.

Question: Mr Howard, I’d love to stay on that day and hear more about that incredible day. But today will be the day that the Americans have finally left Afghanistan, the last plane has gone, and we’ve seen on some of the news today that all the Black Hawks are still there. All that American military equipment is now there for the Taliban. I heard one of the American military people saying that they have more Black Hawks than Australia does. So, can we have some of your observations and feelings about that?

John Howard: It’s hard not to feel that the final withdrawal could have been handled differently. I can understand and respect a decision made by the United States that, for a whole combination of reasons, it couldn’t remain indefinitely in Afghanistan. In the end, of course, it was America’s call, simply because the overwhelming bulk of the forces in Afghanistan were American. I do think that the decision taken by the Trump administration to publicly commit to an American withdrawal, more or less by a prescribed date, without first having established the protocols for that withdrawal with both the Afghan Government and also the Taliban, was obviously going to, at the very least, have enormous influence in Afghanistan. I think that was a mistake. It seemed to be fundamentally wrong to say, “Well, we’re leaving, you should know that, but now let’s talk about how we’re going to handle it.” That hurried retreat and the desperation with which attempts were made to extract people who might be at risk to the hands of the Taliban was very depressing. A lot of people were moved and there is nothing quite like the capacity of the United States military to move a lot of men and materials, if I might use the American expression, in quick order. I am concerned, as most people are, about what will now happen. I’m rather sceptical of the promises of the new Taliban. I think all of that is pretty empty.

It seemed to be fundamentally wrong to say, “Well, we’re leaving, you should know that, but now let’s talk about how we’re going to handle it.”

That’s the view of most people. I do fret about what will happen to some of the advances that have been made for women and girls in Afghanistan. It would be terrible if the country reverts to anything resembling what existed before. A lot of progress was made in that area. We tend to forget that. People tend to just look at the intervention in Afghanistan from the beginning and the end point and forget that part of the benefit of the allied involvement was there were improvements. Women did get opportunities for education and, in some cases, were owning small businesses and the like. So, it’s impossible not to have all of those feelings whilst respecting, obviously, it’s an American call and, of course, the United States lost between 2000-3000 defence personnel. The Brits lost about 400, we lost 41. And the Canadians, on a per capita basis, took a very heavy casualty hit as well. Of course, there were tens of thousands of Afghans who died fighting the Taliban. So, that part of it is unavoidably sobering, if I can put it that way. It could have been handled in a different fashion. And it’s hard not to feel that that the explanations given by the President over the past week or two were not all that adequate.

It’s impossible not to have all of those feelings whilst respecting, obviously, it’s an American call and, of course, the United States lost between 2000-3000 defence personnel. The Brits lost about 400, we lost 41.

Gerard Henderson: So, you’ve described the outcome in Afghanistan as sobering. It’s not quite an outcome yet, but how do you look back on Iraq?

John Howard: Well, in a sense, it’s the same with Afghanistan. It’s at least sobering, perhaps worse. The mistake in Iraq is easier to clearly define. I continue to defend the decision to invade Iraq, and obviously my government contributed forces. We were unashamedly part of the Coalition of the Willing. The mistakes were made after the invasion – the decision to disband the Iraqi army, the aggressive de-Baathification of the Iraqi civil service and the inevitably negative impact those things had on internal security. The great Iraqi deficit for so many years was the internal strife, which could have been substantially avoided if those three things had not taken place. I remember having a discussion years ago with the late Lee Kuan Yew. He said to me, “John, you will be astonished to know that when the Japanese took over Singapore, how few people who held positions there were replaced by Japanese. Because they realised they needed the domestic infrastructure to keep the place going on a day-to-day basis. You won’t like that analogy.” I said, “No I don’t.” He said, “It’s something that you should bear in mind.” And, of course, one thinks even at the end of World War II that there were some parts of the domestic apparatus of Germany that were kept in place just for the sake of a bit of order.

The mistakes were made after the invasion – the decision to disband the Iraqi army, the aggressive de-Baathification of the Iraqi civil service and the inevitably negative impact those things had on internal security.

Question: Mr Howard, I wonder if you could speculate how you see the ANZUS alliance in the context of a Trump or a Trump lookalike winning in 2024?

John Howard: I think the ANZUS alliance is still strong and robust. I understand people saying that this has been a blow for American prestige, but I don’t think it means that American power and America’s capacity to react to threats in the future has been diminished. I think it emboldens people, perhaps, to do some things they ought not to do, and they ought not to assume that America won’t retaliate. But I think as far as the ANZUS alliance is concerned, it’s still our fundamental security guarantee. I have held a view for a very long time that America’s most reliable ally, certainly in this part of the world and perhaps anywhere, has been Australia. When you think of the more difficult and controversial operations in which America has been involved over the last 50 or 60 years, you have to think of Vietnam, you have to think of Iraq, rightly or wrongly, Australia was there beside her and I think we’ve demonstrated a commitment to the alliance, and for good reasons. But I am not pessimistic about the future of the alliance; I am quite positive.

As far as the ANZUS alliance is concerned, it’s still our fundamental security guarantee.

Question: You mentioned Alexander Downer had spoken of ANZUS when you were talking after 9/11. Paul Kelly had a very interesting summary of the history of ANZUS in the weekend press. You were not directly involved at that stage, but what are your recollections of the early days of ANZUS?

John Howard: Well, I just saw ANZUS as a natural expression of the post World War II reality. The, I suppose, received view about the United States was that, but for the United States through the Battle of the Coral Sea and Midway and others, Australia could well have been under real attack. That we owe our survival to the United States more than any other country out of World War II. That was a received view, and it was not said negatively about our other allies, it was just a statement of what people felt. I can remember as a young person, when ANZUS was signed and I was 12 years of age, thinking this makes a lot of sense. And it was a very bipartisan thing in the United States. One of the things that should be remembered about the relationship between Australia and the United States, historically, is that at critical periods it crossed the party divide.

I can remember as a young person, when ANZUS was signed and I was 12 years of age, thinking this makes a lot of sense. And it was a very bipartisan thing in the United States.

The commitment of Australian forces in Vietnam, the combat battalion in 1965, was the decisive decision that was made by the centre right Prime Minister Menzies and, of course, the then Democrat President of the United States Lyndon Johnson. It’s fair also to say that to the extent that there was an irrevocable commitment made by America to enter Vietnam, it occurred at the instance of the Kennedy administration. So, you had this crossover, and that’s always been a feature of the alliance. I know for a fact that the Hawke Government had good relations with the Reagan administration. So, there was a bipartisan component to the relationship and I have very positive views about it in that context, and I don’t say that slavishly. I’ve not been without criticism of some aspects of American foreign policy, but there’s not much doubt that it was hugely in Australia’s interests to have that treaty, except for a difficult period in the early 1970s during the Nixon administration when there were a lot of attacks launched by senior Whitlam government ministers on the bombing of North Vietnam. Even so, the relationship remained pretty stable.

Question: Mr Howard, to some extent, China, until now, has been isolated from, or has not been a target for, international terrorists – and to a lesser extent, Russia as well. With an emboldened Taliban, which also has some legitimacy and access to a huge amount of arms and resources, is there any likelihood that they would end up supporting groups like the Uighurs in China and some other organisations in Russia, and therefore shift the whole focus and objective of international terrorists?

It’s been an historically very difficult country to govern, and we regale frequently those stories about Afghanistan having been the graveyard of empires.

John Howard: The only honest answer I can give to that is that I don’t know. But it is possible. Let me speculate that the Taliban will have a lot more challenges domestically in keeping control of the country, than they might otherwise have expected. As time goes by, you will see a lot of isolated disaffection with the Taliban in Afghanistan. It’s been an historically very difficult country to govern, and we regale frequently those stories about Afghanistan having been the graveyard of empires. There’s some truth in that description. My hunch, and it can’t be any more than that, is that, certainly in the immediate future, the Taliban will be preoccupied with maintaining law and order and maintaining control within Afghanistan. That doesn’t mean to say that you won’t have some inspiration given by what has occurred in Afghanistan to groups in China that are sympathetic to it. But the Taliban will have its hands full. My hunch, again it’s only a hunch, is that in a few months’ time, we’ll be hearing stories and reading reports about resistance to the Taliban inside Afghanistan. I’m not sure all of that equipment will be totally sequestrated by the Taliban.

Question: Mr Howard, I’ve noticed, in the last couple of days online, interviews with more radical Islamist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and even nation states such as Iran, who are feeling quite emboldened that America now doesn’t have the metal to stand up and be the protector of, if you want to call it such, Western democracy. Do you feel that there might be increased insurgency now that they see there is an opportunity?

I’m a long standing critic of the nuclear deal with Iran. I thought that was a huge mistake and I’m part of a group of former prime ministers and foreign ministers from around the world that periodically sign letters criticising it.

John Howard: Well, I think that is a real possibility. As you may know, I’m a long standing critic of the nuclear deal with Iran. I thought that was a huge mistake and I’m part of a group of former prime ministers and foreign ministers from around the world that periodically sign letters criticising it. I remain very strongly of that view. What was done to embolden and refinance Hezbollah, as a result of that deal was absolutely terrible. It was a real slap in the face for the only genuinely democratic country in the whole Middle Eastern area, namely Israel. Now, there will be a certain amount of emboldenment, but those that might have that in mind should understand the capacity of retaliation in certain parts of the world against that behaviour. It’s too early to do other than acknowledge the real possibility of what you say occurring. I do hope that as a result of this, the Biden administration doesn’t think that it should accelerate the re-embracing of Iran. It’s hard to imagine, given the stance that they’ve taken, that they would change that attitude. But I would hope that in the bowels of the State Department there is a re-examination of their policy towards Iran.

We know what the attitude of Iran is, and Iran has just elected somebody who, let me put it this way, is not going to be warmer in his embrace of international relations.

It is important that part of the American response be a full assessment of the reactions in the Arab world. We know what the attitude of Iran is, and Iran has just elected somebody who, let me put it this way, is not going to be warmer in his embrace of international relations. That’s the least that could be said about him. And that’s depressing. The Americans should also understand that, however much they may not want to acknowledge it, Trump did make some real progress in breaking down some of the barriers between Israel and some of the Arab states. There were some real weaknesses in Trump’s foreign policy, but that was his best area. He did very well on that front.

Question: Mr Howard, how do you see ANZUS operating in this era, with the new quad alignment in place? Does one support the other, do you think, or change its area of operation? What do you think the role of China will be in this new world alignment?

John Howard: China will continue what it’s been doing for the last several years. The elephant in the room is obviously what happens to Taiwan, and we can’t avoid that. My own view is that China will not launch an orthodox assault on Taiwan, because it would fear, legitimately, that that would present a clear choice for the Americans; either abandon Taiwan or defend it. If the US decided to defend Taiwan, China would come off second best. China will do aggressive things short of that and, right now, is in the process of working that out. That will continue. Our relationship with China is undoubtedly still the biggest foreign policy challenge that our country has. We’ve got to keep in mind that China is still our best customer, which is hugely important. China will continue to buy our fossil fuels, because it needs them to maintain its march towards higher living standards for the middle class. And we’ve got to understand that we do owe that trade relationship a lot economically.

Our relationship with China is undoubtedly still the biggest foreign policy challenge that our country has. We’ve got to keep in mind that China is still our best customer, which is hugely important.

That doesn’t mean to say we cave in on values. I don’t think the Australian government has. By and large, the handling of the relationship with China by both sides of politics in Australia over the last 10-15 years has been fine. The big change has come from China. Until Xi Jinping, China maintained the communist authoritarian dictatorship while being relatively cooperative with the rest of the world. That has changed under Xi Jinping, and there’s a world of difference between the China led by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and the China led by Ji Xinping. China will continue to buy favour in our part of the world; it will continue to buy favour in Africa and continue to scout around for alternative sources of fossil fuel. We’re very fortunate that we’ve got high grade coal. And I can’t for the life of me understand why people are in such a hurry to destroy an industry that is incredibly valuable to us. But that’s for them to defend and explain.

Question: I was embarrassed in the last week or so by the behaviour of the Biden administration in that, no matter what, they were going to get this evacuation done. Many people who’ve spoken to me have said that this has weakened America and, with it, Australia’s support for democracy. Are you concerned about the psychology and attitudinal impact that the rush towards this has seemed like the goal was more important than the people involved?

I’m always reluctant to make too many negative, personal remarks about the deportment of the American President, but it has not been a great period of time.

John Howard: Well, I can understand that feeling. I’m always reluctant to make too many negative, personal remarks about the deportment of the American President, but it has not been a great period of time. But I don’t think we should see it as an indication that the United States won’t, on other issues, have plenty of backbone. The truth is that both sides of politics in America had decided to get out of Afghanistan. That can’t be denied. Trump had more of a megaphone for withdrawal than Biden did. It was the manner of the withdrawal, “the order of their going”, to use the old expression, was what people can criticise. You can have reservations about whether they should have decided to go in the first place. But the truth is that from the time the Obama administration came to power, and perhaps part way through that, it was pretty clear that America was not going to be in Afghanistan indefinitely. And there’s an argument for that, although people say that they’ve been indefinitely in Korea, there’s still tens of thousands of American troops in Korea. Anyway, with regard to Afghanistan, the truth is that both sides of politics decided that they had to get out. But the way in which it was executed has not looked good, to say the least. Does that mean that America will be an unreliable ally? No, I don’t think it does. It means that American prestige has been, at least, temporarily damaged, and that’s always a bad thing, because respect for potential power and retaliatory response is often a sobering reminder to people who want to misbehave, and that is the best way I can put it.

Question: On another contemporary issue, how much danger do you think is posed to our culture and politics today by the progressive left in the United States, Australia and other democracies?

John Howard: Well, forgive me for being a little partisan, but I always think the progressive left is a danger in Australia and elsewhere. It’s always been there. There is one thing that has changed in the United States, and this struck me during the last presidential campaign. With all the Democrat presidents that I can recall in my life, starting with Harry Truman through to Kennedy and Johnson, Carter and Clinton, and so on, I can’t remember words like socialist ever being used by any of them. It was not a term that we used. And I had the impression for a long time that one of the defining differences between Australian and American politics, particularly on domestic politics, was that in some way – forgive me using these left/right expressions – politics in America was slightly more to the right on both sides than it was in Australia. That was based on the belief that there was a deep free enterprise streak in the Democratic Party which on various occasions, not always, had been absent from the Labor Party in Australia.

With all the Democrat presidents that I can recall in my life, starting with Harry Truman through to Kennedy and Johnson, Carter and Clinton, and so on, I can’t remember words like socialist ever being used by any of them.

That has changed, and the ascendancy – or the near ascendancy, certainly the increased influence – of people like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders has transformed the Democratic Party, and it’s hard to know how many compromises had been made by the President and those immediately around him to the left wing point of view. Certainly, some of the spending proposals there have been damaging in the long run. That is an issue and, of course, it was an issue for a period with the British Labour Party. Jeremy Corbin, in the end, was destroyed. Whether his replacement is more of a Blair or a Gaitskell than he is an Aneurin Bevan or somebody on the left wing of the British Labour Party remains to be seen.

Question: Mr Howard, considering that American troops were stationed in Europe and Japan and South Korea much longer than they were in Afghanistan, and there were no major American casualties over the last two years, was moving out of Afghanistan really necessary or wise?

John Howard: Well, in the end, I have to say it was one of those things that was ultimately America’s call. I would make this observation; there was a difference between the reason America went into Afghanistan and why it went into Korea and obviously Germany. Both of those latter cases were what you might loosely call the result of conventional military assaults. North Korea invaded South Korea, and the United Nations authorised people to fight that. In fact, the Australians who fought in Korea, fought under the United Nations flag. Now, some people would argue that, no matter how long America stayed in Afghanistan, you’d have continued to have skirmishes with the Taliban, whereas we haven’t had any skirmishes in Germany, we haven’t had any skirmishes in South Korea. We’ve had a few eye staring and fist pumping moments in Korea, and we have that extraordinary spectacle on the Demilitarised Zone. But, it’s different. Having said all of that, I go back to my observation that if there had been more thought given to the manner in which the United States extracted herself, we’d be in a better place.

Having said all of that, I go back to my observation that if there had been more thought given to the manner in which the United States extracted herself, we’d be in a better place.

Question: You mentioned the British Labour Party. For a time you were, certainly in a policy sense, very close to Tony Blair, who was obviously quite courageous to join the Coalition of the Willing in view of the fact that he was the leader of the Labour Party in Britain. How did you find Blair? Because in a sense you had a certain commonness to him because the Americans were the leading forces, the British and the Australians were less large in terms of the commitment. So, how did you two talk together and how did you talk together with respect to the Bush administration?

John Howard: I certainly had a lot in common with Blair on foreign policy and international relations, although we had a very different view – not that it was really any of my business – about Britain’s membership to the European Union. He was a fervent Europeanist, or remainer, and I cheered Brexit through the rafters. I thought it was a great decision. Blair was very courageous and it has to be said that the British contribution in Iraq was very big. In the end, the Brits contributed about 45,000 troops to the Iraqi operation. That has to be kept in mind. Blair fought against a Labour Party that was fundamentally divided; a third of them agreed with him, a third of them were implacably hostile and a third were wobbling between the two. If it hadn’t been for the support of the British Conservative Party, which was then led by, firstly, Iain Duncan Smith and then Michael Howard, the House of Commons would have voted against the deployment of British troops in Iraq, and Blair would have had to resign. So, it was a very courageous thing that he did.

Blair had a very strong view that international terrorism represented a threat to a way of life that we all held in common. He also feared that if America were not given help, in the end, the US would retreat to isolation, and they would just go home and say, “Why should our boys and girls die in other people’s wars?” That sort of language surfaced in what Joe Biden said a couple of weeks ago when he was talking about that terrible attack last week – that there hadn’t been any battle deaths suffered by the Americans in Afghanistan for about 18 months. The truth is that Blair did display great courage and he is not remembered well in many sections of the British Labour Party because of that.

Question: How dangerous do you think the radical right is, both in Australia and in America, and the world generally, particularly in light of the Capitol riots?

John Howard: I’m always suspicious of fanatics. One of the great virtues that our country has is that we’re generally pretty sceptical of people who bang on too much. I worry about fanaticism, and fanaticism always tries to exploit opposition to a left-wing cause. I remember back in the times of debate over our involvement in Vietnam, there were fringes on the centre right side of politics that included some people who were extremists. You have to worry about extremists. To their credit, the security people in Australia are conscious that it’s not an even threat from both sides, if I can put it that way. But it would be unwise to imagine that they can’t be a threat. The Capitol Hill riots were appalling, I don’t think Trump helped, and I think his general demeanour after the election was very poor. The truth is that – if I can use a cricketing analogy – he’d been given out by the umpire, it had gone to the review system, the umpire’s decision had been confirmed and he should have just left the field without arguing.

Question: Mr Howard, in the wake of the Afghanistan pull out, there was much commentary written that this was also the end of the US as the great global umpire, protector, referee, whatever. To what extent do you see America’s power declining as a global force and, if so, what are the new conglomerations that we need to be aware of in terms of our own protection and defence?

The US has two enormous advantages over China. One of its great advantages is population; China will grow old before it grows rich.

John Howard: Well, I am still very much a believer that America will remain the dominant power in the world for the foreseeable future. The US has two enormous advantages over China. One of its great advantages is population; China will grow old before it grows rich. That hackneyed phrase about demography being destiny is certainly true. Look at the statistics and the appalling mess that China has made of population policy. They had a one-child policy and then they had a two-child policy. The two-child policy barely lasted a few years and now they’ve got, in certain circumstances, a three-child policy. That indicates to me an incredibly disorganised amount of thinking by the upper echelons of the Chinese state. The other great problem that China has is eventually, when more and more people are born into relative affluence, those people are going to want to run their own lives.

The other great problem that China has is eventually, when more and more people are born into relative affluence, those people are going to want to run their own lives.

If you’ve transitioned from poverty to affluence, you might give some credit to those who were running the place for that transition, but if you’ve been born into it, you’d take it for granted. That’s a challenge for China and it’s something we’ve got to keep in mind. I wouldn’t be as pessimistic as some people are about the ultimate strength of the United States. It has other challenges and weaknesses, all of those things, all countries have, but it’s got a remarkable capacity to regenerate, has remarkable technological pre-eminence and the entrepreneurial spur in that country is still without peer.

Gerard Henderson: A couple of weeks back, you seemed to get quite irritated with Leigh Sales’ question about our contribution; “Was it worth it?”, “Did you regret it?”. So, leaving aside the irritation, how would you sum that up with reference to the 41 dead brave soldiers of the Australian Defence Force.

John Howard: Well, certainly, I have always acknowledged that loss and, in different ways, I’ve done my best as former Prime Minister to keep saying that and to keep in touch. But it was undoubtedly the right thing to do, and it was done with great professional skill. One of the things that we should understand is that the desire of the American military to have our people involved was overwhelming. They didn’t get into the business of saying whom they wanted and whom they didn’t want. But there was no doubt in my mind that for America, if there were to be contributions from elsewhere, we were right at the top. That should be born in mind.

I can’t criticise, in any way, the efficacy of the military contribution; it was right, and what it demonstrated, politically, was obviously a determination to be part of an anti-terrorist activity. It was also a fealty to an alliance which was very important to Australia’s strength and stability in future. I don’t say that as someone who is uncritical of the United States, and I’m certainly not. There are features of American society that we should make sure we don’t emulate.

We have seen, over the past few years and, indeed, over the past few weeks, some of the weaknesses of the presidential system of government as distinct from the parliamentary system. Not that America is going to change its system, or we’re going to change ours. On occasions like this we should reflect that we don’t have a bad system of government in this country and that it operates very effectively. There can be strains placed on American decision making as a product of it being presidential, as distinct from a parliamentary system of government.

Gerard Henderson: Well, time’s up. John Howard – thank you very much for your valuable and insightful reflections.