Italian Politics After The 2013 Election

Giulia Massotti is a project manager with the Institute of European Democrats, a research institute established in 2007 and based in Brussels. On Monday 22 April 2013, at The Sydney Institute, she joined Luca Bader, CEO of the Institute of European Democrats in Brussels and an Honorary Research Fellow at La Trobe University’s Centre for Dialogue in a discussion on the 2013 elections in Italy and the aftermath.

 ITALIAN POLITICS AFTER THE 2013 ELECTION

 GUILIA MASSOTTI

In this contribution, I will try to address some of the European implications of the Italian elections.

First and foremost, I would like to thank Gerard and Anne Henderson for the great opportunity to tackle this topic from its European side with a non-European audience. Indeed, it is quite a challenging task, since European politics and issues are not generally considered as the most appealing topic to talk about even with a European public.

An unexpected expectation gap:

An immediate insight to be drawn when listening to the description of the Italian political evolution, from the context prior to the elections to the stalemate caused by their outcome, is that the expectations commonly shared on the electoral results were largely out of line with reality. One of the variables of this parabolic evolution not properly considered by politicians and commentators, inside and outside the country, was the voters’ perception of Europe and the way the European issues were tackled by the competing electoral campaigns.

The European variable:

For the first time in Italy, Europe was a high-priority topic on the agenda of national campaigns for the 2013 elections. By choosing the position on Europe, kept by the main political competitors in their electoral campaigns, as a variable through which to observe their electoral performances, it is evident that this element stands out as highly decisive.

Those parties that were building their electoral campaign on a pro-European message were penalised in terms of electoral votes. In particular, the political forces that had supported the Monti Government and its austerity policies praised by commentators from Brussels, Frankfort (and Berlin), campaigned for the conservation of a national position aligned to the European one, although on different lines and for different reasons. On the one hand, logically, the new party founded by Monti and his centrist coalition was strongly committed to pro-European positions. And, on the other, PD and PDL, the two main competitors that had supported his technocratic government, could not campaign against policies backed till that moment – at least for the sake of coherence – although Berlusconi made great use of sensationalistic promises contradicting them. Alone stood Grillo, campaigning against austerity and resorting to Eurosceptic and populist arguments. Eventually, his strategy “against” – against European policies but also indistinctively against the Italian establishment – proved worthwhile.

In the end, as in an indirect relationship, those parties defending EU-aligned positions lost public consent and the more they were pro-European, the smaller was the result they scored; whereas the 5 Stars Movement scored a stunning result.

A historic, missed opportunity:

If this interpretation is correct, then Italy just missed an historic opportunity.

Since 1951 and the Treaty of Paris establishing the first European Community, Italy has always been pro-European and has always claimed its role of founding member of the European integration process. However, along with the process itself, this Italian vocation has always remained circumscribed to national political and economic élites.

In the light of the above, notwithstanding the European topic is back on the electoral agenda, the core political forces missed the opportunity to broaden the limits of its attractiveness and to reduce its gap vis-à-vis the citizens. What is more, by missing the opportunity to reach out the citizens and deliver their pro-European message, Italian political forces, holding strategic and influential positions vis-à-vis the European partners and institutions, failed to justify their previous political choices. Such accountability could have boosted a renewed democratic process that, on the one hand, would have loosened up public opinion and ensured a more democratic decision-making; and, on the other, would have given to the Italian governors the legitimacy to influence significantly the choices made at the European level. 

A more incisive European role for Italy would have been possible, and even seemed possible for almost a year. That would have meant an opportunity to turn the European alleged intervention in Italian politics into a positive.

Undeniably, in August 2011, the Italian political pathway was massively affected by European influence, when the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Jean-Claude Trichet and the Governor of the Bank of Italy Mario Draghi addressed a joint letter to the Berlusconi Government calling for a series of economic measures needed for the stability of the country and the whole Eurozone. Three months later, in November 2011, Berlusconi resigned as Prime Minister and, within two weeks, Mario Draghi was appointed as President of the ECB. Mario Monti was nominated by President Giorgio Napolitano as Senator for life and was then sworn in as the President of a technocratic government. Undeniably, the European and international influence had been significant. Securing two Italians with significant reputations in Europe (such as Monti, who had been twice European commissioner from 1995 to 2004) in strategic positions could have turned out to be a trigger for the Italian relaunch.

A democratic deficit:

However, not surprisingly, public opinion and media blamed such international influence for being an interference in national politics. They refused to accept the austerity measures implemented by the new government, as they were had been decided elsewhere and imposed without any sound democratic legitimacy.

This discontent was not properly considered and tackled by traditional parties, neither during the Monti Government nor during the electoral campaign. On the contrary, it was well understood by Grillo, who met detachments of citizens and, thanks to a populist and Eurosceptic campaign, turned it into electoral advantage.

The inadequate attitude of traditional parties left room for the development and rise of anti-system, populist and Eurosceptic parties and movements all over Europe, manifested in the newly established German “Alternative für Deutschland” or the new French “Front National” which has sought an alliance with the Italian “Movimento 5 Stelle” to build a common strategy against European austerity. These are just two examples.

In conclusion, the Italian elections held in 2013 were affected by the inability of the main traditional parties to reach out their voters and to meet their needs. As a result, an anti-system movement was able to gain power. After a year and a half of technocratic government in power, the political national forces were not able to make the most from the democratic competition and process.

The current stalemate and the electoral results have prevented Italy from playing a leading role within the European Union. In the current scenario, where the two traditional European member states, France and Germany, cannot exercise their leadership because of their weakness and pre-electoral constraints, Italy could have stood out as a new driving player for a new European course. But, Italy has missed this historic opportunity.