CHINA, RUSSIA, UKRAINE – MORRISON’S MISSION

When he became Prime Minister in 2018, Scott Morrison was a foreign policy amateur confronted by unprecedented challenges: an assertive Beijing and a looming rivalry between the two biggest economies in world history, the United States and China. In Paul Kelly’s newly released Morrison’s Mission: How a Beginner Reshaped Australian Foreign Policy, Editor-at-large at The Australian Paul Kelly argues that Morrison has since emerged as a unique and global player with the signing of the AUKUS deal. To discuss how this happened and its consequences for Australian foreign policy, Paul Kelly addressed The Sydney Institute on Tuesday 22 March 2022.

CHINA, RUSSIA, UKRAINE – MORRISON’S MISSION

PAUL KELLY

It’s a great pleasure for me to be back at The Sydney Institute again. I always enjoy being here and I want to acknowledge Gerard and Anne Henderson for the sterling job they do at The Sydney Institute, and the wide diversity they have in speakers. Today I’m talking on China, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, in the context of Scott Morrison’s foreign policy. This, as Gerard says, follows the recent publication of my book; Morrison’s Mission: How a Beginner Reshaped Australian Foreign Policy. I thank the Lowy Institute for inviting me to write this book, and also Penguin as one of the publishers.

There are three major themes in this book. First, that Scott Morrison has been Prime Minister at a time of extraordinary global turbulence and disruption, where the strategic order has been fundamentally redefined. Essentially, he in turn has had to make a series of changes and responses in Australian foreign policy. While Morrison was a diplomatic novice when he came into the job as Prime Minister, he was seasoned in as much as he’d been a long serving member of the Cabinet National Security Committee. Neither Tony Abbott nor Malcolm Turnbull have had that advantage when they became prime minister. One of the consequences is that Morrison has taken a series of decisions, as Prime Minister, which will have long run consequences for Australian foreign and strategic policy. So, what he’s done matters.

The second point is that Morrison, as far as I can see, has responded as a conviction politician, and as a believer. Not in foreign policy and security terms as a marketing man. I know this will come as a shock to many people, because Morrison has been branded, fairly successfully, by many of his critics as being a marketing man, as a politician. But I argue in the book that the framework for his foreign policy comes very much from a set of beliefs and convictions. They reflect his conservative values. They reflect his security consciousness, his quest for domestic political advantage, and a deep-seated sense of Australia’s national interest. Morrison is not a natural diplomat; you may have noticed. In his approach to foreign policy, and the rhetoric of foreign policy, he does often rub people up the wrong way. One of the interesting tangential questions about Morrison’s time as foreign policy Prime Minister is, how important is diplomacy anyway? Is it underrated, or is it overrated?

Certainly, assessing Morrison, one has to look not just at the diplomatic side, but the substantial side; what he’s actually done in foreign policy and security policy. He does have a view of the world, and a view of global power. This is that foreign policy is a contest dominated by state power and the quest for national sovereignty. In this particular approach, Morrison does draw a nexus between national interest and national sovereignty. In particular, he says that if we’re to be the country we want to be, in terms of our values, in terms of being a tolerant multiethnic liberal democracy, then we have to ensure that we conduct a foreign policy in the national interest that enables us to realise those objectives. Morrison, in his approach to foreign policy, has relied on traditional norms and faiths. Some of his moves have been bold but, to a large extent, they’ve followed an established strategic outlook.

Morrison’s China policy did constitute a sharp departure from that of John Howard; moving the Liberal Party away from Howard’s formula of not having to choose between the United States and China. Yet this was widely interpreted within Coalition politics, and much of the media, as being a reaction driven by different and more dangerous China. Morrison was seen, not as staging a revolt against an orthodoxy but, to a certain extent, as an exponent of a new orthodoxy given a new and different China.

Morrison does bring his own style to the conduct of foreign policy. His instinct is for ambition and activism. He listens to experts but is not necessarily swayed by them. Like most prime ministers, he backs his own views and judgements. He rarely defers to others, and he puts the stamp of his style, beliefs and judgements all over Australian foreign policy. Anyone who thought that Morrison’s initial lack of experience in this area might produce a reticent prime minister in the diplomatic domain, was soon disabused.

He’s an enthusiast. He likes the conduct of foreign policy. He thrives, in terms of dialogue with other heads of government. He constantly oversells his own initiatives. He’s a quick learner and, as a politician, has a good instinct for power. I think that his secret and sustained effort to secure the nuclear-powered submarine decision, in conjunction with both the United States and the United Kingdom, is a singular example of executive decision making that only prime ministers can pull off. In these remarks, I’m going to focus, in particular, on Morrison’s dealings with and attitude to China, his attitude to the United States, and then I’ll talk about his view of Ukraine. But the point to make about Morrison’s attitude towards Ukraine is that it follows on, to a certain extent, in a seamless way from the foreign policy that he’d already put in place.

In a sense, what he’s argued is that he wasn’t surprised by what happened with Ukraine, that he’s been warning for the past three years that we live in a far more dangerous world, where the traditional norms have been broken down and where there’s an increasing risk of autocratic states using military power and other means of national assertion to further their interests. In relation to China, Scott Morrison inherited the Malcolm Turnbull framework, and it’s certainly true to say that under Malcolm Turnbull as prime minister, policy towards China fundamentally changed. We saw the Turnbull government embrace a fundamental change in foreign investment policy – and that, of course, when Morrison was treasurer.

We saw the Turnbull government embrace tough new foreign interference laws, based on national security advice, which produced a very sullen and sharp backlash from China. And we saw the Turnbull government, right at the very end, banning the Huawei technology company from operation in our 5G network. That was clearly the most significant national security decision taken by the Turnbull company, and it’s had enormous ramifications. Essentially, what happened there was, that in many ways Australia was the first Western country to take that decision, and that’s had a significant flow on effect when it comes to other industrialised nations. China’s hostility to Australia in relation to the Huawei decision is not just about what we decided – it’s China’s concern about the impact that our decision had on other countries.

What’s happened under the Morrison prime ministership is that the relationship between Australia and China deteriorated even further. By the second half of 2020, Morrison saw this deterioration in the bilateral relationship as involving a much bigger question; would Australia have resilience to succumbing to the status of becoming a Chinese client state. Morrison never put it quite like that, but that’s how he saw it. Once Morrison accepted that framing as the challenge, every aspect of China policy assumed a new meaning. For the Prime Minister, this was about foreign policy. But it was also about an existential challenge. The ultimate issue was Australia’s autonomy as a Liberal democracy. Within the Morrison government, senior advisors saw the issue of having international significance around this test; was Australia, as a nation, able to confront China’s bullying successfully and therefore set an example which could have international significance? Or would Australia become a test case in how not to manage ties with Beijing?

The way we managed the China relationship was always going to have international significance once China’s economic coercion with Australia was joined. A senior official said to me, “Australia is on the leading edge of a global struggle over how the rise of China will play out.” It was not so much about China being a direct military threat – and ministers rarely made any suggestion to that effect – it was rather about China’s pension for using coercive power against Australia to extract changes in our foreign and domestic policy. That is, it was about our sovereignty. It’s interesting that after Malcolm Turnbull left office, he spoke more openly about how he saw the challenge that Australia faced from China. In May 2021, drawing upon famous Cold War analogy, Turnbull said, “We do not want to be to China, what Finland was to the Soviet Union”. That’s the bottom line. The reference to Finlandisation, the term used to describe Finland’s accommodation of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, did offer an insight into the private sense of government thinking.

The conclusion that Morrison reached, as he conveyed to another senior minister, was that “China will push as far as the rest of the world allows it”, and “If Australia does not stand its ground here, we will be forced to stand on more difficult and weaker ground later on”. While some commentators lamented Australia’s inept diplomacy with China, and its inability to improve relations with Beijing, Morrison’s real priority lay elsewhere. It was about building across the board resilience against China’s intimidation. Andrew Shearer, appointed Director General of the Office of National Intelligence, in December 2020, after being Cabinet Secretary, had Morrison’s confidence and argued for a dual approach to China, based on resilience, protecting domestic institution and promoting an international alignment to balance Beijing in the region.

Although Morrison has never said this, and it would be unwise for him to say it, I do argue in the book that the ultimate goal of his foreign policy, in power terms, was to deny China regional strategic primacy, since that would constitute a serious blow to Australia’s interests and autonomy. This is an unprecedented policy ambition, unique in Australia’s history, and not necessarily achievable. Morrison’s strategy is multi-dimensional. It aims to deepen the alliance with the United States, and military partnerships with allies in the region, boost Australia’s defence budget and capability to project power into the region and promote new ties with Indo Pacific countries to build a deeper sense of common purpose.

I want to quote two competing views of Morrison’s policy. One of his most intelligent critics has been former ambassador to Beijing, Geoff Raby. Former ambassador Raby has warned that Australia is making a fateful blunder. He says that China neither threatens Australia in a military sense, nor does it threaten our values. He says China is plagued by anxieties and vulnerabilities that all but rule out the projection of power by military means beyond its near abroad, and that China is unlikely to become a regional hegemon. For Raby, Australia is misinterpreting the China threat and making a related mistake; it’s acting on the assumption of China as a serious strategic competitor. We should take that assessment, and critique, seriously.

But I would quote another former ambassador, and current Liberal MP, Dave Sharma, who has argued that Morrison’s China policy is actually world leading. And that because Australia was subject to strong economic coercion from China, Morrison’s response has been at the forefront in terms of global policy towards China. Dave Sharma said to me, “I think Morrison has been at the leading edge of the global debate about China. He has been one of the first leaders to recognise and articulate the view that China’s external policy is fundamentally veered to assertion and changing the global norms”.

So, what does Morrison’s policy towards China reveal about him as Prime Minister? I think Morrison has always tried to keep the door open to China, while engaging in a substantial resilient strategy, to ensure that Australia can withstand Beijing’s pressure. He sees China’s tactics as an exercise in intimidation, not just to break Australia, but there’s a personal element. Morrison saw China’s tactics as an effort to break him as Prime Minister, to break his resolve. And so, I do believe that there was a strong personal dimension in the way that he responded to China.

Morrison has been meticulous about standing by every national security committee and cabinet decision about China, under this phase of Coalition government, and convinced that to show any sign of weakness would be a mistake. Morrison feels that if China succeeds in dictating to Australia, then it will simply pocket such success, move on and repeat the tactic with other countries. He feels the challenge Australia faces today will be the challenge other nations face tomorrow. Critical to Morrison’s resistance has been very substantial domestic political support. The Australian public has essentially supported his line against China – this has been particularly important. I might say in passing that it’s rare that an Australian prime minister takes a significant foreign policy stance at the cost of public opinion. Sometimes it happens but it doesn’t happen too often.

The Labor Party – and I think this is significant – obviously has its own nuanced approach to China, but it’s important that Labor has endorsed every major Morrison policy decision on China, while criticising Morrison’s diplomacy and his motives. Morrison has been greatly assisted by the sheer ineptitude of China’s policy, its wolf warrior diplomacy, and simply how counterproductive this has been, both in terms of Australian domestic opinion and international opinion. I quote Peter Vargas, a former head of DFAT. He said to me, “I think China is probably surprised that we didn’t give in, given the sheer extent of the retaliation. Australia has taken the hit, but China’s tactics have turned public opinion against Beijing. This gave Scott Morrison political cover when the government, otherwise, would have had to carry more of the blame.”

The former head of DFAT, Francis Adamson, said to me, “China may reach the point where it believes it can largely set the terms of its future engagement with the world.” Given this situation, Morrison has put a high premium on willpower. He sees his response in the same way, telling me, “If I was to be jittery, that would be exploited with the result that the Australian nation would begin to lose confidence.”

So, in summary on China, I think the key points are China attempted to break Australia, the Australian government stood up and, in a broader sense, the Australian nation stood up. The way we conducted ourselves, I think, became an example to the world. Did we get everything right? Of course not. But I think we should look at the fundamentals. And the fundamentals look pretty good.”

Let me move to the United States. More than any recent Prime Minister, Morrison faced an exacting test of US alliance management. Having to deal with two contrasting presidencies: the erratic unilateralism of Donald Trump, and the progressive multilateralism of Joe Biden. The democracy that put Trump, and then Biden, into the White House reflected a nation traumatised by domestic divisions, that cast out on the reliability of America’s role in the world. Morrison, and Malcolm Turnbull before him, faced a more troubled America than any Australian leader since the inauguration of the ANZUS treaty in 1951. The paradox facing Morrison was obvious. While Beijing’s assertiveness created the need for Australia to align more closely with the United States, the reliability of the United States as a senior partner was coming under its most intense questioning in decades.

Now, the way Morrison operated was to attempt to establish an effective personal relationship with Trump, but he worked the administration. Joe Hockey played an invaluable role in Washington. So, Morrison developed effective relations with Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. They worked around Trump, with senior officials in the Trump administration. This is an overlooked feature that’s very important in the relationship. What helped Morrison enormously with Trump, was Morrison’s 2019 election victory, because Trump interpreted Morrison’s victory as a replication of Trump’s own success in America. In a sense, he saw Morrison as a fellow traveller. Trump was excited about Morrison’s victory. And, of course, we all know what it’s like with other heads of government. Heads of government respect other heads of government who, like them, just won an election.

That 2019 election helped Morrison with other heads of government, not just Trump. But the point I want to make is, contrary to what the Australian media repeatedly argue, the Trump-Morrison period actually saw policy differences between Australia and America that were some of the most significant in the past several decades. Disagreement over the liberal trade system, disagreement over the WTO, disagreement over Trump’s protectionism, disagreement over Trump’s disruptive trade war with China, disagreement over the transpacific partnership trade deal, disagreement over the Paris agreement on climate, disagreement over the Iran nuclear deal, the Human Rights Council, the World Health Organisation, and disagreement over the ideological framing of the contest with China.

The key was the absence of a security dispute in terms of a bilateral Australian-American relationship, and that was particularly important. So, I give Morrison very substantial marks as I give Turnbull very substantial marks for successfully conducting a relationship. It’s easy in retrospect to say, “That wasn’t too hard”. Just look at what happened with other American allies, and the difficulty that the Japanese government had, and many European governments had in managing relations with Trump. Now, the essential critique made of Morrison in terms of the American relationship has been that he should have qualified it more. That because the United States is plagued by domestic political traumas, it would have been intelligent for Morrison to put a bit of distance between himself and the United States. I reject this criticism. I think that this is a misreading of the situation. I think that Morrison was correct, not only not to downgrade or hedge the United States alliance, but to seek to deepen the alliance.

I ask the critics – what on earth was Australia supposed to get in return if we put distance between ourselves and the United States? The idea that China would have come along and offered Australia something for distancing itself from the United States is utterly fanciful. What, I ask, was Australia supposed to get in return? I quote the former head of DFAT and the former head of defence, Dennis Richardson, summing up Morrison’s foreign policy towards the United States and China. Richardson said, “Whatever the shortcomings of America, we are always going to be closer to the United States than to China. This is not just about values, but about national interest. China has shown a propensity to interfere in our domestic affairs. It’s retaliatory measure against our trade tells you how China views relations with countries like Australia if you step out of line. In global terms, would Australia be more comfortable with alliances led by the United States and like minded countries, or a global framework dominated by China? On all accounts, the answer is obvious.”

I’ll make a brief comment about AUKUS, and then talk about Russia and the Ukraine. The interesting feature about the AUKUS nuclear powered submarine agreement – and this is a significant global agreement involving Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom – is that this was Morrison’s initiative. The idea came from Morrison. First of all, working with the Defence Department to see if it was possible to develop a nuclear-powered submarine in Australia without having a civil nuclear industry. And then, when he got the green light on that, taking the idea, first to Boris Johnson, getting Boris Johnson on board, and then having Morrison and Boris Johnson together, take the idea to President Biden.

I know there are a lot of problems with this arrangement; I won’t go into them now. Of course, there are problems. All I’d say is, if you think that Australia needs a long run approach to its defence and strategic policy during the course of the twenty-first century, and that nuclear powered submarines are a significant defence procurement asset for Australia, then you accept the reality that these submarines are not going to be available until 2040. That is the reality here; there’s no shortcut. You’re not going to get these submarines after 5, 10 or 15 years. If you want them, you have to wait until 2040. There’s no point in commentators complaining about this and criticising it. If you don’t like it, then you should oppose the deal and say Australia should stick with conventional submarines. But if you want it and support the deal, you’ve got to accept that this is going to be a long-term deal.

Several weeks ago, President Putin invaded Ukraine. I spoke to the Prime Minister not long after this and he argued to me that a) he wasn’t surprised about this, and b) this fitted in with the global message that he’d been conveying for the past three years. That is, that we have seen strategic disruption and strategic upheaval in which the autocratic nations were far more prepared to exercise military muscle. Morrison said to me that the Ukraine war would redefine the global political landscape more clearly into two camps; aggressive autocracies and most of the rest of the world and he hoped the Russian invasion would rip away the veil that he felt had concealed the true nature of Russian and Chinese authoritarianism.

Morrison sees a ray of optimism in all this, because essentially what he believes is that Russia’s illegal and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine is a very big wake up call to the liberal democracies. To the United States, to the European Union, and to liberal democracies in other countries in the Indo Pacific. Morrison believes that the two great autocracies, Russia and China, have an instinct to work together, but he does recognise that Russia and China have very different positions. He’s taken a hard line against Russia; supporting sanctions, arguing that we need a very aggressive course of sanctions. This leaves the impression that he would like sanctions almost of a North Korean variety, which is probably not realistic but nonetheless an example of the hard line that Morrison’s taken towards Russia in terms of this invasion. In terms of China, Morrison’s been very careful. He’s deliberately put a lot of pressure on China, given the meeting between the President of Russia and the President of China in early February, when they talked about a new partnership between their countries that had no limits.

Morrison has put pressure on China, demanding that it formally oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and put pressure on China to try and ensure that it does not try to assist Russia to get round the sanctions regime. When I asked the Prime Minister what he expected from China, Morrison said to me, “Join all the sanctions that we are opposing, it’s simple. They should be responding in the same way as so many other countries. No country is going to have a bigger impact on Russia’s aggression than China. But instead, they are meeting with them and they are throwing them an economic lifeline. They’re creating a moral equivalence between the claims of Russia and the claims of Ukraine.”

So, to sum up on this issue, Morrison sees the invasion of Ukraine as being of global significance. He believes that there could be beneficial outcomes in terms of a stronger sense of resolve within the United States, within Europe, and between the Atlantic partnership. He likes to think that this stronger sense of resolve will also carry over into the Indo Pacific, in relation to China. He’s been very careful in relation to Taiwan. He’s been careful to say that there is no parallel between Ukraine and Taiwan; he sees these as very different situations, and I think that’s completely true, and completely sound. He’s been particularly keen to argue that henceforth, we’re going to see a situation in which economic policy and global economy policy is much more closely related to security policy and international security policy. That is, Morrison sees a new era in which economic and security issues are going to be bonded together in a far more difficult and dangerous world.